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ABSTRACT
The Portuguese Communist Party's Strategy For Power:
1921-1986
(May 1987)
Carlos A. Cunha, B.A., University of Massachusetts
M.A., University of Connecticut
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
Since its foundation in 1921 the Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP) has played a decisive role throughout
Portuguese history, especially after 1929. Despite
clandestinity it was the major opposition force during the
forty-eight year Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, emerged as
the most organized party after the 1974 military coup which
restored democracy, and continues to be a major
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary force.
The bulk of this study focuses on the party's
evolution from its foundation by individuals with strong
anarcho-syndicalist tendencies, through its Bolshevizat ion
during the 1 930' s when the party went clandestine, its
Stalinizat ion in the 1940' s, and its continued orthodoxy
throughout the dictatorship and the new democratic regime
v
which replaced it in 1974
. The focus is on those events,
personalities, strategies, and organizational structures
which, when poured into the mold provided by Moscow, left
the PCP with a unique character distinguishing it from its
fraternal communist parties in Europe and the rest of the
world
.
After the 1974 military coup the PCP continued its
orthodox strategy, which included a firm commitment to
Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
democratic centralism, and the conquest of power via
revolution or putsches. With the regime's radicalizat ion
after March 1975, the PCP determined that conditions were
quickly ripening for revolution and acted accordingly.
However, in November 25, 1975 the failure of a military
coup led by left-wing extremists abruptly ended the
"revolution," ushered in moderate politics, and
strengthened the liberal democratic parliamentary system.
Faced with the drastic change in the political situation,
the PCP chose to remain Stalinist, consolidate the
revolutionary gains, and continue a "dual strategy" of
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity in hopes
that revolution would return. It concluded that the
Eurocommunist path could never bring socialism to Portugal.
This study analyzes the
vi
PCP' s Marxist-Leninist
/Stalinist strategy for power, its impact on the political
system, and its future prospects. Because case studies
should contribute significantly to the broader fields of
comparative political parties and comparative politics, it
also includes chapters on general political party theory,
the Portuguese political system, and Eurocommunism.
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PREFACE
Although I have always been interested in the subject
as a result of my nationality, it was only after studying
Portuguese politics under Howard J. Wiarda (at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1977) that I
closely followed Portuguese political events. My interest
in the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) formally began with
Ronald Tiersky's (a Visiting Professor at the University of
Connecticut in Storrs) Eurocommunism course in the Spring
of 1979. In the process of writing a research paper for
the course I made two observations. First, the Portuguese
Communist Party had not been as systematically researched
as had other Western European communist parties. In some
cases a few articles were scattered in journals and
newspapers, in others there were several pages and
(occasionally a chapter) devoted to the PCP in books on
Portuguese Politics or European Communism. I concluded
that this scattered information did not do justice to a
communist party which was receiving between 15 and 20
percent of the vote. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE)
already had entire books written on its behalf despite a
much lower percentage at the polls.
Second, I felt that formal study of the PCP was needed
to explain why this party, even though it had a history
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similar to that of the PCE/ was radically different from
its neighbor. In other words, why had the PCE chosen to
pursue a Eur ocommuni s t path to power while the PCP
continued its orthodox, Marxist-Leninist approach? what
does the PCP's tactical choice hold for its future? Can a
rejection of the democratic road to power succeed in a
democratic Portugal? Do the circumstances in Portugal
differ radically from those in Spain to justify the PCP's
rejection of Eurocommunism? Or is the major reason for the
PCP's continued orthodoxy a result of the leadership's
experiences rather than Portuguese political conditions?
In answering these and other questions I begin with
general chapters which place the analysis of the PCP in
context. First a chapter which introduces political party
theory and the varying approaches to the study of the
political party. Next a chapter on Portuguese culture,
history, and economics followed by a chapter on Portuguese
parties
.
The fourth chapter focuses on the PCP's history from
its Anarchist and Anarcho-syndicalist roots to its
formation in 1921 and the fall of the dictatorship in 1974.
The PCP's history has been difficult to uncover and
continues to be researched. Nevertheless, much more is
known today of the PCP's history than has been printed in
English. For this reason I have devoted a lengthy chapter
xv
to the historical development of the PCP
.
The fifth chapter deals with the April 25, 1974 to
November 25, 1975 revolutionary period and the role the PCP
played in it, which has been the focus of most English
language studies. The sixth chapter analyzes the PCP's
tactics since the failure of the "Portuguese Revolution."
It analyzes why the PCP has chosen to continue its Marxist-
Leninist strategy. The seventh chapter is devoted to the
party's organization and leadership.
The eigth chapter and the conclusion analyze why the
PCP has not become a eurocommunist party. Although several
factors are noted, the most important one focuses on the
party's leadership. Thus, it is not an analysis of
eurocommunism in general.
In the years which it has taken to research and write
this dissertation I have incurred a number of debts. My
scholarly debts will be apparent from the footnotes and
selected bibliography. Special thanks go to my committee
members Howard J. Wiarda (chairperson)
, Gerard Braunthal,
Ronald Tiersky, and Eric Einhorn for reading the manuscript
and providing valuable advice. Thomas Bruneau and Alex
Macleod also provided advice both here and in Portugal. I
am also greatful to the Earhart Foundation & the Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis for funding a research
fellowship at the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, &
xvi
Peace in Stanford, California prior to my field research in
Portugal
.
Across the Atlantic I am greatful to several
Portuguese scholars and citizens of communist, ex-
communist, and other political persuasions for their
interviews and advice. Geographically and especially
intellectually Portugal is a very small country which
complicates the issue of acknowledging my sources.
Although I make references to scholarly articles in
footnote form, I have not done so for interviewees. Even
an indirect reference might divulge the source because
Portuguese intellectuals will be familiar with their
backgrounds. (In some cases I was explicitly warned that
complete denials would be issued should their comments be
divulged.) Therefore, I have chosen to list only Jose
Pacheco Pereira because of his invaluable advice and
excellent research on the PCP (especially the pre-1974
period)
. The Portuguese are already familiar with his
views and would not be surprized to see his name mentioned.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Rhonda, for
her patience, support, and editorial remarks. This work
reflects her time and effort almost as much as it does
mine. Thanks also to my parents who gave me the
opportunity to pursue a higher education rather than remain
in subsistence agriculture as a Portuguese "minifundista .
"
xvii
I remain, of course, solely responsible for any errors of
fact or interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 1974 a military coup ended the forty-
eight year old dictatorship in Portugal and replaced it
with a democratic regime. Despite right- and left-wing
military counter-coup attempts in 1975, a dozen years later
democracy continues. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)
was the only party to survive the authoritarian
dictatorship. it emerged from clandestinit y as the best
organized political party in the country. Since then it
has consistently played an important role in politics. For
this reason, to fully understand Portuguese politics, the
PCP's political strategy must be analyzed.
This study focuses on the PCP's strategy for power
from its formation in 1921 to the present and its
implications for democracy and the party system in
Portugal. However, comparatively this analysis'
ramifications reaches beyond an "area studies" domain and
adds to the comparative study of political parties and
party systems in general and of Western Europe in specific.
For this reason in chapter One we discuss general theories
of parties and party systems.
Even though our focus is on the PCP, the study must be
placed in context of the political system within which it
xix
operates. Therefore, chapter Two provides a general
analysis of the cultural, socio-economic, political,
anthropological, and historical background of Portugal.
Chapter Three analyzes the parties with which the PCP
competes in the political system.
Because we cannot understand the PCP today or compare
it to other communist parties without understanding its
past, the specific analyses of the PCP's strategy for power
begin in chapter Four which covers its evolution from 1921
to 1974. The PCP suffered a longer period of
clandestinity than most communist parties which profoundly
affected its leaders and added to its Stalinist character;
but in other respects, its past is similar to that of
other Western European communist parties.
Chapter Five focuses on the PCP's tactics during the
"revolution" which began on April 25, 1974 and abruptly
ended after the November 25, 1975 aborted ultra left-wing
coup. As this period progressed and politics increasingly
shifted to the left, the PCP's radicalism escalated as did
its analyses that conditions for seizure of the state were
quickly ripening. Chapter Six focuses on the PCP's
strategy from November 25, 1975 to the present. After the
revolution lost its momentum and moderation dominated the
political scene, the party's tactics became defensive as it
attempted to protect the conquests of the revolution and
xx
hoped for a new leftward shift in the future. Therefore,
chapters Five and Six provide a historical analysis of how
a "Putschist" strategy failed in Portugal and the
ramifications of this failure on the party's future.
Chapters Seven and Eight take a more thematic
approach: that of a Stalinist communist party and its
strategies for the future. Chapter Seven describes and
analyzes the PCP's organizational structure, including the
major party leadership and "democratic centralism." m
analyzing the PCP's rejection of Eurocommunism, in chapter
Eight we shed additional light on the factors which lead
some parties to become Eurocommunist and others to remain
orthodox. Although varying conditions from nation to
nation are key factors, of greater importance in
determining party strategy appears to be the leadership of
the parties.
The PCP, as communist parties were intended to be, is
a party like no other party. In this study we will address
the question of how it differs from its competitors. One
example is the PCP's conception of power: whereas the other
major parties see power as control of the government
through democratic elections, the PCP minimizes the
parliamentarian path to power and emphasizes other Leninist
tactics. How does this diverging view of power affect
democratic politics and the party system in Portugal?
xxi
We will show that the PCP continues to be an example
of "ordinary Stalinism" as described by Ronald Tiersky.l
Is the party destined for decay in the long term? Can it
change, and if so
- how? This study contributes to the
field of comparative communism in general and Eurocommunism
in specific by providing an additional case study of the
evolution, or non-evolution, of communist parties. Unless
it radically alters the strategy it has been pursuing since
November 1975, the party's power base will gradually
weaken. Because evolution would require a radical change
in the leadership, which is unlikely in the short- or
medium-term, major change is unlikely.
As discussed above, this study contributes to the
field of comparative political parties, comparative
communism, and comparative government /Western Europe by its
analysis of one party, the PCP, and its impact on
Portuguese politics.
xxii
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CHAPTER 1
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The Portuguese Communist Party must be analyzed in the
context of the comparative study of political parties. To
portray the controversy and dynamism which still exists in
the field we discuss the evolution of political parties as
well as the perpetual difficulty in defining them. To
emphasize the absence of and need for a general theory of
parties we discuss several reasons why a general theory is
still lacking and suggest some of the steps necessary to
fulfill this goal. We also define and discuss important
terms and concepts which are essential for an understanding
of parties and party systems. By tracing the evolution of
party studies from the turn of the century to the present
we survey the various methodological approaches to the
study of political parties. We conclude the chapter with a
discussion of the approach we use to study the PCP and the
significance it has for the comparative study of political
parties
.
The Study of Political Parties - Its Controversial Nature
The political party is a relatively new form of social
1
organization. its age is debatable, as some scholars trace
its beginning back further than others. Feliks Gross, for
example, traces political parties to Republican Rome's
"factiones." He allows that these sponsor groups of
chariot racing in Rome were not parties in the modern sense
of the term but they were, nevertheless, the embryo of the
political party which resulted in the familiar term
"faction." Beginning with Republican Rome, Gross follows
the evolution of the political party through medieval
Italy's Ghibellines and Guelphs, through the Leveller's of
seventeenth century England, to the political groups of
eighteenth century France. 1 Max Weber also refers to the
existence of political parties prior to "the French
revolution - [e.g.,] the Huguenots or Catholic League or
any of the English parties including the 'Roundheads' . " He
also discusses the Ghibellines and Guelphs of thirteenth
century Italy as parties. 2
Most scholars, disagreeing with Gross and Weber, argue
that the political party is a relatively recent creation.
Maurice Duverger, for example, claims political parties did
not arrive on the scene until the middle of the nineteenth
century
.
We must not be misled by the analogy of words.
We use the word "parties" to describe the
factions which divided the republics of
antiquity, the troops which formed round a
condottiere in Renaissance Italy, the clubs where
the members of the revolutionary assemblies met,
Snder%ChTltteeS prePared ^ electionsu t e property franchise of theconstitutional monarchies as well as the vastpopular organizations which give shape to publicopinion in modern democracies... Obviouslyhowever, they are not the same thing... m 1850no country in the world (except the UnitedStates) knew political parties in the modernsense of the word.'* 3
Giovanni Sartori adds that what Weber, and implicitly
Gross, consider political parties are in reality only
factions; political parties did not emerge until the early
nineteenth century with the Jeffersonian Republicans . 4 The
views of Sartori and Duverger are supported by Joseph
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner who claim modern political
parties emerged around the nineteenth century when the
suffrage broadened and mass parties formed. Specifically
they point to the Federalists and Republicans of the 1790'
s
in the U.S., to the Liberal which emerge in England after
the reform of 1832, and to the French groups after 1848. 5
That some scholars trace political parties back to the
Middle Ages while others insist they did not emerge until
after the nineteenth century illustrates only one of the
disagreements between them. Duverger, Sartori, LaPalombara
and Weiner, and Leon Epstein, to name a few, all agree
parties did not exist prior to the turn of the nineteenth
century, yet each gives a different date for their
emergence. 6 The use of the term "modern" to qualify the
Epstein notes,
...modern political parties emerged with theextensron of the vote to a fairly largeproportion of the populace. 7 g
According to Sartori,
if
„
m
°K
eri
!
politics has something peculiarly
modern" about it, the novelty derives from apolitically active, or politically mobilized,
society, which is a new resource and also a new
source of complexities. if so, modern politics
requires a party channelment: the single party
when not, or where not, parties in the plural .
8
Although most scholars hold a similar view of what makes a
political party "modern" their views concerning when a
party becomes modern still differ.
Disagreements also surface on what constitutes a
political party in the 20th century. LaPalombara and
Weiner state that:
The political party is a creature of modern
and modernizing political systems. Whether one
thinks of Anglo-American democracies or
totalitarian systems such as the Soviet Union,
Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany; emergent African
states in their earliest years of independent
evolution or Latin American republics that have
hobbled along for over a century; a mammoth
ex-colonial area such as India groping toward
democracy or an equally mammoth Communist power
such as China seeking to mobilize a population
through totalitarian methods, the political party
in one form or another is omnipresent .
9
But the "forms" that some scholars accept as parties
are rejected by others. Sigmund Neumann, for example,
..
to call such a dictatorial organization [theN.zi party] a "party" is a misnomer and often aconscious misconception, for the right to combinefreely (the basic freedom of choice to
denied"?^ ™ ** '° fr ° m) iS e ^entially
Only the coexistence of at least one othercompetitive group makes a political party real. 11
Disagreements also concern parties in Africa; many of
the "forms" which Rupert Emerson or Thomas Hodgkins call
parties are not considered such by others. 12
We discuss above the reservations which some scholars
have when communist parties are considered "parties," and
the controversy intensifies when we focus on party systems.
Can one consider communist political systems, in which
opposition parties are not allowed, to be party systems?
Does not the term "party system" imply that more than one
party is necessary in order to have a system? Neumann
certainly accepts this view:
The dictatorial party's monopoly, which prevents
the free formation and expression of opinion, is
the precise antithesis of the party system. 13
A one-party system is a contradiction in itself. 14
. . . the same is true of the critical period of a
party system. By the very definition, "party"
connotes not only the coexistence of different
competing entities, with their characteristic
partnership, separation, and participation, but
also a fourth feature, most significant and yet
often forgotten - the essential inclusion of
every separate group as "a part of a whole. n1 ^
The number of scholars who reject communist political
systems as "party systems" is even greater. 16 And we have
yet to consider whether the African one-party states and
the "fluid" nature of their politics can allow us to label
these political systems - party systems. 17
Why do some scholars trace the origins of political
parties back further than others? When does a faction
cease to be a faction and begin to be a party? when does
the "modern" political party emerge? What is a political
party? What constitutes a party system? That controversy
still surrounds these questions and leaves them without a
universally accepted answer gives us an insight to the
state of political party theory and its highly
controversial and dynamic nature.
The Party Defined
One of the more difficult problems is in defining the
political party. If scholars could arrive at one
definition there could be agreement on their emergence and
on the make-up of party systems. With a resolution of what
constitutes a party system, the comparative study of
parties could be improved. A snowball effect might develop
and considerably diminish the controversy which exists in
the field as a whole if we could only standardize the
connotation of the term "political party."
Unfortunately, defining the party is an old problem.
Definitions proliferated in the last thirty years as
scholars, unhappy with the definitions which existed,
created new ones according to their own views. in some
cases they found the pre-established definitions too broad
and all encompassing. In other cases they found them too
narrow and selective, omitting what they considered to be
political parties. As a result we now have definitions by
Edmund Burke, Joseph Schumpeter, Harold Lasswell and
Abraham Kaplan, Kenneth Janda, Fred Riggs, Leon Epstein,
Samuel Eldersveld, Sigmund Neumann, Kay Lawson, and
several others. 18 So many definitions are now available
that for those seeking a definition of the political party
it has become a "buyer's market." And if scholars are
still unable to find the definition which suits their
purposes they can always create their own (and usually do)
.
It has become vogue to define terms creatively and
differently when explaining one's methodological approach
in an introductory chapter. The proliferation of
definitions is a problem if one is interested in the
creation of a general theory of political parties.
Scholars should make an extra effort to use existing
definitions. As long as the drive to be "different" or
"creative" continues, a general theory will also continue
to evade us.
Certainly if conditions change and party systems adapt
to the changes, the definitions, if they become outdated,
must accompany the evolution. But caution must be taken to
assure that those definitions already in existence are not
applicable any longer. Although conditions may certainly
arise in the future requiring new definitions, in many
instances the new oefinitions will continue to emerge as a
result of scholars' unhappiness with definitions already in
existence. For others the impulse to be different will
supersede the need to create a general theory. Caution is
a prerequisite to any attempt to revise definitions. The
first step is to bring to a halt the unnecessary
proliferation of definitions. The second is to agree on
only one definition.
Having surveyed the available definitions we will use
Sartori ' s
:
A party is any political group identified by an
official label that presents at elections, and is
capable of placing through elections (free or
nonfree)
, candidates for public office. 19
Sartori's definition is the best available for several
reasons. He approaches the formation of his definition
with a genuine concern towards the creation of a general
theory of political parties. He closely examines previous
definitions and discusses why all are rejected as
inadequate . ^ 0 He carefully designs his definition to
differentiate the political party from the faction, from
the movement, from the pressure group, or from the labor
union. He also maintains the "electoral criterion of
discrimination" without the ambiguity of many other
definitions, and includes the dictatorial party (e.g.,
communist party) under his definition.
Sartori's definition may not be perfect but can we
ever expect to find the ultimate definition? Sartori
admits that in trying to compare systems as different as
the United States, the Soviet Union, and those of Africa it
is inevitable that country specialists will be unhappy with
the sweeping nature of his general study (and implicitly
his definition) .21 Nevertheless, a general framework is a
necessary precursor to a general comparative theory of
political parties. And in turn, a universally accepted
definition of the political party is a precursor to a
general framework.
Approaches to the Study of Political Parties
Ever since the emergence of the modern party scholars
have studied it from various methodological approaches.
Prior to the fifties most studies of parties were
criticized for focusing on only one nation and taking a
historical, descriptive approach rather than an analytical
one. Since the fifties the study of political parties has
become increasingly comparative and the range of approaches
for their study has broadened beyond the historical to
include the structural, the behavioral, the
functional-systemic, and the ideological. During the last
three decades scholars have also attempted to create a
general, comprehensive theory of political parties to bind
these various studies and approaches together. Today,
despite theoretical advances, this goal remains to be
fulfilled.
Of the early party studies perhaps only M. Ostrogorski
and Robert Michels come close to attempting a broader
theory relevant to other nations. 22 Their works differ
from their contemporaries in that they study party
organization and the distribution of power within the party
while moving toward a more general comparative theory.
Ostrogorski deals mainly with the similarities between the
American and British parties, but he is also interested in
showing the "consequence of rapid democratization and the
nature of the party as a vehicle for rapid
democratization .
"
2 3
Michels focuses on only one political party yet his
analysis is not confined within any geographical border.
He sees his work as a break with historical studies and a
move toward an "analysis of the nature of the party." 24
Michels is struck by the differentiation within the
social-democratic parties between the leaders and the
followers. He concludes that the mass membership of
large-scale organizations is "incompetent" and does not
desire to run them. The membership, therefore, provides
its officers with a near monopoly of power which the
officers will inevitably manipulate to pursue their own
interests. Michels' conclusions are reflected in his "iron
law of oligarchy"
- that all democratic parties are run by
small groups for their own interests, and as a result they
are doomed as an instrument of democratic government . 25
In 1951 Duverger begins a new era for party studies
with his contribution toward a general theory of political
parties. 26 H e pushes the field into a new realm by
combining analytical concerns with a systematic treatment.
He wants to standardize the methods and techniques used to
study parties, to infuse objectivity into a field "where
high feeling and special pleading are the general rule."
According to Duverger, he:
. .
.
seeks to draw up a general plan of the field
of study by compiling a balance sheet of all the
essential questions and by coordinating them one
with another so as to bring out their interdepen-
dence and their individual importance. This
attempt at methodical classification is
primordial: political science will make no true
progress so long as its investigations are
scattered and individual, empirical rather than
scientific . 27
He focuses on the structure of the party and its
organization more than its members or electoral numbers.
Duverger provides the field with its first typology of
political party systems.
After 1951 the number of studies devoted to political
parties increases. 28 Neumann presents one of the more
significant volumes of the Fifties, a book designed to give
scholars the "theoretical concepts, historical depth, and
comparative data" which they needed to continue working
toward a theory of political parties. 29 As Neumann notes:
Political parties are the main agents of public
affairs. For this very reason they must be seen
within the complete setting of their owngovernmental systems. Only against thebackground of historical circumstances,institutional traditions, and national
characteristics can the specific nature, issues,
and contributions of the different party patterns
be fully evaluated. Each national analysis,
therefore, emphasizes different features (grown
out of long-range experiences of the people's
existence) and adds to the cumulative definition
of modern political parties." 30
His concluding chapter is an especially useful general
discussion outlining some of the steps necessary to bind
individual nation studies into a general conceptual theory
of political parties and party systems. 31
By the Sixties it became evident that Duverger' s study
was not a definitive study, of course he never expected it
to be one. His aim was to divert the field in a new
direction, to break out of:
...a vicious circle: a general theory of partieswill eventually be constructed only upon the
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The aim of this book is to break out of thecircle and to sketch a preliminary general theoryof parties, vague, conjectural, and of necessity
approximate, which may yet serve as a basis and aguide for detailed studies. 32
At the very least Duverger fulfills his purpose by
inspiring additional studies of political parties which
contribute to a general theory.
In 1963 Apter concludes, after analyzing the studies
which followed Duverger, that a general theory of political
parties was still lacking. 33 It is especially concerned
that Western multi-party states, dictatorial one-party
states, and emerging one-party states (e.g. African) are
not being compared. The lions share of research focuses on
Western political parties, he claims, and even then there
are very few successful comparisons between nations.
Despite the spurt of activity that follows Duverger, the
study of political parties leaves much to be desired.
The study of parties is rather confined to a
description of characteristics obtaining in each
particular party, its relations to government,
its recruitment and leadership, its objectives
and programs, and its electoral performance.
Analysis of political parties has been primarily
concerned with improving representative
government. ...What is lacking is a theory of
political parties. 34
Even the studies produced in the fifties were too abstract
and systematic at the expense of the rigorous comparisons
which were now necessary.
The general theory which is lacking must be able to
increase our understanding of all types of political
parties. It must seek out those functions which all
parties share and compare them on that basis. Apter
suggests one possible method of comparison. Political
parties whether in democratic, dictatorial, or emerging
nations could be studied at three levels: the party to
state level, the party to community level, and the party to
party level. For example, at the party to state level does
the party make the rules (is it dictatorial) or abide by
them (or is it democratic)? At the party to community
level is the party an organizational weapon or a broker?
At the party to party level is the party monopolistic or
pluralistic?35
During the two decades that lapsed since Apter'
s
criticism, political party studies from various
methodological approaches multiplied. Lawson divides these
studies, as well as previous ones into five categories:
historical, structural, behavioral, functional-systemic,
and ideological . 36
The historical approach. According to Lawson there
are four types of studies with in this approach. The first
is "case histories of the origins and development of
particular parties." These studies are very important as
source material. They are necessary as a base upon which
to build analyses. These are the types of studies that
dominated the field prior to the fifties. 37
Duverger's work falls into the second type of
historical approach "which examines the kinds of
circumstances most likely to produce political parties. "38
He concludes that political parties emerge in two ways:
internally from within the legislatures or externally from
without. Externally created parties have their origins in
groups such as trade unions, churches, ex-servicemen's
associations, and industrial and commercial groups. 39
LaPalombara and Weiner's volume is an example of the
third type, studies which "link a party's origin to the
kind of party it will become." 40 Unlike Duverger,
LaPalombara and Weiner focus on "crisis" combined with a
certain degree of "modernization" as the impetus which
leads to party formation. 41 As examples of their theory
the authors claim that parties which emerge under an open
legislative system are more likely to lead to a multi-party
system while parties which are repressed and clandestine
(e.g. in colonial Africa) are more likely to lead to
one-party systems. 4 ^
of
The fourth type focuses on a "cyclical pattern-
party activity. As examples Lawson cites Charles Seller's
"equilibrium cycle," Walter Burnham' s "critical election"
(both apply to the Us), and Dankwart Rustow's cycle in
Turkish politics. 43
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The structural approach. This approach studies the
party's formal organization and the role and relationship
of the participants within the party "as these are revealed
in recurrent patterns of actions." The question of power,
for example, is examined. Who has it, at what level, how
did they get it, etc.? Lawson provides Ostrogorski
' s study
f the British caucus system and Michels' study of power
ithin social democratic parties as examples of this
approach. Duverger also takes a structural approach
because of his emphasis on party organization and his
distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties. 44
The behavioral approach, According to Lawson this
approach focuses on "the human actors who influence the
operation of parties, the acts they perform in the process,
and their attitudes and expectations in performing these
acts." The party is not seen as an independent variable or
theoretical abstraction but instead as a dependent
variable, a product of human action and interaction.
Attention is focused on the membership and leadership's
activities. Rather than focus on one individual this
approach tends to take one aspect of human behavior (e.g.,
voting, leadership, activism) and studies it in the context
of a large number of individuals. The behavioral approach
focuses on mid-level theory rather than individual/micro
theory or general/macro theory. This approach has been
applied to studies dealing with the US (especially in the
area of voting behavior) more than those dealing with
Europe. The type of activity they may choose to study, for
example, is how voters may act in a given situation, or
"the effectiveness of several party leaders in a particular
elective office such as the presidency." 45
The functional-systemic approach. The functional-
systemic approach is one of the more popular approaches to
the study of political parties. This approach makes an
inquiry into "the relationship between the subject and its
environment for the effect one has on the other." Lawson
names Almond and Coleman's studies on interest aggregation
as an example of this approach. The party has often been
portrayed (e.g. by Easton, Huntington, or Sartori) as a
broker which acts as the intermediary facilitating the
exchange and comparison of political ideas. Others have
studied why the same type of parties exist worldwide.
A common criticism of this approach is that the
functionalists assume every structure which exists within a
system performs a maintaining function for the larger part.
It has also been criticized for maintaining the status quo
instead of trying to understand the change which is taking
place in the world. Lawson believes these criticisms can
be partly resolved by rephrasing the types of questions
this approach might take. if instead of asking "What is
the functions of this (e.g., party) in making that (e.g.
political system) work?" they were to ask "What, if any,
function does this (e.g., party) reform in making that
(e.g., political system) operate as it does (persevere,
change, self-regulate, perish)?" many of these criticisms
would be reduced. 46
The ideological approach. This approach focuses on
the ideological nature of the party. What dees the party
stand for? What tactics and strategies does it pursue, and
how important are they to the party? Are its goals
short-term and pragmatic or long-term and ideological? In
this category are works by party ideologues such as Lenin,
Mao, or (in the case of Portugal) Cunhal. 47
Typologies
.
Lawson also discusses typologies ranging
from the simple: Duverger' s "mass versus cadre party,"
Neumann's "party of individual representation" as
contrasted with "party of integration," and Kircheimer'
s
"catch-all parties,"; to the complex: Sartori's typology
of party systems. These are discussed separately from the
five approaches since typologies, especially the complex
ones, draw from all five. She sees typologies as the most
promising method of bringing together the hundreds of
political parties with the five approaches. 48
Sartori: From a General Theory to a Preliminary Framework
As we have just witnessed from the survey of political
party studies, the amount of literature which now exists at
all levels of analysis is voluminous. Nevertheless,
according to Sartori the field is still lacking what it
needs the most - a general theory of political parties.
"...little has followed [Duverger] in terms of broad theory
building. ...the more we know about parties, the more we
are faced with a proliferation of threads and the less we
seem capable of pulling them together." 49 In attempting to
create the general theory which has been missing for so
long Sartori realizes that the 30 years of empirical
evidence is now massive.
. . . but for what theoretical use? I tried hard
to substantiate the theory with the findings and,
indeed, that added up to nothing. Over and over
again, my efforts were defeated by a conceptual
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The ultimate, general theory which he intended to create
was transformed by these preliminary problems into a
projected two- volume enterprise, of which only the first
one has appeared.
In it, there is a framework for analysis devoted to
resolving the preliminary problems by focusing on the
fundamentals rather than trying to mold his theory around
the empirical evidence.
... we have so much empirical evidence to reckon
with. ... the task of pulling the threads
together ... starting from the empirical
evidence, appears by now unmanageable. We are
thus left to hope that the task of theory
building can be managed the other way around,
from the fundamentals down to the particulars. 51
He discusses and clarifies the issues relevant and
essential to the study of political parties. He wades
through the dozens of definitions of the party and develops
the definition which he hopes will replace all others. He
discusses the emergence of parties as well as their role in
a modern society and provides what he believes is the
ultimate typology of party systems. He discusses the
difference between parties and party systems and deals with
complex questions such as: Do one-party nations have party
systems? Do less-developed countries have party systems?
If so, can their party systems be compared with modern
ones ?
Although the first volume is not the general theory
which the field is so badly lacking, it is nevertheless, an
important exercise which has paved the way for a general
theory to follow. Almost a decade later Sartori's promised
second volume has not yet appeared. Given the amount of
time it took to complete the first volume and the
complexity of the subject this is understandable. Should
the second volume appear we may expect his general theory
of political parties. In it he will create mid-level or
subsystem analysis as a bridge between "whole system
analysis" and empirical studies. Analyses of party systems
and especially party subsystems will be useful as the
building blocks for this bridge. Sartori considers parties
to be the fundamental units of study. Parties are brokers,
crucial "intermediary structures between society and the
government." Without them, channelment of societies'
desires to the government would become extremely difficult.
All modern systems, including the dictatorial, need
political parties. 52
If scholars follow Sartori's prescriptions (for
example, if only those entities defined as parties by
Sartori are studied as such, if only those entities which
are party systems are studied as such) then a general
theory, if it is manageable by only one individual, can be
facilitated. The intention here is not to portray Sartori
as infallible. Some may criticize his bias toward modern
western democratic parties or his rationale for excluding
Africa from his typology. His study may not be perfect but
it is the best, most complex, and comprehensive to emerge.
For this reason this study of the PCP has been coordinated,
as much as possible, with his prescriptions.
Are Parties Necessary?
We discussed what a party is when we defined the party
earlier. Our next concern will be whether parties are
necessary. What role does the party play in society? Can
political systems function without them? According to
Sartori the answer is no, unless the nation in question
wants to lock itself into a "pre-modern" state of existence
(if that is possible in today's interdependent world) or
become a military repressive regime which is anti-party.
As modernization increases even anti-party states tend to
become uni-party states to control society more
effectively. 53 He notes that the first uni-party states
"took over in reaction to the failure and alleged
shortcomings of party pluralism, as in Italy or Germany, or
in the face of a very fragile and shaky beginning, as was
the case in Kerenski Russia. "54 Party pluralism emerges
with the extension of the suffrage whereas uni-party states
emerge with the "political awakening and activation of the
population at large." The result is a politicized society
which "both takes part in the operations of the political
system and is required for the more effective performance
of the system. "...it gradually came to be realized that
the population at large could no longer be side-stepped and
discounted as an irrelevant entity. "55 Sartori's
"politicized society" is the combination of what is known
as the "mass society" and the "mobilized society. "56 His
point is that the partyless polity (whether parties have
been suppressed or have not yet developed) cannot remain so
once the society becomes politicized.
He contends that, "The larger the number of
participants the more the need for a regularized traffic
system"; the more the need for "channelment " and a party
which performs this function, the more the need for a party
which deals with the entry into the system of "mass
publics .
"
No parties at all leaves a society out of reach,
out of control, [single party states] need apervasively politicized society
7
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The single-party state needs the party not only to channel
but to "chain" its people through "compulsive regimentation
and monopolistic regimentation" to make them believe that
they are much better off with the one-party system than the
multi-party system they either had or could have. 58
According to Sartori, among the major functions of the
party are "expression," " channe lment , " as well as
"communication." All party polities with subsystem
autonomy have the "expression function." "Channelment " is
a function of all party systems except no-party polities.
All political systems have political "communication." By
"expression" Sartori refers to the party's function as the
representative or "expressor" of the public demands. If we
were to define the one-party system on the basis of its
expressive function we would find the party system to be a
system of free (autonomous) canalization in which
"expression prevails" throughout the political system over
repression. A party-state system would be defined as a
system of compulsory (monopolistic) canalization in which
"repression prevails" down the line over expression.
One of the few similarities which Sartori finds
between the party system and the party-state system is the
channelment function. AH parties serve the function of
"conductors" (channelment or linkage) by capturing or
conducting the societies' energies. in a party system the
energy is transmitted to the government while in a
party-state system the conductor captures the energy and
diverts it according to orders received from above.
Communication can take on a two-dimensional flow.
Messages from below (demands) can be passed on to the upper
levels of society and messages from above (orders) can be
passed down as directives to the bottom layers of society.
The important distinction is communication from whom to
whom? Communication at the subsystem level keeps the state
under control while communication at the party-state level
keeps the citizens under control. 59
Expression, channelment, communication - these are all
crucial roles which any modern political system needs
parties to perform. Other studies of the parties have also
focused on the roles of pluralism, representation,
coercion, participation, mobilization, or linkage. The
distinction is primarily one of terminology since these are
all encompassed by Sartori' s three roles. 60
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Parties and Party Systems
We now know what parties are, why they exist, and how
they developed; but nations can have several parties to
none. How can we comparatively study such distinct
political systems; what are party systems? According to
Sartori, although political parties can emerge with a
limited suffrage it is only with mass suffrage by a
substantial section of the community that the party system
emerges. The sequence of steps surrounding the emergence
of such systems is not clear or uniform but there is an
irreversible order for these three: 1) responsible
government (as opposed to responsive government) 61
2) "reality" of elections, 3) the establishment of parties
as a subsystem. Elections and participation alone without
constitutional and responsible government historically
could not result in the emergence of a political party
system . 62
What is a party system? It is the "whole" of which
political parties can only be "part" of or "subsystems."
According to Sartori the whole system is larger than the
sum of its individual parts. In order to have a healthy
party system there should not exist too much partisanship
and factionalism, otherwise the parts could overwhelm the
whole and destroy the system or one party could dominate
the whole. For a system to succeed the parties must
balance partisanship with impartial governing, loyalty to
the party with loyalty to the state, and party interest
with the general interest. 63
If as comparativists we are studying party systems to
what extent can a one-party state in which other political
parties are not permitted to compete, be considered a party
system? Can we compare it to a pluralist party system? A
party system must "display properties that do not belong to
a separate consideration of its component elements." A
party system also "results from and consists of patterned
interactions of its component parts so that the
interactions are the boundary of the system." According to
Sartori, the one-party system does not do either of these.
First, the description of the single party coincides with
the description of the system. Second, the "patterned
interactions that occur are not within but across the
boundaries indicated by the term party." For a party
system to exist, therefore, more than one party must also
exist within it. A system results from the interactions of
inter-party competition. A party system allows subsystem
autonomy by parties, pressure groups, or unions, for
example. A one-party state does not allow subsystem
autonomy so it cannot be a party system. The parties of
the party system are created voluntarily at will by private
citizens, membership is not compulsory and there are
several types of organizations to choose from. The
one-party state does not allow voluntary organizations. it
lacks subsystem autonomy, whereas a party system allows
party canalization to serve the purposes of society,
recognizes dissent and institutionalizes opposition.
Parties are instruments of expression in the plural, but
when only one is allowed they become instruments for
extraction. Whereas the society shapes the party in a
multi-party system, the party shapes society in a one-party
state. 64
Whether or not the one-party state allows subsystem
autonomy it still continues to use the same techniques and
organizational structures as parties do in multiparty
systems. Can we ever expect to create a general theory of
political parties if we exclude studies of the numerous
one-party states (whether communist totalitarian,
authoritarian, or fascist)
?
Sartori provides a solution to this problem. True,
the one-party state cannot be included in the category of
"party system" since it does not allow the free competition
of other parties and one party alone does not comprise a
system. The one-party state, nevertheless, is still a
member of a system. It is a miniature political system and
should be studied as such. it is not a "system of parties"
but is instead a "party-as-a-system. " The most accurate
label for the one-party state has been provided by scholars
of the communist system - the "party-state system." it is
a system in itself. The party is a duplicate of the state;
whether the party controls the state or vice versa is
irrelevant
.
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The Party: A Miniature Political System
A study of parties and party systems must include the
party subunit. Analysis at the subunit level can be
applied to the "party-state system" or to the individual
parties which comprise party systems. Studies which focus
on only one party are important, especially if they include
the party's relationship to the whole. A clearer
understanding of the parties which make up party systems is
a positive contribution to a general theory of parties.
Eldersveld states that the party is:
a miniature political system. It has an
authority structure. ...It has a representative
process, an electoral system, and subprocesses
for recruiting leaders, defining goals, and
resolving internal system conflicts. Above all,
the party is a decision-making system ... .66
An analysis of the party subunits can focus on each of the
individual elements which Eldersveld mentions under
"subprocesses." a complete study of a particular party
might analyze the leadership role (authority structure),
the decision-making process, the representational aspect of
the party (whether it represents the voters, the members,
or the leadership), and the recruitment of its leaders,
cadres, and members. It might focus on the issue of
intra-party democracy and power distribution as Michels'
did or on the organizational aspect of the party as
Duverger did.
Similar types of parties exist throughout the world
(e.g., Christian, Democratic, Socialist, Communist) yet if
two parties of the same label but of different countries
are compared, they are undoubtedly different. According to
Sartori, the reason similar parties differ is the
"fractions" or "subunits" which exist within them. 67 The
party can have several types of sub-units. The most
familiar sub-unit is the "faction," a "self-consciously
organized body, with a measure of cohesion and discipline
thus resulting." 68 Sartori is very cautious of using the
term "faction" because it carries a connotation of the old
type of factions, predecessors to the party, which are
still very much alive in Africa and Latin America. To use
the term faction carries with it certain value judgments
and a degree of ambiguity. To Sartori a faction is "a
specific power group." He prefers to use the term
"fraction" for the subunit which is a "general, unspecified
category." Thus when he speaks in general terms of the
subunits within parties he speaks of "fractions." But if
he focuses on a specific subunit within a particular party,
that is a "faction." The final subunit is the "tendency"
which is a "patterned set of attitudes" rather than a
specific power group. The "tendency" is a subunit which is
more diffuse than the fraction (e.g., a left or right party
tendency). 69 Partie s may be fract ional i zed along four
dimensions "the organizational, the ideological, the
motivational, or the left /right .
"
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Therefore, the party subsystem and its subunits are
important units of analysis as complex as the party system
itself. Any general theory of political parties must
consider their role.
The Portuguese Communist Party in Comparative Perspective
The study of parties and party systems has evolved
rapidly since the fifties. Today studies abound at all
levels of analysis and from various approaches. This work
on the PCP takes advantage of these studies. One lesson
drawn from the literature is that specific studies and
general studies complement each other. For the study of
political parties to be accurate it needs Micro, Mid-level,
and Macro theory; all three are important.
This study, focuses on only one political party - the
Portuguese Communist Party. Despite its specificity, an
awareness of its relevance to the study of parties at all
levels of analysis is maintained throughout. At the micro
level a detailed analysis of one of the most important
participants in the Portuguese party system is provided.
The research at this level clarifies the tactics, function,
and organization of the PCP which in turn, through its
interaction with other parties, increases our knowledge of
the Portuguese party system as a whole and all party
systems in general. The analysis of the PCP's subunits not
only increases our knowledge of its internal politics but
also provides an additional example of the significance of
subsystem analysis. By speculating on why the PCP is not a
Eurocommunist party this analysis contributes to theories
which focus on the emergence and success of communist
parties in- general and their possible consequences for
democratic systems. Indirectly this discussion of the PCP
contributes to studies of "party-state systems" since
internally it is run as such and were it allowed to govern
the "party-state system" would most likely be its model.
Remembering the importance of a general theory of political
parties, Sartori's guidelines are followed and his
terminology is used as much as possible. The Portuguese
party system is also integrated into his typology of party
systems
.
This analysis of the PCP also uses all five approaches
which Lawson discusses because each one is important to
understand any party. The historical approach will be
drawn from in the search for the origins of the PCP, its
evolution to 1974, and the determinants of its strategy for
power. Sartori may be correct when he states that similar
parties throughout the world are different because of their
internal fractionsVl (or in the PCP's case its internal
tendencies); it is only by studying Portugal's past that we
can decide how and why those tendencies emerge.
Forecasting the PCP's future is impossible without using
the historical approach.
From a structural approach we will discuss the PCP's
formal organization. How the party works in theory
(according to its statutes) and in reality. We will
determine if the PCP is a "mass" or "cadre" party. We will
study the distribution of power within the party - who
holds it, how it is accumulated, how power distribution may
have changed with the party's transition from a clandestine
to a legal party.
From a Behavioral perspective we will focus on the
results of individual action. How a leader leads, what
activities he or she carries out, the role of the cadres
and the members, the role of the sympathizers and the
voters. The three forms of party-linked behavior -
leadership, activism, voting - will be examined to
understand who is doing what and why. m using this
approach we will not be focusing on the compilation and
analysis of large quantities of data (partially because the
data is a closely guarded secret of the PCP and
inaccessible) but rather will use electoral results to
measure the voters appeal for the PCP since 1974.
From the Functional-Systemic approach we will examine
the role which the PCP plays in the Portuguese party
system. How and to what extent does it fulfill the
functions which Sartori attributes to political parties:
expression, channelment, and communication. Since the PCP
gets most of its support form workers and landless
peasants, to what extent has it improved their lives? To
what extent is the PCP expressing its members' views or is
it instead expressing its views through its members? Could
the Portuguese people have gotten more from the system
without the PCP acting as their "broker"?
From the ideological approach we will focus on the
tactics and strategy of the party, examine its long and
short-term goals, and study the ideological beliefs of its
members (especially its leadership)
.
Each of the five approaches is relevant and essential
to the study of political parties. To take only one
analytical approach cannot do justice to their complex
nature
.
This first chapter has placed the analysis of the PCP
into the context of general political party and party
system theory. To provide the setting for the PCP, the
next chapter will describe the Portuguese political system.
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CHAPTER 2
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM
In this chapter we place the analysis of the PCP
the context of the Portuguese political system. Despite
the fact that the PCP is an independent actor, it has an
impact on the rest of the political system and is itself
affected by that system. As Stammen emphasizes:
While it is true that the individual politicalparty is a more or less independent agent in thepolitical process of its country, it alsointeracts with all the other parties in the samepolitical system in an interdependent way.
...The complexity of the situation suggests thatit is inadequate to study an individual party inisolation, that is, without considering itsposition and role within this framework. it is
necessary to regard the various parties as a
complex unit and to treat them as such, takinginto account the social, economic, and political
conditions. This unit has to be considered as aframe of reference, even if only a single party
or specific structural feature of a party system
is to be examined. 1
Therefore, to understand the PCP we must understand
the political system within which it acts. Only after
establishing this basis can we accurately analyze the
tactics and strategies which the party follows. Only then
can we uncover the significance of the PCP's existence
within the system. To what extent is the PCP committed to
parliamentarian democracy? How does the party differ from
other communist parties? These and other questions which
41
we focus on in later chapters require this initial inquiry.
in this chapter we examine the social, economic, and
political conditions which have molded the Portuguese
political system in the past and present. We discuss the
subgroups which play or have played an important part in
the Portuguese system (social groups or classes such as the
landed elite, military, church,
...). m this manner we
present the setting within which the PCP must act.
Historical Background
Early history. Portugal is one of the oldest and
geographically most stable nations in Europe. Its 800 year
history as a nation-state has led to a high degree of
cultural unity so that today Portugal does not have a
linguistic, racial, or religious minority of major
significance. With one of the worlds most stable
frontiers, there has been hardly any change to its
boundaries since it became an Iberian nation. Portugal's
past begins with settlements or invasions by various
peoples .
2
Beyond the certainty that it did exist in Portugal
there is little additional information concerning the
prehistoric southern Mediterranean Paleolithic culture,
can
whose roots are thought to be based in the Afri
continent. The first major settlements to succeed the
prehistoric tribes were those of the Iberians around 3000
B.C. The Lusitanians, a branch of the Iberians, populated
the western most part of the Iberian peninsula. From
around 1200 B.C. the Phoenicians, later the Carthaginians,
and by 800 B.C. the Greeks explored the western coast in
search of trade. Lusitania (the early name for Portugal)
3
provided very little interest for these early explorers.
After 900 B.C. the Lusitanians were influenced by various
waves of Celts migrating west from the Danube (primarily in
northern Portugal and Galicia). 4
Until the Roman invasions around 2 0 0 B.C. the
Lusitanians continued to dominate the western part of the
peninsula. Even after the invasions Roman settlers
preferred southern Lusitania to the northern regions.
Latifundios, large estates, became abundant in the Alentejo
and the Algarve while few Roman settlers ventured up
north. 5 With the fall of the Roman empire in the fifth
century A.D. the Swabians, a Germanic tribe, created a
kingdom in Western Iberia. Perhaps their major legacy to
Portugal was the system of agriculture they left in the
north - dispersed, single small holdings which became ever
smaller from generation to generation as the land was
further divided among heirs. 6 To this day this pattern of
small land holding remains a ma in factor in the
conservative, anti-communist nature of the northern and
central Portuguese peasant. The south continued to consist
of small 'nucleated villages' and large estates (this
structure would remain long into the future providing the
PCP in the twentieth century with a strong basis of support
from the landless agricultural workers of the Alentejo and
the Algarve)
.
The Swabians continued to control Portugal until they
lost their autonomy to the Visigoths in the sixth century,
who were in turn conquered by the Moors beginning in 712
(by 715 they had conquered all of Iberia except for
Asturias). Not until 938 A . D . was the most northern of the
Portuguese provinces, as well as Spanish Galicia, liberated
from the Moors and established as an administrative unit of
Leon called Portucale. The liberation was gained by local
counts who were left to their own methods and resources to
end the Moorish occupation. As a result they developed a
substantial degree of autonomy. In the years after King
Afonso VI of Castile-Leon presented Henry of Burgundy the
title to the counties of Portugal and Coimbra as dowry on
his marriage to the king's daughter Teresa, the counts
became unhappy with the increasing control which Castile-
Leon imposed on the counties. As a result, they convinced
Teresa's son, Afonso Henriques, to depose his mother and
rule in her place. m 1128 Portugal emerged as an
independent nation under the rule of Afonso Henrique
(Portugal's first king). By 1249 Afonso III had succeeded
in completing the expulsion of the Moors and establishing
the present boundaries of Portugal. Portugal's borders
with Castille were stabilized in 1295.7
During the Moorish occupation of Lusitania the
landholding patterns of the north and south continued.
Portugal's expulsion of the Moors did not alter the basic
agricultural structures. In the south the crown and the
church merely redistributed the vast latifundios to
aristocrats in return for services rendered during the
conquests. As far back as the thirteenth century the
conditions which would later allow the PCP to develop a
strong following in the Alentejo were already in evidence.
As historian Robert Rinehart notes,
The land was tilled by sharecroppers, by peasants
contracted to the land (though dependent serfdom
appears to have been rare) and, most numerously,
by wretched masses of itinerant rural laborers
who worked without the protection of a lord or a
manorial contract that would have regulated their
status and assured them of minimal rights. 8
Portugal returns to the sea . The privileged feudal
class did not have an interest in profit oriented pursuits
(mainly because it was war-like and parasitic) , a partial
reason why Portugal remained underdeveloped and in many
ways became a colony of other nations. 9 The author Antonio
de Figueiredo states, "...Portugal has been as much an
economic and political colony of Britain as an intellectual
colony of France and a religious colony of Rome... "10
By the fifteenth century, much earlier than other
major European powers, Portugal was already enjoying a
strong sense of national unity; it was relatively free of
civil strife; and it was governed by a strong
institutionalized government. Since Portugal had firm
territorial boundaries its militaristic aristocracy turned
its attention to the sea. The focus became one of maritime
trade and colonization. 1 !
Because the sea-going ventures were state run (and
very profitable with returns of at least 100 percent profit
and often reaching between 400 and 600 percent), 12 the
profits went into the state coffers and were used by the
elites for extravagant life styles. This was to be one of
the major reasons keeping the industrial revolution from
reaching Portugal. The industrial revolutions of England
and the Netherlands were primarily financed by the middle
or entrepreneurial classes. In Portugal the wealth was
never accumulated by these classes. It remained in the
hands of the elites who used the wealth to build expensive
churches and to purchase luxurious goods. • They preferred
to import these goods from outside rather than to inspire
their production «ithin Portuguese borders. By the
sixteenth century Portugal began to see a fall of profits
from the colonies. The combination of a series of bad
kings and the decrease in revenues led to serious foreign
debt problems. 13
As the last heir to the royal House of Avi Z/ the death
of Cardinal Henrique meant the simultaneous end of
Portugal's royal line. Because Philip II 0 f Spain had the
best claim to Portugal, and the most power to enforce it,
for the next sixty years Portugal was governed by him until
the Duke of Braganca declared its independence in 1640.14
British support had been sought and received by
Braganca during his struggle to restore Portuguese
independence. The price, however, was the Treaty of
Methuen of 1703 which gave the Portuguese a preferential
duty on wine exports in return for the lifting of
restrictions on British imports. The long term result was
a substitution of Spanish political domination for British
economic domination.
Because it could not produce enough grain to meet
domestic consumption, Portugal already had balance of trade
problems, and with increased British imports the balance of
trade worsened. What saved Portugal was the discovery of
gold and diamonds in Brazil. Like the spice boom of years
before, the discovery allowed Portugal to ignore the causes
of its chronic balance of trade problems. Also similar to
the earlier spice boom was the frivolous manner in which
the new wealth was spent. it was quickly siphoned off by
England in return for its exports. A large amount of the
new wealth was also used to fund Portugal's baroque era. 15
The Methuen Treaty was a clear hindrance to Portugal's
industrial development. The end result was the "old
country's" transformation into a giant sieve through which
Brazilian gold passed to help England finance her
industrial revolution. Portugal was left in the periphery
well into the twentieth century. Even during Marquis of
Pombal's restoration period (he governed the nation for
King Jose from 1750 to 1777) little attention was devoted
to Portuguese development. Through his authoritarian,
highly centralized government Pombal introduced the
Enlightenment to Portugal, but even these conditions did
not produce the middle-class Portugal would need to one day
take its place alongside the industrial nations. 16
The liberal era
. Until the nineteenth century,
Portugal remained free of the civil unrest and coups
against royalty which had occurred in many other nations.
From the 1820s on, however, (ever since the crowns' flight
to Brazil during the Napoleonic invasions and its
reluctance to return to Portugal after Napoleon's defeat)
the upper middle-class and military elements assumed a
broader role in Portuguese politics. Increasingly, liberal
ideas such as democracy, equality, and popular sovereignty,
began to infiltrate these emerging political groups. while
the crown remained in Brazil the English General William
Beresford ruled the nation. His resistance against these
progressive ideas undermined the credibility of the regime
since it was foreign as well as reactionary. As a result,
liberals were able to muster wide-ranging support since
their opposition was not only ideological but also
patriotic. A revolution in 1820 succeeded in driving
Beresford out of the country and marked the beginning of
Portugal's modern political evolution. 17
These new power groups created a Constitution in 1822
which limited the royal power, abolished the inquisition,
and expanded the suffrage to all but the illiterate (the
latter comprised about 90 percent of the population) , 1
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women, and friars in the biennial election for a parliament
independent of the crown. The drafters of the new
constitution wanted to limit the power of the crown, create
a representative system, insure individual rights, and
"create a rational, unified legal system." The liberal
changes should not be mistaken for a restructuring of
Portuguese society to its roots. The constitution
succeeded in compromising with the traditional forces by
maintaining a monarchy that reigned (yet did not rule),
and, according to historian Olveira Marques,
"preserving
the religious and economic interests of the church, and not
imposing social and economic reform of the landholders."^
At this time, however, the liberal urban middle-class
groups still provided a very small base upon which to
increase its powers. Liberalism was imperiled in Portugal
for three reasons: first, it represented only nine percent
of the Portuguese population; second, the cities were the
centers of liberal strength and Porto and Lisbon were just
about the only cities which existed; third, the flood of
British imports continued to undermine domestic commerce,
the mainstay of liberal strength. The conditions which
could lead to the emergence of a class of "economically
independent, prosperous townsmen" who could support a new
democracy simply did not exist. These conditions were
compounded by divisions amongst the liberal groups and
Brazil's declaration of independence. 20
The traditional forces seized these opportunities to
make a comeback and rival the radical Jacobin and liberal
groups. The comeback, however, was short-lived since the
liberals ultimately became the victors in the 1832-34 civil
war against the traditionalists. One consequence of the
war was the seizure of large southern landholdings (a
bastion of conservative strength) . A decision was made to
auction the property to help pay the enormous debt incurred
during the civil war. The result was the passing-up of an
opportune moment in which to implement a radical land
reform. instead, as is so often the case in Latin
societies, the latifundios of the old church and noble
elites were transferred to the liberal upper and
upper-middle classes (mainly to successful traders or
industrialists) making them a new landed elite. The reform
did not alter the squalid existence of the landless
peasants. Neither did it help to eliminate the debt as
intended since the land was purchased by only 623 families
at below market prices with 60 percent of the cost covered
by state^ credits. The liberal class, therefore, was to
become an avid supporter of the new regime since it was
responsible for its newly found elitist position. 21
The year 1851 saw a final realignment of the nation's
political structure to accommodate the recent class shifts.
With the collapse of the traditionalists the new political
order was dominated by financial and agrarian oligarchs and
their clients from the upper class and upper middle-class.
It was during this period that factions, the precursors to
political parties, first emerged in Portugal. These two
factions, the Regenerators and Historicists (later called
Progressives), alternated in power under a system called
" rot at ivismo
.
" The difference between the factions was
on
based more on personal loyalties or local interests than
ideological divisions. After a government took power
elections were held solely to legitimize the new
government. The elections were not representative of the
general public since only one percent of the public was
allowed to vote. By 1880 the inequalities of the system
were increasingly questioned by many of the educated,
politically aware, and lower middle-class elements
(especially the younger generation) who were prevented from
participating. 22
Although industry (as well as the first Portuguese
millionaires) was beginning to emerge, the Portuguese
economy still lacked domestic capital, skilled labor, and
the raw materials necessary to fully industrialize the
nation. 23 Agriculture, which continues to be backward to
this day, had already been causing problems for some time
(e.g. balance of payment problems, a result of grain and
food imports)
.
The rural areas suffered from poverty,
irrigation, shortages, lack of chemical fertilizers,
emigration, primitive techniques, and alarmingly low
yields. Plots were too small in the north (minifundios) to
improve production through modern techniques. The
latifundios of the south, where modern techniques would
have worked best, were usually badly run. Their owners had
little interest in investing to improve production since
they acquired the land as status symbols. 24
Republicanism began to make inroads through teachers,
journalists, small businessmen, clerks and artisans. By
1896, rather late for a European nation, these new
political groups were attracting between 15 to 20 percent
of the population. The Portuguese Republicans' proposals
included "complete political freedom and equality,
guarantees for the rights to associate and strike,
separation of church and state, and the elimination of most
indirect, regressive taxes. "25 The rotativismo system was
increasingly imperiled as elitist solidarity began to
weaken in the 1890' s. Lower middle-class radicals and the
Republicans took advantage of the situation and were given
an additional boost with the consolidation of the Third
French Republic (1876) and the overthrow of the Brazilian
monarchy in 1889. Officially the Republican Party had been
created in 1880 but until the 1910 revolution it was a
small force drawing its support mainly from an urban
clientele. Although not strong doctrinally, it adhered to
federalism, cooperat ivism, and social reform. 26
Between 1896 and 1906 the system of rotativismo ceased
to function as smoothly as it had previously.
Disagreements between the two factions were publicized
rather than settled behind closed doors. The complexity of
the situation increased as internal splits struck each of
the major factions. The collapse of " r ot at i vi smo
»
contributed to the unrest which preceded the assassination
of King Carlos I and his eldest son in 1 908 by radical
Republicans and left the monarchy on shaky ground. m 1910
a revolution led by the Republicans with the support of
urban intellectuals and the lower middle-class created the
first republic in Portugal and the third in Europe
following the French and Swiss. The republic was installed
with little opposition due to the gradual transformation
which had been occurring within the Portuguese system. The
hierarchy in the military was neither republican nor
authoritarian and allowed events to unfold. The landed
elite were not very concerned since land reform was not a
republican goal. in short, because the revolution which
overthrew the monarchy was not a radical revolution, the
elites in Portugal were not overly concerned with its
consequences .
^
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The instability which existed prior to 1910 continued
into the newly formed republic. In a nation where
personalism was a dominant characteristic of the political
system no strong leader emerged to head the victorious
Republican Party. As with many other revolutions, the
coalition of forces which helped the Republicans come to
power in 1910 quickly began to drift apart. The vague
doctrine which held the Republicans together also allowed
its varied supporters to interpret the doctrine in
different ways. Once the Republicans were in power the
supporting groups realized that their interpretation of
Republican doctrines were contrary to the Republicans'
interpretation. After only one year the Republicans had
split into three parties: the Evolutionists, Unionists, and
Democrats (the latter continued to use the Republicans
'PRP' initials and inherited its party machine). 28 One of
the major reasons for the split was controversy over the
government's policies toward the church. The more
conservative elements were unhappy with government policies
which separated the Church and state, as well as with other
measures taken against the Church. (Figures show that
during this period of extreme suppression of the church the
institution lost about ten percent of its priests.) 29
Parliament was dominated by intellectual classes
rather than business, worker, or farmer groups. In
addition, the government under the 1911 constitution
rejected a strong executive and decentralization of power
and opted instead for a strong legislative branch. Because
the parties were plagued with divisions and disagreements,
focusing power on Parliament only exacerbated the
instability which the political system was experiencing,
leading in time to extremely unstable governments.
The economic and social underdevelopment did not help
the situation either. While the new prp was considered a
radical party because it attacked the Church, it did not
attempt to widen the suffrage to include women nor did it
help the underprivileged. The PRP was a radical party from
a social standpoint but conservative from an economic one.
Its policies were designed to benefit the urban lower
middle class that provided most of its support. The
radical left was unable to politically organize the working
class which was spread over many small industries and was
more attracted to ant i
-political anarcho-syndicalist
leaders . 30
The government's decree of 1913 decreased the recently
expanded suffrage to only literate males (a decrease from
850,000 to only 400,000). The decree continued to exclude
women (who were allegedly influenced excessively by the
church)
,
urban workers (who were easily attracted to
demagoguery)
,
and most peasants (who were manipulated by
the reactionary forces)
. Political instability, limited
funds, and urban politician neglect of the rural problems
meant that very little change or reform was initiated. In
addition, there was not a peasant party of illiterate
farmers since they did not have the vote. The neglect and
instability spawned by the PRP allowed the conservative
elements in Portuguese society to accumulate power once
again. Portugal still did not have parties in the real
sense of the term. m their place it had factions.
The instability which dominated the nation compounded
by the PRP's treatment of the military eventually led to a
coup in 1917 under Major Bernardinio Sidonio Pais. The PRP
had tampered with military affairs by not allowing members
of the military to run for parliament and by increasing the
privileges of noncommissioned officers and sergeants. m
addition, upper-level officers were unhappy with the PRP's
decision to enter WWI while militarily unprepared. 31
Sidonio Pais sought to usher in a semi-authoritarian
system with the parliament subordinate to the executive.
He made the PRP illegal and increased the role of the
monarchist, religious, and business groups. It was a
conservative but not a traditionalist regime which
maintained many of the trappings of the republic. Portugal
returned to universal suffrage which was included in the
constitution of 1911 but had been restricted in 1913 to
literate males only. Increasingly Pais was supported by
the upper-class, military, students, and landowners. The
new regime was integralist, traditional and strongly
opposed to liberalism, individualism, socialism, and other
doctrines which denied God, the family, and other
traditional concepts. The integralist movement which was
founded in 1910 was one of the first signs of a right-wing
backlash against republicanism.
was
Pais' assassination in 1918 by a radical corporal
followed by the second republican regime whrch lasted until
1926. This regime was extremely unstable, perhaps even
more so than the first republican regime which Pais
replaced. Even though the Democratic Party continued to be
the largest party during the republican era it was plagued
with internal divisions which prevented it from governing
effectively. Frustrated with their inability to alter the
floundering political system by legal means, rival
republican parties increasingly turned to violence and
unlawful measures to resolve the dilemma. Assassinations
became common, especially by secret societies such as the
Carbonaria
.
That Portugal had four governments in 1919 and nine in
1920 are good indicators of the instability which affected
the regime. By the 1 920' s even urban professional and
middle-class elements were abandoning the parliamentary
system. Abstentions in parliamentary elections became
increasingly common as voters tired of the political
deadlock and extra-parliamentary violence. Meanwhile the
PRP's dominance of electoral votes prevented successful
reform movements from either the right, left, or center.
As Republicans from all parties became frustrated with both
the party system and the violence, they retired from public
life. In their place they left mediocre, incompetent
successors often more concerned with their own political
careers and monetary gain through corruption than in the
welfare of the nation. They accumulated giant fortunes
while the nation was left to flounder. Lat i fundistas,
professionals, bankers, merchants, and industrialists
pursued their own independent goals yet never gained enough
power to govern on their own. The groups knew of their
need to reach a solution above factional interests, yet
were unable to reach one. 32 The response was ^ emergence
of several progressive governments after 1923 which led to
a rise in conservative opposition. Whereas previous
governments only fought over the spoils of government, the
new progressive governments actually contemplated
implementing broad-reaching reforms of the agricultural
sector, of education, of the banking system, of the tax
structure, and of social welfare. The Seara Nova group and
the Leftist Democratic Party especially fit into the mold
of progressive parties. These were parties which were
committed to their beliefs rather than groups of
individuals more interested in their own personal
motivations. These committed parties, however, lacked the
parliamentary majorities which were necessary to implement
their programs and provided the fragmentary
counter-revolutionary forces with the common foe needed to
fuse them. Up to this time the Right had not been able to
unify because of the monarchist question. Once the
regeneration of the monarchy was dropped as a goal even the
middle-classes were attracted to the Right. 33
The new radical rhetoric lost republicans the support
of conservative groups (clergy, capitalists, landowners,
and a portion of the middle-class) who regarded the
proposed transformation as too fast. They also lost the
support of radical intellectuals and workers who saw the
evolution as too slow. They wanted more action and less
talk. Upper and mid-ranking civil servants (including the
military) were displeased with post-WWI inflation which had
decreased their real salaries by 50 percent. Bankers,
merchants, and industrialists were displeased with high
taxes, economic crises, and the emergence of socialism and
anarchism. The clergy favored a regime which would
reinstate its lost influence. The conservative
intellectuals became disenchanted with Republicanism and
looked instead to fascism. Even the middle and lower
classes of Lisbon and Porto, the Democrats' greatest basis
of support, were tiring of the constant coup attempts,
street violence, and interruptions of daily life. Neither
could the Democrats expect support from the peasants nor
the women for while they comprised two thirds of the
Portuguese population they were extremely conservative and
beyond the PRP's reach. According to Oliveira Marques,
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As we have seen, the sixteen years of Republican rule
were as unstable as the final years of the constitutional
monarchy. strikes were legalized and became common affairs
as workers attempted to keep their wages on par with
inflation which increased 2800 percent from 1911 to 1923.35
Governments under the republic were short lived averaging
one every four months (45 governments, seven parliamentary
elections, and eight presidential elections were held
during this period)
. Political violence, involvement in
WWI, budget deficits, bread shortages, capital flight, a
backward agricultural sector, and currency devaluation
added to the instability and to an increasing unhappiness
with the republican regime. As time progressed the regime
became decreasingly able to deal with the instability. It
found itself isolated. By 1926 a large part of Portuguese
society acquiesced to the need for a right-wing,
non-republican solution. A general unhappiness with the
Democrats began to infiltrate all sectors of Portuguese
society
.
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The decrease in liberal democratic values
accompanied by an increase in the formation of
anti-parliamentary groups, most of which succeeded i
recruiting the young and drew heavily from French rightist
ideas. The upper-bourgeois youth and the military were
especially drawn to authoritarian and integralist
solutions. Even the press began attacking liberal
democracy and gave favorable coverage to the Italian and
German solutions. Calls for a military coup became ever
more popular. Although a military coup failed in 1925 a
second coup attempt in 1926 succeeded in ending Portugal's
first experiment in liberal democracy. 36
Salazar's "New State"
The coup, as in the 1910 and 1974 revolutions, was a
bloodless one. Republicans, monarchists, integralists,
catholics, and nationalists supported the military's move.
As liberal measures were eliminated, the military regime
led by General Oscar Carmona became more repressive.
Initial support came from the public at large which hoped
that authoritarianism would lead to stability and economic
recovery. The coup leaders seized the reigns of power from
the middle-classes and returned them to the upper-class
conservatives. Not since the early liberal era had the
upper classes amassed so much power. 37
in 1926 political parties which were involved in an
attempted military coup were made illegal. m addition the
right to strike was withdrawn. The economic problems in
Portugal continued as the military was not experienced in
economic management. Economic conditions deteriorated to
the point where many compared the crisis to the worst
periods of the republic. By providing Professor Antonio de
Oliveira Salazar with broad budgetary powers the military
was able to recruit him to manage the economy. His
solution was to trim the budget by cutting the benefits to
the lower and middle-class groups. The level of military
spending remained untouched despite bureaucratic waste and
a 23.42 percent share of the budget. 38
By 1930 the military and Salazar had succeeded in
returning political stability to the nation. That same
year Salazar proclaimed the formation of the National Union
party which would become part of his "new state."
Corporatism would replace the political parties, trade
unions, a free press, and other organizations. Power was
to be focused on the executive. The values of God, family,
and the nation would be given the highest priority. Change
would be controlled. Corporatism would be the Portuguese
solution to alien radical transformations such as
socialism, liberalism, or communism.
According to Political Scientist Howard Wiarda
,
The corporative tradition implies abased upon widespread acceptance ofTeraS"elitism, organiclsm, and authority. it means Y apattern of corporate sectoral and functional
or central state apparatus and with the various
o^der^^unitl8 (n ° bilit^ Church?rders
,
universities, municipalities)incorporated into a single, organic whole forpurposes of integral national development it
s'tate^autho^'r
° f t ic-pat?imoniali ttate authority and a social order basedsimilarly on patron-client interdependence itmeans a predominantly Catholic society' andPoetical culture based upon Thomisticprinciples. it implies an etatist andmercantilist economic system. And it implies a
author^
1 SYH^ m baS6d ° n Patrimonialism,thority, and hierarchy, with a centralized
vertical, pyramidal structure of power anddecision making. 39
In theory, social unrest would end since the
"corporation" would represent the clergy, military,
students, workers, employers, and all other groups equally.
The central government would guarantee a harmonious
coexistence to all. in reality the government was biased
toward the employers and traditional elements at the
expense of the lower classes. As a result, the Portuguese
solution towards harnessing, taming, and manipulating
radical change failed because the lower classes realized
the government was not mediating between contending classes
but was instead using corporatism to favor the upper
classes . 40
Most of Salazar's support in the early years came from
the Church and other groups that had the mos t to gain under
the new regime. His opposition came primarily from the
middle and lower classes. m 1933, Salazar quickly began
to set-up the formal structure of his "new state" by
creating a new constitution. Although basic civil rights
were included, they were nullified by a clause allowing the
state to restrict them when necessary for the "common
good.
"
In 1933 all political parties were made illegal,
including the conservative Catholic Center party. The
government was anti-political party. Because parties were
blamed as the source of Portugal's past ills, even its own
National Union was considered more of a civic association
or movement than a party. The structure of the government
did not allow a very large suffrage. In fact, only 7.8
percent of the population was allowed to vote in the 1945
elections. Women did not get the vote until 1968 and even
then there were still many restrictions imposed on both
sexes
.
A comparison of Salazar' s dictatorship with German or
Italian Fascism shows that Portugal was not a fascist
state. Despite Salazar' s sharing views with Hitler and
Mussolini on authoritarianism, anti-communism, and
hierarchy, Portugal's dictatorship was not as harsh or
violent as theirs. One reason is that the Portuguese were
easier to control. Portugal was primarily comprised of a
peasant population which was highly Catholic, politically
unaware, socially quiescent and conformist in its general
cultural view. Therefore, large scale coercion was not
necessary, except in the industrial sector. 41
in the early 1900' s Portugal was just beginning to
develop communist and other radical parties which had
existed in other parliamentary systems much earlier. Since
the parties were mainly city oriented, it was easy for
Salazar to dispose of them. Any political instigators
which remained were from the Right and were eventually
coopted into the system as members of elite conservative
groups. Therefore, intervention at all levels of society
was not necessary, allowing for a low-key authoritarian
regime. Portugal never created a mass-based fascist party
and Salazar was anti-party anyway (his National Union was
an "association" or non-party). The historian, Tom
Gallagher seems to think that Portugal compares better with
the 1934 Dolfuss regime in Austria than with Germany or
Italy. The "New State" was not fascist but paternalistic,
traditional, and conservative. 42
According to the political scientist Thomas Bruneau,
Salazar' s reign must be categorized as a
"clerical-conservative" or "corporatist-authoritarian" one.
It was a "conservative and authoritarian regime of personal
rulership." Salazar purposefully sought to keep Portugal
underdeveloped. He used press censorship, controls on
foreign investment, and other measures to prevent foreign
influences from infiltrating Portuguese society. m this
manner he hoped to prevent change or at least retard it to
a pace which he could manage. 4 3
By the late fifties and early sixties economic and
political factors (for example, the African wars) led
Salazar to initiate measures which ran contrary to his
"isolationist" policies. By allowing an increase in
foreign investment and joining the European Free Trade
Association and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
he was planting the "seeds of change" which would help
bring about the inevitable transformations he had hoped to
avoid. 44
In 1968 Salazar suffered an incapacitating stroke.
His successor, the scholar Marcello Caetano, was rhought to
be somewhat more liberal. Changes were expected to bring
Portugal closer to the rest of the European community as it
distanced itself from dependence on a colonial empire.
With time the "seeds" which Salazar had planted began to
sprout. The increased foreign investment made Portugal
more sensitive to changes in the world economy. Foreign
investment increased from 1.5 percent in 1960 to 27 percent
in 1970, inflation reached the double digits by the early
seventies, and unionization and labor unrest also
increased. Emigration, which for years had solved the
governments inability to deal with underemployment and
unemployment, began to have unwanted repercussions. Not
only did the emigrants return with the desperately needed
foreign currency but they also brought undesired foreign
ideas and values which spawned a desire for change. since
the change which had been expected of Caetano never took
place the tension mounted. 4 5
In 1974 a military coup was carried out by mid-level
officers, reflecting their own grievances. Given the
widespread dissatisfaction with the Salazar/Caetano
dictatorship, popular support soon transformed the coup
into a revolution. A brief summary of the major changes
would include:
1) the break up of the colonial empire,
2) the governments increased involvement in the
economy,
3) the emergence of political parties,
4) an increase in labor rights and PCP domination of
unions,
5) a reorganization of local governments,
6) a limited agrarian reform.
Of these six changes Bruneau considers only the first to be
irreversible; the others could still be altered depending
on the political situation of the future. 46
Because in this chapter we focus on variables which
form the basis of the Portuguese political system, we will
discuss events which occurred after the 1974 revolution in
later chapters. 47
The Portuguese
From these historical sections we should get an
understanding of the Portuguese political system. We are
dealing with one of Europe's oldest states. We are also
dealing with one of the most homogeneous people in Europe.
Today Portugal has a population of approximately ten
million people. A very proud people who are proud of their
past, their culture, and their empire. The "Fado,"
literally interpreted as "fate," is one of the musical
forms unique to Portugal. It helps convey the Portuguese's
obsession with their past. The "Fado" portrays in song "a
kind of melancholy longing, intermingled with sadness and
resignation. "48 Most Portuguese have always led a harsh
existence, yet rather than look to the future and hope for
better times they look instead to the past when Portugal
was a powerful nation with possessions encompassing the
globe. 49 It is not uncommon, especially in the rural
areas, to hear peasants exclaim, "But that Salazar were
still here. Things were never this bad under him!" Why
the majority of the people would long for the past is
ironic because even during Portugal's "Golden Age" the
general public struggled to survive. The wealth never
benefitted the agrarian maj orit y nut was instead squandered
on the extravagant lifestyles of the aristocracy.
Keefe notes that in addition to pride the Portuguese
are very "family oriented, generally apolitical, basically
conservative and individualistic
... intensely patriotic
but not public spirited.
... phlegmatic but not practical
in
... public attitudes." Because of the hard life which
the Portuguese have always led they tend to be more
concerned with survival rather than politics. 50
The Portuguese overall are a socially conservative
people. Their views are more often a result of tradition
than an awareness of conservative ideals. On the whole we
are dealing with an extremely religious Catholic people (95
percent catholic, although significantly less are
practicing Catholics)
.
The church has always played a very
important role in Portugal either through a strong
influence in politics, education, and colonial policy (up
until the late 1700' s and during the Salazar dictatorship)
or as the object of criticism and repression (from the late
1700's to the early 1900's). 51
The society tends to be male-dominated with women
still delegated to an inferior position. Although women's
rights are slowly increasing, many inequalities remain in
the system. Among the most conservative are the peasants
of the rural agricultural regions (especially tn the
north,
.
For centuries all governments, regardless of their
position in the political spectrum, have neglected these
regions. Insufficient peasant education, traditional
land-holding patterns, and religion are all factors which
help explain the peasants' conservative nature. The
Portuguese are hardworking people. They strive to do the
best job possible at all times. They are a people who are
still strongly attached to the family both nuclear and
extended. Parents will go through extreme hardships to
help provide their children with a better life than the one
they have known.
One of the few keys open in the search for a brighter
future has been emigration. Emigration for any people is a
difficult choice for it usually means families will suffer
long periods of separation at worst (if only the male
emigrates and sends back money) or a difficult period of
assimilation at best (if the entire family emigrates).
Assimilation usually carries with it the traumas of dealing
with a new culture, learning a new language, tolerating
discrimination, and accepting jobs rejected by citizens of
the host nation. It is not an easy process. Certainly one
cannot ignore the plight of the emigrant which has become a
part of Portuguese culture. Emigration has helped Portugal
face its unemployment (by providing an escape valve) while
simuitaneously creating a new source of foreign currency
(through emigrant remittances, to camouflage its chronic
balance of payments problems. 52
Regional Diversity
Despite the homogeneity of Portuguese society,
observers should not conclude that Portugal lacks
diversity. indeed, for its mere 35,510 square miles of
territory (which includes the Azores and Madeira) Portugal
has a great deal of diversity. The homogeneity stems from
the strong nationalism which all Portuguese feel for the
patria (homeland). The diversity is a result of the
various landforms, climatic conditions, and soils
which exist in this small nation. Although the major
division in continental Portugal is between the northern
mountainous region and the southern rolling plains there is
also variety within these two main topographical
divisions . 53
The North
.
The Minho, which occupies the northwest
corner of the country between the Rio Minho and the Rio
Douro is one of the most densely populated regions of
Portugal (see figures 1 and 2) . The climate is very
favorable with abundant rainfall supporting the most
intensive agriculture in the country. Centuries of
dividing the already small land-holdings in the Minho among
heirs (a tradition dating back to the Swabian settlers of
the fifth century) has resulted in plots so small that they
are barely large enough to support even only one heir. m
the last few centuries this has resulted in a "newer-
tradition whereby the oldest son inherits the land while
his younger brothers forfeit their right to the property
and seek their livelihood elsewhere even though by law they
are entitled to their inheritance. The minuscule plots of
the Minho have led to the emigration of landless males
primarily to foreign nations but also to other regions of
Portugal
.
The northeastern most region of Portugal,
Tras-Os-Montes, is an arid and very poor region. it is
sparsely populated since the land is not as capable of
supporting the intensive agriculture which the Minho
supports. The harsh life has added to the sparse
demographic figures as the young have chosen to emigrate in
search of a better life.
The Beira region encompasses much more territory than
these two other northern regions. It includes all of the
territory south of the Rio Douro, north of the Rio Tejo,
and west of Spain. The Beira region is itself divided into
three sub-regions: Beira Alta, Beira Baixa, and Beira
Literal. Of the three, Beira Baixa is the least populated.
Its topography resembles the arid, wind- swept
Tras-Os-Montes region. Both of the other sub-regions are
very fertile and harbor a large concentration of
population . 54
These northern regions are amongst the most populated
of Portugal. Although they are diverse they are also
similar enough to be distinguished from southern Portugal.
Poverty is prevalent in the north as in the south but at
least most peasants own their own plots of land, no matter
how small, from which they can farm a self-sufficient
living. This self-sufficiency combined with strong
catholic beliefs are major factors behind the conservatism
of the north.
The north has also suffered the most from male
emigration so that today women outnumber men. It is neither
uncommon to find many unmarried women nor to find more
women integrated into the work force. The emigration
figures are unusually high. When computed for the nation
as a whole Portugal lost 1,033,000 of its people from 1960
to 1970 resulting in a net loss of 226, 140 people in its
1970 census. 55 In the north social cleavages are not
apparent among the poor. The basic class structure is a
division between the small elite groups which hold most of
the wealth, a small middle-class, and the rural peasant
Figure 1. Portugal. Districts, 1976
Source: Eugene K. Keefe et al
.
, Area Handbook For Portugal
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) , pT
xiv
.
Figure 2. Portugal. 1933 Provinces
Source: Eugene K. Keefe et al., Area Handbook For Portugal
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) , P. 62.
which makes up the largest group. 56
— S °"thern Portugal Is made up of a
topographical area remarkably different from that in the
north. The Alentejo, some divide it between the Uf
(Upper, and Baixo <Lo„er, Alentejo, is a large region of
gently rolling hills which rarely rise above 600 feet. It
is sparsely populated and, l ike the topography, land
holding patterns are radically different from the north
While land distribution in the north has centered on small
Plots ever since Swabian settlements, the large estates of
the south can be traced to the Roman conquests. The
Alentejo is dominated by large estates comprising up to
1,000 acres, although the revolution ushered in a partial
land reform which has since transformed into cooperatives
some of the larger estates. These latifundios are often
owned by absentee landlords. As a result most of the
inhabitants of the southern region are landless and provide
an abundant source of agricultural labor. Unlike their
northern counterparts who emigrated abroad to seek a better
life, most southerners migrated to the cities instead.
The Algarve, the other southern region, still shows
strong Moorish influences as it was the last of the
Portuguese regions to be liberated from the Moors.
Compared to the Alentejo the Algarve is less hilly and more
of a coastal plain. 57
Politically the south has a long history of radicalism
when spared to the conservative north. This is partially
a result of the landless existence of southerners. Most
are totally dependent on the local landowner for their
existence and would have very little to lose if radical
change was initiated. Every day they worx for the local
latifundista reminds them of the uneven distribution of
wealth. Even within their own class the southern poor have
an established hierarchy. Those who own land have the
highest prestige, next come the sharecroppers, at the
bottom are the landless laborers. In the north the poor
are all "equally" poor.
Religiously the south is the least pious of Portugal.
Illegitimacy, which is common in the south, is a crude
indicator since the religious peasant of the north would
rarely allow a child to be born in such a state (although
in many instances the reason for illegitimacy is that the
poverty of the landless peasant is so great that he often
is unwilling or cannot spare the sum necessary to pay for a
civil ceremony). 58
Therefore, despite Portugal's small size, regional
diversity exists and has a strong influence on politics.
Although poverty exists in the north as in the south, at
least northern peasants have enough land to remain self-
sufficient. The northerners access to property is a major
reason behind their conservative nature. The southerners
on the other hand, have been totally dependent on the sail
of their labor which has made them muoh m0 re radical. Also
important, northerners migrated oversees while southerners
migrated internally to the cities adding to the radicalism
m the labor force. This helps explain why the PCP's
regions of strength are in the indn^ri,,<-ne ustrial zones and in the
latifundio south.
Social Structure
Portuguese social structure survived the centuries
with few changes in the class structure. Keefe emphasizes,
"ironically the very stability - indeed the stagnation - of
Portugal's social structure may well have been a product of
the country's homogeneity." At the time of the 1974
revolution the class structure was still comprised of a
"small, wealthy upper class, a some what larger middle
class, and a massive, predominantly rural lower class."
The major change has been the expansion of a working class,
an increase in the middle class, and minor changes in the
upper class. 59
Prestige, political power, and economic success in
early Portugal was based on land ownership. m the
traditional social structure an elite group made up of the
aristocracy, the military, and the church contrQlled ^
wealth through land ownership while the vast raaj ority of
the population remained in poverty. This social hierarchy
continued until the mid-eighteenth century when the
traditional elitist groups were joined by a small rae rchant
class which had accumulated enough wealth to take advantage
of and purchase the lands seized from the church and
aristocracy under the Pombaline "land reform." m,
reshuffling of the elite classes did not improve the
peasants' lot. Even with a newly emerging middle class of
mercantilists and professionals (nine percent of the
population) the poor peasant classes comprised 88 percent
of the population while the elites (aristocracy, new
bourgeoisie, and clergy) dominated with a mere three
percent . 60
Although the rest of Europe faced considerable
upheaval during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Portugal managed to remain unscathed by the new ideological
currents emerging beyond the Atlantic and Pyrenees. The
peasants were ignorant of the changes occurring outside of
the nations' borders, while the middle classes were too
weak to carry out similar social change. The major change
in the class structure during the liberal era was a result
of changing land ownership patterns as mercantilists
purchased additional property seized from the clergy and
aristocracy and climbed the social ladder. Many of the
C"°" "ere alS
° °« so that the peasants
conditions actually deteriorated rather than improved
.
At the turn of the twentieth century the class
structure re raained basically the same . The working class
was still relatively small. With the ad(Jltion Qf ^
nouveau riches elements and the fall from grace of the
clergy and aristocracy, the elitist classes declined to
about one percent of the total population while the middle
class increased to 15 percent T h 0. The majority of the
population were still poor peasants. 61
Salazar's dictatorship did little to remedy the plight
of the peasant. Since he realized that much of his
strength lay in the rural, conservative peasant he had
little interest in educating and otherwise inspiring change
which might produce an unwanted side effect - disaffection
with the regime and a class consciousness. Salazar
believed strongly in the "traditional" model of organizing
an economy and society based on birth. He believed that
God had given him "the privilege of being poor" and that
"education, health, and economic reform 'would not create
happiness'." Given these beliefs it is easy to understand
why Salazar tried to prevent change in Portugal.
The industrial pace under his leadership was much
slower than that in the rest of Europe. By the Sixties and
Seventies studies had determined that the sociai structure
had changed very Uttie in the previous century. The upper
class still compri sed only one percent of the population
while the middle class comprised 15 to 25 percent
. The
bul, of the Portuguese were still in the hotter, layer of
society. industrialization contributed to an increasing
urban proletariat, but the major change was in the
emergence of an upper-lower class of clerks, lower-level
civil servants, and others who lived just above the poverty
line
.
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in the years prior to the revolution the very small
elitist class recognized the potential threat to its
interests from the rising lower-middle class and working
class. it tightened its grip on its exclusive social
position through interclass marriages. As a result, at the
time of the revolution the elites were the largest
landowners, the directors and owners of the largest
industries, the high-ranking government officials, the
leading financiers, the senior military officials, the
members of the Catholic church hierarchy, the university
professors, and the professional elites (top lawyers and
medical professionals)
.
Eighty percent of the economy was
controlled by only eight of these elite families. Upward
mobility was almost impossible except through education
which was virtually inaccessible to the lower classes. 63
to define and describe. Compared to the middle class in
other nations it was very small and encompassed
,^
range of income groups if defined broadly. The traditional
middle-class was made up of small-scale entrepreneurs
those in the professions, and university teachers below the
level of professors. On the whole this class was
better-off than the mass of the population and found its
interests closer to the upper classes. Beginning with the
industrialization and urbanization of the 1960<s and 1970's
a lower-middle class began to emerge. This new class was
composed primarily of skilled technicians, clerks and
employees in the service sector, mid-level business
executives, schoolteachers, lower to mid-level civil
servants, small-businessmen, and medium-sized landowners.
The 75 percent remainder of the population considered
to be lower class lacked a mutual bond or class
consciousness to bind it together. As mentioned previously
the lower classes can be divided into several types: the
small landholding peasant (mainly in the north), the
peasant with limited or no access to the land (mainly in
the south), and the urban worker. In the northern rural
areas the lower classes owned very small plots of land (78
percent of the farms were less than 4 hectares), and little
social differentiation was apparent within the class. In
the south the poor were divided i„t0 different SQcial
categories dependent on their aocess to land with the
landless peasant at the bottom of the scale. The urban
worker was the third group which comprised the lower
classes
.
64
With the decolonization, Portugal had to face the mass
return of 800,000 Portuguese refugees fro, the colonies
The "retornados", as they were called in Portugal, became
both an economic and a political burden. The new pressure
group was resentful, angry, and frustrated. For years they
had been encouraged to emigrate to the colonies. Like
their counterparts who left Portugal for Europe or North
and South America, they had gone in search of a better
life. Whereas other emigrants had something to show for
all their labor the retornados now had only the shirts on
their backs. Both struggled, yet the retornados were
looked down upon by other emigrants and by those Portuguese
who never left home in search of a better life.
Some of the resentment toward the retornados was
because of the unfounded belief that they had made large
fortunes through their exploitation of the African natives.
This was true for a small number of the retornados who had
managed to leave Africa with large sums of money in foreign
bank accounts. But most of the retornados went to Portugal
and worked as low-level civil servants at the request and
ln£luence of their—
.
They were very resentful
that they should now return nome i.poverished. After years
of toil in the colonies they wanted to know where their
rewards were. „here was the upward ability which other
emigrants received in return for their years of hard work
and suffering, They were also resenfcful Qf ^governs s rapid decolonization and its sluggishness in
removing the, fr0m the civil strife and fear of reprisals
by the natives. Since parh ,h„hs e c adult refugee was only allowed
to take USS200 out of Africa, it is not dlfficuU fcQ
understand why they were resentful. The wealthy retornados
could afford to fly to any nation that would give them
refugee status, hut the poor could only return to
Portugal . 65
The Portuguese government made an effort to meet their
needs with social assistance. it attempted to direct them
back to the regions where their roots lay. However,
because the retornados had gotten used to a certain
standard of living, it became very difficult to send them
to the underdeveloped rural areas which could not provide
the lifestyles to which they had become accustomed in the
colonial cities. Most preferred to remain in the
Portuguese cities rather than move to the countryside.
This is one of the reasons why the Portuguese feel
resentment toward the retornados. The Portuguese
Un"Pl0yMnt situation was grave p rior to the
decolonization process, but with ^ return ^ ^
and the retornados the unemployment ,itttrtlon
The government preferred that the retornados return to
their place of origin so as to defuse a potentially
dangerous political group. Meanwhile the Portuguese had to
support the retornados. Their unwillingness to raove to the
rural areas became a source of unhappiness and resentment
to the rural population (especially up north, who would
answer the contention of the unemployment problem with the
following: "Only the l azy don <t work or Can<t fin<J
There is plenty of land to plow." The insinuation was that
the rural peasant had plenty of work to do and could never
find enough time to do it in. The unemployment problem
would be non-existent if the unemployed were to pick up a
hoe and dig ditches.
in many ways the retornados have become the scapegoats
for Portugal's societal ills. The retornados are often
accused of being the cause of Portugal's increase in crime
as well as the increase in drug abuse. Evidence has shown
that many retornados have turned to crime out of
desperation and some would resort to crime even in the best
of circumstances, but to blame the retornados alone for
these problems is not just.
Economy
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Portugal's economy experienced very slow growth over
the centres. m the seventies the problems persisted
because of the colonial wars, the oligarchy whi
continuously controlled the economy, the increasing
between the rich and the poor, and the bacxwa^
agricultural sector which produced some of the lowest
yields in Western Europe. The only bright spot in the
economic picture was that Salazar's frugal m0netary
policies had resulted in large gold and foreign exchange
reserves. Largely because of its development aid to the
colonies, the International Monetary Fund and the World
Banx labeled Portugal a developed country. By most other
standards Portugal rates behind Spain and sometimes Greece
both of which were considered developing countries by these
bodies in 1975.66
In many ways Portugal's colonial empire actually
harmed Portugal's economic development more than it helped
it. As Portugal diverted ever increasing amounts of its
budget to fight the independence movements in the colonies
this had a significant negative impact on the economy. But
even before the colonial wars Portugal had begun to suffer
negative effects because of its colonies. The easy access
to the colonial wealth led the Portuguese economy to become
dependent on its export-import trade with the colonies ^
the expense of Nestle economic development. Neglect of
denestic development was encouraged by the British whQ
exchangee, manufactured goods for wine and agriculfcural
goods. What little economic development was carried out
was in infrastructure modernization financed primarii y by
the poor who paid the brunt of the excise taxes. Portugal
was a late developer and by 19X0 only 20 percent of the
work force was employed in the industrial sector, of which
a mere 20 percent worked in firms which employed 10 workers
or more. Industrialization was still at the rudimentary
stages, centering in leather goods, textiles, and cork and
wine processing. Over 60 percent of the work force was
still engaged in farming and fishing.
The Republicans were not devoted to economic
development either. The economy deteriorated as severe
inflation reduced the currency in 1926 to only one
thirtieth of its value sixteen years earlier. Bank
failures, labor unrest, budget deficits, and chronic
balance of trade problems exacerbated the situation. The
economic crisis had a significant role in bringing down the
Republican experiment . 67
After the coup of 1926 the military found itself
unable to handle the same economic problems which had
contributed to the Republicans' downfall. in 1928 Salazar
took over total control n €of the economy. According to
Keefe, he was a strong believer in:
••• balanced budgets and fiscal
corporate free enterprises within th
s ° lvenc Y and of
state control. His faith 7n ^ ? llmits of strict
a stable currency backed b IT," standard and inforeign exchange reserve! , 9 ^
,
and substantial
worst days of the world-wfrte h
""shaken even in the
the 1930's and 1940?s These
^ssion ^ »r during
effective in bringing "hV^untrv^th ™-"ydepression with only moderate h Y throu 9h the
stable, albeit static! economv It ,u
Ptl °" ° f its
for example, when the r«t „?J;>, he end of 1933 '
from widespread unemployment re^eredT ^P""9m Portugal was less than one percent 6^ unemPl°y™ent
Portugal emerged from WWII unscathed and in excellent
condition vis-a-vis the rest of Europe. Had Portugal
pursued the appropriate measures it could have become a
developed nation along with its European neighbors,
instead it was left behind as a backward nation while its
neighbors industrialized.
The primary explanation for Portugal's backwardness
was rooted in Salazar's economic philosophies. Keefe
states, "His insistence on a stable currency, a positive
balance of payments, and a balanced budget and his
suspicion of foreign aid and foreign investment outweighed
the arguments of those who would have preferred a more
dynamic attack on the low living standards and static
economic development." His critics argue that Salazar did
not exploit foreign aid to its maximum potential. 69
Although the Portuguese economy did remarkably well in
the 1960's Wit, a 6 , 2 peroent average increase, thefavorable growth reflected prima ri ly the industrial and
service sectors of the urban areas. Agriculture grew at
only 1.3 percent while industry grew at 9 percent,
construction at 8.1 percent, and services at 5.9 percent.
Despite Salazar's forty-year rulf> ;>«>-Y le as
"economist-dictator,
»
Portugal continued to be Europe's poorest nation. 70
Caetano recognized that Portugal had to initiate
changes to deal with the economic problems and implemented
limited liberal policies. Wages were allowed to improve at
a faster rate and foreign investment was encouraged. The
increase in world oil prices as well as the onslaught of a
world-wide inflationary spiral complicated Caetano's
attempts to improve the economy. Inflation in 1973 rose to
30 percent. 71
After the revolution the new government began moving
in a new economic direction. Decree Law 203-74 included
economic and social welfare measures which were to provide
a preview of the major changes to occur in the new
Portuguese economy. As Keefe describes, an income
distribution program was called for in the decree which:
. . .
combined minimum wages with salary ceilings
and tax reform to ease the burden on lower incomegroups and reduce tax evasion in the higherbrackets. Anti-inflation measures included afreeze on prices for essential goods, rents, and
other services. Labor was to have a stronger
voice in enterprise management and to receive
and transactions i„ sec ° it f„ "° were closedFourth development plan wl« r
s
:
,sPended. The
new development prioritie «, ™
bS shelved
, and
included more regional c,lLT a™°"nced. These
to smaller indoles asTIT asSistan«investment in infrastructure proie^t/"^o^ 3^housing, and education ihf! ' l°»-cost
monopolistic practices and ,„ l " atlon of
cooperative movements and o tL^ 01" 0^ 011 ° fimprovements were promised^ marketing
Beginning in July 1974 the second provisional
government announced steps to deal with inflation and
increase productivity through a series of draft decrees
which curtailed strikes, controlled prices, prohibited
lock-outs, promised credits to threatened businesses, and
offered incentives for low-cost housing construction and
foreign investment. strikes could not be initiated during
a thirty-day mandatory negotiating period, lay-offs were
almost impossible to carry-out, the minimum-wage was
doubled in May 1974 and increased an additional 20 percent
in July 1975. Salaries were stabilized with a ceiling
imposed in June 1975 Anti-infiaH«n a=> i o
.
mu latio ry measures were
imposed, including restrictions on consumer credit and
steep surcharges of 20 to 30 percent on many imports.
Although the new regime did not. initially have plans
to nationalize any major aspect of the economy except for
banks of issue (carried out in the fall of 1974), by
1«« the most important sectors of the economy had been
nationalized. The nationalizations were carried out as a
reaction to the attempted right-„ing coup of March ^ ^
and not as the result of any well-planned decision. The
nationalizations of domestrc banks and insurance companies
requested by the communist dominated ban. worker's union
had a large impact on the rest of the economy because large
segments of the maj or industrial enterprises were
controlled by them. m April and May electricity, oil,
steel, railroads, national airline, road transport, cement
Plants, shipbuilding, heavy engineering plants, wood pulp,
and tobacco industries were also nationalized.
Most of the nationalizations were directed at the
family-owned conglomerates which had dominated the
Portuguese economy prior to the revolution. The Companhia
Uniao Fabril of the Melo family was considered the largest
of these, controlling about 20 percent of all industry and
10 percent of the entire economy through its 186
subsidiaries. Other families with huge conglomerates and
large shares of the Portuguese economy were the
Champalimaud Group, the Espirito Santo family, and the
Borges Irmao and Quina families. Intermarriages between
these families meant that between 100 and 200 families held
positions of prestige prior to the coup and a mere 20
families controlled most of the economy. Since these
none
families owned the banks and insurance companies i
Portugal, the nationalization of bot h meant that with
swoop the government was able to control m0re than half of
Portuguese industry. By the end of December 1 975 many
claimed that the Portuguese state controlled as much as 65
percent of the economy. It controlled U7 nationalized
firms as well as their 201 subsidiaries, not to mention the
firms placed under government management because of
financial difficulties.
The purges of management following the military coup
led to a shortage of necessary managers to keep these firms
in strong operation. The nationalizations were formalized
by the new 1976 constitution which stated in Article 9 that
among the fundamental duties of the state was the
socialization of the means of product ion . 73
Salazar's isolationist policies favored the
accumulation of investment capital from domestic sources
rather than foreign investment. with the loosening of
foreign investment restrictions in the sixties, foreign
capital rushed to Portugal to take advantage of the low
wages and docile labor force. By 1970 foreign capital had
reached 27 percent of investment as compared to the 1.5
percent of the 1 960's. Although the post-revolutionary
governments were cautious not to frighten foreign capital
away, the political and economic chaos inevitably led to
re s
some desertions by foreign copies or decreased f0rei gniaVeStMnt
'
By 1976 the «o»o*ic mood had increased
foreigners' desires to invest in Portugal. 74
Portugal had some advantages when compared to othe
nations faced with post-revolutionary problems and social
upheaval. Because of Salazar's monetarist polici
Portugal had amassed very large foreign reserves (us 52
billion,
. If managed correctly these ^^^^
given the country the leeway necessary to carry out its
policies with minimal foreign interference. Unfortunately
Portugal began dipping into its reserves so that by 1975
they were down to only US$1. 5 billion. Another advantage
was that Salazar had not run a significant budget deficit
during his reign. 7 5
Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed major factors which
influence the Portuguese political system. After seeing
the inequalities which dominated the system prior to the
1974 military coup, it is not surprising that it gained the
wide-spread popular support necessary to convert it into a
revolution. Our focus on Portugal's background also
enhanced our understanding of the PCP's appeal in the south
and lack of appeal in the north. in the next chapter the
background is completed as woP z a e focus on the political
parties with which the PCP competes for power.
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CHAPTER 3
PORTUGUESE POLITICAL PARTY
We have discussed several aspects of the Portuguese
background which are essentia! for an understanding of the
Portuguese politica! system, we cannot expect to
understand the motivations behind party strategies unless
we have at least a momentary knowledge of the nation's
history, of its people
, Qf ifcs economy
^ ^ Qf
geography. The historical analysis has shown that Portugal
"
Sti11 f6eling thS
-"-noes of the land-holding
patterns left by both the Romans and Swabians ,for example,
the low-productivity of the agricultural sector,
. we now
have an understanding of the important pressure groups in
Portugal (for example, the military, latifundistas, clergy,
middle classes, peasants, and workers)
. We have traced the
political turmoil over the decades and the paternalistic
nature of Portuguese politics over the centuries. And we
have examined the impact of decades of corporativism and
centuries of neglect on the Portuguese economy. with this
essential information now in mind, we can proceed with an
examination of the Portuguese political party system in
historical perspective. We will begin with an analysis of
the party system's evolution from its formation, through
the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, to the post-revolutionary
100
^ alS ° inte9rate System into Giovanni
Sartori-s typology (dlscussed ^^ one) ^ ^
contribution to comparative political Party studies.
Early_jiistory
According to most scholars familiar with Portuguese
history and political party theory, the modern political
party did not emerge in Portugal until relatively late it
is difficult to pinpoint an exact date for the emergence of
the system, although most would agree that prior to 1910
the parties which existed in Portugal could only be
considered factions at best in the traditional definition
of the term.
Until the end of absolutism in 1834, politics was the
competition between rival elites for control of power. it
was a struggle of "absolutists" supported by the old
nobility, the Catholic church hierarchy, and the
conservative peasantry that made up the bulk of the
population; against the liberal elite who preferred a
constitutional monarchy and were supported by the emerging
upper commercial bourgeoisie of the major port cities, the
educated bureaucracy, some of the petty nobility of central
and southern Portugal, some of the military officers, and
the lower clergy. As Walter Opello, a political scientist,
notes, 102
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From 1822 to 1852 three factions competed for power in
the Cortes (parliament). The Miguelists represented the
interests of absolutism and were opposed to the development
of a constitutional system. The Chartists supported the
principle of moderate constitutionalism of the 1826 Charter
which created a parliamentary regime. The Septembrists
advocated the more radical constitutional order of 1821.
The Chartists and Septembrists merged in 1852 to form the
Regenerators who supported the revised liberal constitution
of that year. 2
The Regenerators split into the Historical Left at
first and later into the Progressives. The remaining
Regenerators regrouped into a constitutional rightist
party. Until 1910 Portuguese politics was dominated by the
Regenerators and Progressives under a system dubbed
"rotativismo"
. Undpr hhioe this system each faction would
alternate governing the nation anHl d taking advantage of the
spoils . "3
The Socialist Party emerged in the mid-1870s but it
never developed a sign i fi cant oasis of support. In 1881
various Mi guelis t l ibe ral elements formed the Portugese
Republican Party (PRP)
. Although durlng ^ ^the party was radical (or socialistic), with time it
realized that Portugal lacked the conditions necessary <a
large worker base, to make that philosophy a reality. The
party platform evolved to include universal suffrage (later
it limited the vote to curtail conservative influence on
the electorate,, a legislative branch dominant over the
executive branch, limited taxation, and general support of
cooperatives. The Republicans became a "mass-based party
(to the extent that a limited suffrage can be considered a
"mass" base, and as it did so its philosophy became less
coherent and its members more heterogeneous. The
Republicans were anti-Monarchist, anti-church and Jesuit,
anti-corruption, and anti-oligarchic. They were highly
nationalistic and favored the consolidation of the colonial
holdings
.
4
The basic structure of the Republican party after 1910
was one in which a large center-left party, the Democratic
party (the original PRP split into various groups but the
Democratic party inherited the pRp iabei ^ ^
support, was surrounded by other marglnal wMch
emerged and taded according t0 ^
«-u.lly the rise and fall of their leaders>
_ ThepRf
managed to survive in an atmosphere Qf unstabie
Parties because it always remained
person al rivalries and quarrels
. The ^
suffered from strong personalistic ieadership and intense
rivalries
.
5
A fully developed party system did not exist during
the short period of Portuguese Republicanism. Except for
the Republican Perty there was little involvement on the
Part of the masses at the grass roots level and an absence
of organizational structure at the lower levels of the
society. Opello states,
The other groupings, were for the most m r,cadre parties or factions restricted ^ t • Pk 'Porto, and Portugal's larger towns' without' Sear
?han
ra
n,
and d°m
i
nated by Personalities rathe"t issues and ideas. Both houses „ f f!!Congress did much to aggravate the immobility orthe Frrst Republic with frequent votes of no
m^tirgs^dTfT 3 Vi ° l6nt and tumultuouseetings, and a failure to deal with Portugal'spressing economic and social problems. Moreover
legislation"^ f larga " rely had an im?a« °"slation; and groups with distinct ideologiesP""" 1
,
1; «e monarchists, remained outside Ifthe parliamentary system. 6
At the turn of the century the parties or factions
were still based excessively on personalist ic leaders (as
because „ the limlted
^ ^abated period of Portuguese RePublicanism
, the parties
-re just beginning fco evQlve ^ ^ iinotabian ^ ^
Party but never quite got opportunifcy ^
Therefore, it is difficult t0 say ^ ^ ^ ^^Portugal had developed a party system . In the modern sense
of the term perhaps only the PRP rnnin k=y Liie fkf could have been considered
a Party, but only one party does not a systen, make
Because the PRP was not dictatorial and allowed factions to
exist, this could not even be considered a
"party-as-a-system.
"
If Portugal did not have a party system by 1926 then
not until 1974 can Portugal really be considered to have a
one. if the Republican period could not be considered a
"party-as-a-system, can the dictatorship be considered
one? Even though Sartori claims Portugal is in the
"party-as-a-system" classification, can Salazar's National
Union (UN) be considered a party?
Several scholars agree that in reality the UN cannot
be considered a party. it was more the voice of the state
than it was a party. 7 According to Opello,
The UN was to be an association without partisancharacter, independent of the state, and theorganization that was to implement Salazar's
corporate ideology among the citizenry. its
objectives were to integrate the nation, build
national consciousness, el«i„ afo ,, •combat partisan activity Th= dlssent ' andorganized according to thl association wasdiscipline and the stated Principles of
subdivisions. it had di^ • . 11>istrativ«parish branches and »„ municipal and
activities by an executTL dlrected in itspresident »as SaL e„»CO™ lttee ' "hose
a mass movement not v er ™„
W
«f,
not
'
ho"CT«-
membership was never more thV inn DM °
"
whom were government bureaucrat, m° ' man l' ofand pay dues as a cond H„„ obliged to joinOutside of the government ° f employment,
collection o f lo ca l n^ k, ™ Was a lo °sepersonally loyal to SaYazaT^ThTuN f^MD <activity was screeninig candid * S Prinorpalpositions and elected offTrl. ,? r sovernmentthe citizenry
Salazar was clearly anti-party and did not consider
hrs National Union a party but instead a
..movement" or
"crvic action association... He was so successful inflaying change that perhaps Portugal during his
dictatorship should be considered at the pre-party stage of
political development. Nevertheless, Sartori considers the
National Union to have been a "one-party pragmatic" system.
When Caetano took over he had difficulty using the
state to perform the same tasks. He found that he needed a
party to mobilize support against an increasing opposition
and to support the state. In 1969 he changed the UN's name
to National Popular Action in an attempt to broaden his
base of support, but he was never very successful. 9 It is
during this stage that Sartori refers to Portugal as
attempting (unsuccessfully) r h «iy t e move toward a
"hegemonic-pragmatic" type of system. 10
I^eJdode^i^arty^Sys^em
With the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Portugal
found itself inundated with poiiticai gr0ups caili ng
themselves parties. However, by April of fch. following
year only fourteen of the m0 re than fifty initial
"Political parties" were certified as such for the
elections to the constituent assembly. Of these only seven
parties were able to get seats in the assembly.
Today the number of parties in Portugal continues to
hover in the teens but there are only four major parties.
From right to left of the political spectrum these are the
Social Democratic Center (CDS)
, the Social Democrat Party
(PSD,, the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), and the
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). These four parties
control approximately 99 percent of the parliamentary seats
and represent 90 percent of the popular vote (the
Democratic Renovator Party [PRO] which was formed in 1985
behind ex-President Eanes might be considered a major party
but it is a personalist party and sufficient data is not
yet available to form a conclusion concerning its
permanence) . 1
1
remalning 10 P— ° f the vote is divided by fcen
;
Ba
;
icr parties
- none
•«
- very important inParliament
.
Although this view is generallv .y accepted bvsome scholars, it is jn0t ln<=°nceivable that some may
disagree. The latter may critics the omission o f the
MOP/COE which has consistently won seats in Parliament <at
first alone and for the last several years as part of the
United People's Action r aptti a inLAPU] alliance with the PCP)
, but
most observers would consider the MOP a front group under
the control of the PCP; therefore it has been omitted as a
major party. The Popular Monarchist Party (PPM) also
received five seats in parliament in 1979 and six seats in
1980, but in both instances it was a member of the
Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition with the CDS and PPD
Given that the PPM has never been able to win more than 6
Percent of the vote when it has run alone, its
parliamentary seats can only be a result of its membership
in the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. Therefore it is
also not considered a relevant party. And some may
disagree with the exclusion of the Popular Democratic Union
(UDP) which has won a single electoral seat in every
election up to 1980. Additional justification for these
omissions will be provided below.
If we categorize Portuguese parties as either
constitutional or revolutionary we find the CDS, PSD, and
PS are constitutional whUe ^ pcp ^ w
rhetorically while participating withi„ ^ constitutiQnai
system. as Opello notes,
The revolutionary parties k„ *i
revolutionary right or^f ?? divided into theParty of Christiar
i Democrlcv an^^ 1^ fc " ThePortuguese Right
. . rePresPn?^ ' Party ° f the
right. The revolutionary left can £T^°?aryinto four cateqories- rVn^ti e subdivided
Socialist Fron Movement of S^ll^ * (P °PUlarand the United Socialist
" Worker^ Pa^rtv ^ ^communist (Marxi at- -t on 4 « ^ ^ s rty) ; radical
Portugal); trotskyit e mevolutT""
1" Party of
the Workers and International r/ Y Party of
and maoists (Peasants and Wears' Al ifa9
"6
'
Reorganizing Movement of fhl d , ? • ll nce,
Popular Democratic onion) ?lf
Proleta" at, and the
The Major Partite
Analyzing a party system which consists of over a
dozen major and minor political parties is complex and
difficult. our task can be greatly simplified if we
analyze only the "important" parties. To determine which
parties are "important" we combine the conventional wisdom
concerning Portuguese political parties with the guidelines
Sartori provides to distinguish the relevant from the
irrelevant parties in a party system. Following this
procedure we find (in order of ideological beliefs in the
political spectrum from right to left) the CDS, PSD, PS,
and PCP to be the "important" or major parties.
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"^^^^^^^iCMK The CDS was
rounded by Diogo Freitas do^ a professQ^Melln
°
toar
° ^ C°St
- * conservative. The ambers were
primarily conservative or ultra-conservative. The parties
ideology consisted of intellect,, , 1 „llectual conservatism, free-
market capitalism, and Christian h=democracy. Freitas do
Amaral was elected president of the European Christian
Democratic Union, with which the party is affiliated, i„
1981. The CDS is especailly strong in the rural north. 13
The CDS' role in the political system is to represent
the conservative elements in Portuguese society. The
designation which it has chosen for itself (Social
Democratic Center, is not an accurate description of the
Party. Neither the party as a collective (after the
revolution) nor its individual conservative leaders (prior
to the revolution) ever belonged to the political center."
The CDS's primary rival in the political arena is the
PSD. in competition for prospective supporters the CDS has
two major handicaps. The first is that the PSD (originally
called the Popular Democrat Party - PPD) emerged as a party
earlier, thereby gaining a significant number of supporters
who might otherwise have backed the CDS. Second, the CDS
has often found that the failure of its leaders to oppose
the dictatorship has been a disadvantage.
IllIts strategy has been to convince voters that it
rtself. The 1976 eiections catapulted the CDS from f0urth
Position, behind the Communists, to third
ahgad
of the,. The success of the CDS in more than doubling its
1975 support assures the party that it wiU continue tohold a significant position in Portugal party syste ra
That has been abie to raa intain its position is an
indication that its strategy has been successfui and that
the PSD will not have the exclusi™ *lusive support of the most
conservative elements in society.
An analysis of its electoral success positions the
CDS, as the major party furthest to the right. m this
position it is virtually guaranteed the exclusive support
of its democratic, conservative flank on the right. To its
left it has and will continue to experience heated
competition from its major rival because since the PSD's
right wing is ideologically closer to conservatism than
it is to social-democracy.
The CDS holds a comfortable position in the political
arena when compared to the PSD. Whereas the PSD must keep
watch on incursions against its support from the CDS on the
right and the PS on the left, the CDS need only keep watch
on its left flank. As a result its strategy can be more
aggressive as it tries to wean conservative voters away
from the PSD. The PSn ™ *.uD
'
°n thS
°ther h^d, must assume adefensive rather than offensive position and politically
steer a nuddle road between the right and the left
A3 long as the CDS can avoid internal crises and
maintain an i ma ge of continuity, it expects to see
additional voters gravitate in its direction. This is not
to say that the CDS need never he defensive. xt must guard
its left flan, and prevent a PSD/PS alli ance
. Such an
alliance, if successful, can erode CDS support. So long as
the PSD stands alone the CDS believes it can profit at its
rival's expense. i* an alliance on the left cannot be
avoided, then the alternative is to for, an alliance with
the PSD itself.
Both alternatives have now been pursued. First came
the Democratic Alliance (AD), a right-wing coalition among
the PSD, CDS, and PPM committed to conservatism and a
revision of the leftist constitution (especially the
provisions dealing with political power, the economy, and
individual rights); 15 and next came a PS/PSD alliance.
Since neither was successful the CDS managed to maintain
its position, but so long as the PS and PSD continue to
exist so does the possibility of another PS/PSD alliance.
In response to this threat the CDS has followed a strategy
of attack against both the PSD and PS. The CDS threat from
the right is also advantageous to the PS since it forces
its major competitor, the PSD, to steer » m„a more pragmatic
course in relation to both parties.
The CDS has succeeded in converting an initialdefensive strategy into an offensive strategy. at first
arena but after establishing itself i t focused insfcead on
broadening its support. *. major line of attack has been
tc take advantage of the crises faced by its rivals. Even
that the governmental crises were caused by divisions
«ithin the PSD and that the CDS should not be held
responsible for them. It atterapted tQ pQrtray^ ^ &
mediating force without which the crises within the AD
would have been exacerbated.
This is not to imply that the CDS has alwayg ^
consistent or that it has not suffered from internal
divisions as well. „hlle a partner ln ^ ^
were members within the CDS who preferred to pursue the
initial strategy while others felt it more important for
the party to concentrate on the CDS's power in relation to
the governing AD coalition. Divisions within the CDS
usually had more to do with individual rivalries than with
ideological or even strategic concerns.
The split within the PSD, which became more prevalent
during 1979, and the unexpected death of Sa Carneiro (the
PSD leader) enabled the CDS to present a clear image of
conservatism The CDS found^ ^ &
station which, if managed correctiy; cQuid ^
^eneiit it. An unsuccessful AD alUance^
to this image by increasing the psD righfc _wlngers , desires
for the pursuit of more conservative measures. The social
erratic elects within the PSD would
, in ^^
-re skeptical of the conservative wing. These lnternal
problems would benefit the CDS. On the other hand, because
the AD was a conservative coalition, the CDS could also
legitimize its image of stable conservatism by forcing the
PSD into fulfilling its conservative role in the party
system.
„ the PSD refused its role and disbanded the
coalition that would also benefit the CDS because the PSD
would be seen as the cause of the AD's fall. As long as
the alliance held together the political problems would
continue to intensify. M the CDS could accompany ^
intensification by further differentiating itself from its
partners, that would show the imperative of relying on
itself as a necessary alternative and solution toward
ending the ongoing crises." Because the PSD would have
more to lose if the alliance was broken, so long as the AD
held together the CDS would wield a disproportionate amount
of power. As a result the CDS could be more forceful
concerning its own position. And when the alliance finally
failed it could pick up members of the PSD's on b s conservativewmg because the only other alii,Y enee option would be aleftward drift toward the PS.
^^^cia^ocr^Par^^
. The pgD ^&
is made up of individuals who were crifcicai ^
dictatorship. The party was caUed popuiar Democrafcic
Party ,P PD) until tt , name ^ changed ^ ^
Democrat Party <PSD, ±n 1978
. The ppD _ ^ ^
rightist party, but if we examine ^ ^ ^
relationship with other parties in the Portuguese system we
find that it leans toward the oenter. The PSD has certain
characteristics which allow it a sinoulsrHi-,, v,gularity when compared
to other parties. It has a strong hase of support
throughout the most important areas of the country (cities,
North, center, Azores, Madeira, emigration zones); and it
is not linked with international party organizations
(although this position is not of its own choosing,
. Both
of these factors allow it political alternatives
unavailable to other parties. The PSD is also situated in
a good position to attract votes from the political center
and the middle classes. As a result it is always in an
important political position whether or not it is a
participant in the government of the day. It is the only
Party, in a strict sense, to emerge directly as a
coup
in
consequence of the April 251 Zb
'
1974 military coup 17
Many of the leaders ot the PSD partioipafced ^ ^o«ici.l organs oe th6 previous Md criticized
dictatorship. In general
, their criticisms q£ ^^
administration were parallelled by the officers
_
the
-llit^y coup of 1974
. According fcQ ^
Parties are at one time or another the foci of partisan
strength but none better represents the political
evolution, reflects its upswings and downturns, as does the
PSD.
^e PSD is an example of an "instant" party which
qurckly sprouted when given the opportunity to do so it
did not take long to realize that the soil int0 wnich it
had plunged its roots could easily erode. m order to
survive the PSD found itself constantly chasing a
perpetually changing and undefined basis of support.
The PSD was the creation of a group of politicians
with an urgent desire to voice their opinions more than it
was the reflection of a social class needing a party to
represent its views. Their vocal opposition, as
parliamentary members under the Caetano dictatorship, left
the PPD founders in a very awkward position. To the
members of the deposed regime they were traitors, betrayers
of the regime; yet, to the opposition which did not "play
along with the regime" they were a mere continuation of the
regime, but in a democratic for™° m
'
Wh° Se ultimate goal wasto revive the dictatorship . 18
The PSD leaders, while still6 S l11 under the previous
-gime, concluded that the y must wor k to bring an
organized end to the dictatorship. They preferred a ^
radical political transition j-oto a new regime than the one
which the MFA initiated with its rallitary coup
. whereas
the liberals preferred a gradual transition hased on thethree of develops, democratization, and
decolonization, the military inverted the transition to
first, decolonization, and then democratization and
development
.
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According to Aguiar, two essential characteristics are
evident in the PSD's long-term strategy. The first is that
it considers itself to be the vanguard of the middle
classes. It strives to anticipate the needs and interests
of this complex class and to officially represent them in
government. It orients its strategies toward maintaining
their role in society. The second is the drive to form a
conservative bloc which will implement the liberal economic
views of technocracy, productivity, investment, private
capital accumulation, and gradual reform of the economy.
Because many of the the right-wingers still prefer to
adhere to the paternalistic ways of the past, this will not
be an easy task. 20
The Popular Democratic part „r P y was formed as a liberal
reaction to the Portuguese Communist Party's <P C P,
strategies. The goal was tQ ^^
and the military's consolidation of power by supporting theliberal Prime Minister P a i ma r * i
'
l Ca rlos, during the first
Provisional government of 1974
. The strategy^ ^
resulted in a backlash which increased the military's hold
on power and neutralized those forces „hich would nave
backed liberalism. 21
The PPD was convinced that the PCP's organizational
strength would allow it to infiltrate and manipulate the PS
to achieve its own goals (according to the PPD these were
the continued erosion of middle-class interests and liberal
recuperation and consolidation,. The prevailing view in
the PPD was that the PS was acting as a smokescreen for the
PCP, whether or not it wanted to do so. So long as the PS
continued to act as balancer between the right and the left
it would spoil attempts to neutralize the PCP or strengthen
economic liberalism. Instability would continue unless the
PS could be eliminated from its intermediary role. The PS
was postponing the inevitable confrontation between
liberalism and communism and was not allowing the public to
see the right/left rift within society. 22
The quick formation of the PPD was also designed to
attract, protect, and rehabilitate the conservative forces
its
that had collaborated wlth the previous regime
_ in ^rUSh
"
bSCOme 3 maSS™ " allowed so large a diversity
of viewpoints into its ranks that- a*. *S at lt: became laden down withinterna! divisions. 23 Eventualiy ^ ^
traditionalists and Uberals within ^ same^ ^ ^
confllcts as the groups maneuvered fQr ^^^^ ^^^^
For the traditionalists the way to increase the right's
power and decrease the left's would be to tighten the two
conservative parties (the PSD and CDS) into a common hloc
as was Cone in the AD alliance. For the liberals the
answer woul d be to form a moderating force which could
succeed in gaining power. The alteration of the PPD title
to PSD, the attempt to enter the Socialist International,
and the occasional overtures toward a coalition with the PS
are examples of the liberal strategy. 24
Leaders of parties will often determine the strategies
and tactics which their parties pursue. This is especially
true if we look at Portuguese political history where
in divi dual leaders rather than ideology usually define a
party's strategy. I„ the case of the PSD, Sa Carneiro was
a crucial figure in defining the future strategies of his
party. After his death the party reacted to the strategies
of other parties instead of formulating its own. This was
partially a result of the deep fractions which divided it
and frequent leadership changes (recent leaders include
To a
Francisco Pinto Balse.ao and Carlos Mota Pinto)
. „
.certain extent this has provided the psD ^ ^
valve because its competitors are neve r ent ire iy sure how
the psd win react t0 their own strateg . es
_
^i^ciMist^arty^. Although ^ ps , s
can be traced bacx to the 1860's its existence has not been
continuous. The party did not achieve _
^^base of support until after the 1974 revolution. Before
during the period of the "new state," the Socialists found
rt difficult to maintain a clandestine existence. Their
already weak party literally withered away. 25
The current Socialist Party was founded by socialist
exiles (intellectuals, in Bonn in 1973. At the time of the
1 974 revolution the PS wa^ n fHas little more than an elite
faction. it had a weak organization and very little
support at the grass roots outside of the major cities and
large towns. its organizational apparatus was not improved
significantly until the campaign for the 1975 constituent
elections. To this day the organizational support remains
less well developed than that of other parties. 26
The PS is one of the single most important actors in
the country's political system, but one should not conclude
that the party is totally in control of its own destiny.
Its strategies, programs, and proposals (like the PSD's)
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are more often responses to others' actions than the
pursuit of its own socialist values. 27
It is difficult to implement long-term strategies in a
parliamentary democracy since to attract votes it is often
more important to pursue short-term objectives.
Nevertheless, the PS seems to be following a long-term
objective which, when it finally emerges, will convert what
appear to be short-term goals into long-term ones The PS
has always been concerned with presenting an image of
independence. Already during the 1969 elections it played
upon this image by forming the CEUD to contest the
elections rather than joining the CDE which was communist
dominated. The emphasis on independence became evident
once again following the 1974 military coup. Despite the
initial solidarity between Soares and Cunhal the PS again
felt the need to demonstrate its independence by increasing
its distance from the PCP
.
It attempted to present itself
as a vital link in an otherwise polarized society. This
long-term goal of independence would help explain why in
1978 the PS rejected an alliance with the PSD. It had
finally managed to recover some of the losses it suffered
as a result of its "friendship" with the CDS in 1976 and
was cautious of damaging its renewed image of independence.
Its rejection in 1979 of a similar overture from the PSD
led its rival to seek an alliance on the right instead
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which resulted in the formation of the AD government . 28
The PS at times has found it necessary to form
coalitions. From its 1 97 6 experience as a minority
government faced with dual opposition, the PS learned that
it may be better to risk a coalition than to face threats
on both of its flanks. After its victory at the polls in
198 3 it chose not to govern alone but to govern with the
PSD. Both parties play the "charneira" role - to draw
toward themselves the majority of voters who hover in the
space between, since that is the real political center in
the political system. The strategies have been different,
for while the PS isolated itself in 1976 for this end, the
PSD joined the AD for the same reason. 29
The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)
. The PCP is
criticized by all of the major Portuguese parties. The
more it pursues a cadre strategy the greater the
democratic distance between the PCP and power and the
greater the instability in the Portuguese government. The
party is so organizationally strong that an alliance with
any other party would inevitably result in decreased power
to its partner. Democracy to the PCP, like
authoritarianism, is only a transitional stage as it
pursues its ultimate goal - power. The party wants to be
isolated in the national party system, but it takes premium
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advantage of this by speaking out against its "forced
isolationism." The party's success can not be derived
from its own effectiveness alone, but also from the
reaction by other parties. 30 since mQst Qf ^
dissertation is devoted to the PCP, additional analyses
concerning its role in the party system will be discussed
in the chapters below.
The Portuguese PartZ_S^tem^^
The classification of political parties to facilitate
cross-national comparisons has been carried out by various
authors since the I950's.31 In the previous chapter we
discussed Sartori's work on political party theory, which
includes one of the most sophisticated and complex methods
of categorizing parties. In this section we use his
typology to place the Portuguese party system in
comparative perspective with other party systems.
To recapitulate Sartori's work on typologies, he chose
to categorize not only according to the number of parties
which exist in a party system but also according to the
ideological and electoral strength of each party. By
widening the variables encompassed by his theoretical work
he expected to produce a tighter and more accurate
typology. He questioned the validity of mere
classification as an exercise and focused instead on the
variables important to a party system. To merely li st and
study every party in a given system was not necessary,
since many of the parties might be irrelevant given the
weakness of their electoral support. By integrating the
ideological criterion into his analysis, Sartori increased
the complexity of his categorization, yet simplified and
increased the accuracy of the comparative study of
political parties. Students could now focus only on the
most important parties of a particular party system. 32
Sartori'
s typology is comprised of seven classes:
(1) one-party,
( 2 ) hegemonic, (3) predominant
, (4 ) two-party,
(5)limited pluralism, (6)extreme pluralism, and
(7) atomized. 33 He categorized the Salazar /Caet ano
dictatorship as a "one-party system" of the third variety -
"one-party pragmatic." The "one-party pragmatic" case
dominates Portugal until 1974. According to Sartori, this
type of system includes little ideological content. it
also includes less extractive, coercive, exclusionary, and
destructive features and focuses on inclusionary and
aggressive features. Policies were more attuned to natural
development rather than imposed political development. The
pragmatic type had the least amount of coercive power and
some measure of pluralism when compared to other "one-party
systems." The "pragmatic" type could be quite open to
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"sub-group autonomy and may also allow room for some
peripheral subsystem autonomy (e.g. for a pressure group
subsystem)." The pragmatic dictator is "bounded by the
constellation of forces with which he must bargain." it
"canalizes by absorbing (or attempting to absorb)." 34
Because the Portuguese case was still in a state of
flux, Sartori did not classify post-revolutionary Portugal.
Given the newness of the parties, the rapid succession of
events, the vagueness and uncertainty of many of the
leaders concerning their position in the political
spectrum, and the delay of the first election until 1975,
it is understandable that classification would have been
difficult. Because in 1986 the party system remains in the
state of flux even after 12 years, classification continues
to be difficult. For instance, in 1985 a new major party,
the Democratic Renovator Party (PRD - also known as the
"Eanista" party because ex-President Eanes is a major
leader), emerged to compete in the party system.
The political maneuvering which has dominated
Portuguese politics since 1974 is a good example of the
instability which still shrouds the party system.
Nevertheless, 12 years is enough time to project important,
though not totally reliable, forecasts. Sartori emphasized
that the classification of new states or developing
nations, which might not yet have developed party systems,
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would weaken his typology because these political systems
were still in a state of flux
. Therefore
, any
classification of evolving systems based on his typology
must be temporary since most of these systems were still
too unstable to classify accurately. while the Portuguese
case may be more developed than many newly emerging nations
and lacks some of the problems which give them their
instability, it is nevertheless newly developing in terms
of its dynamic party system. Portugal appears to be
evolving on the lines of other West European political
systems but its dynamism continues to surprise us with its
own unique methods of resolving political problems. It is
important to keep in mind the special historical
characteristics of the volatile Portuguese political
system.
Although Sartori did not have sufficient information
to classify post-revolutionary Portugal, Aguiar, writing in
1983, has classified the Portuguese case according to
various typologies, including that of Sartori. Aguiar
claims that since 1980 nine parties have had parliamentary
representation. However, tracing representation since the
initiation of parliament, only four parties (the CDS, PSD,
PS, and PCP) are important enough to be counted. These
parties have both an electoral value as well as an
ideological and locational value. "Locat ional " signifies
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in this instance the position of the party in relation to
others. Its ideological position carries with it a certain
weight concerning the alliances possible in the political
system
.
Aguiar does not count those parties which have
received only a small electoral vote. Neither does he
consider small parties without an ideological locational
value. Even if small parties have forged alliances with
other parties they are not counted if that alliance
subordinated them to some larger party (e.g. MDP/CDE, PPM)
.
Those parties which only have an extra-parliamentary value
(for example, through violent action like the FP-25) also
remain unclassified. Thus we are left with only four major
parties to consider, those which in some major way have an
impact on the balance of forces in the political party
system and which affect the strategies and coalition
potential. The ideological tension and strategies of the
parties are also important in classifying the type of
system which Portugal has.
Aguiar concludes that in 1983 the party system would
fit into Sartori's "limited pluralism" if one classifies
solely according to the number of relevant parties (Sartori
allows three to five parties in this category and in
Portugal there are four)
.
If one classifies according the
ideological divisions in the party system the category
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would be one of .. extreme pluralist of the "polarized
Pluralism variety because of the h . ghiy fragmentated;
polarized nature of the parties. And if one classifies
according to the functional characteristics of the parties
the category would be "extreme pluralism" of the "moderate
Pluralism" variety. Which of Sartori's categories is the
correct one for the Portuguese case? The problem with any
typology, and Sartori would be the first to agree, is that
not every nation fits well into the categories available.
However, he realized that to facilitate the comparative
study of party systems some compromises would be
necessary . 35
Portugal appears to be one of the "problem" nations
for Sartori's typology. Aguiar concludes that Portugal
does not classify well as "moderate pluralism" since the
parties do not always act "responsibly." The coalition
potential, which should spread across the entire system,
does not exist since the PCP has been exempted from
possible coalition governments b^ the other parties. A
system in which ideological tensions among the parties runs
so high cannot be considered "moderate pluralism." in
Portugal each party emphasizes the distinctiveness of its
own ideology making it especially difficult for the
moderation which would be necessary. 36
Aguiar shifts, therefore, to "extreme pluralism" of
the "polarized pluralism" variety which normally includes
at least five major parties. in this category at least one
of the parties should oppose the political system. Even
though the anti-system party technically should be a
potential coalition member, it is never called to align
with other parties; therefore its role becomes essentially
negative, although it remains a relevant party (i.e., the
PCP)
.
This category also includes bilateral opposition in
which at least one side wants to change the system. The
real political center should be occupied by one or more
parties. This particular category is not dominated by a
bipolar relationship among the parties but rather by a
tri-polar relationship as they juggle for positions and the
formation of a majority coalition.
Technically the country does not have a party in the
political center which makes us question whether it should
be considered an example of "polarized pluralism." This is
not to say that Portugal does not have a majority in the
political center. The center is in fact positioned between
the PS and the PSD. The Portuguese political center is a
bit further to the left than would normally be expected.
While the PS rhetoric has always been leftist its policies
have usually been rightist, even when it governed alone as
a minority government. The PSD similarly uses a centrist
language but its policies are also further to the right
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than its rhetoric. Neither side develops the center but
instead leans to where it sees the votes which tends to be
between them. since neither of these two parties are
committed to the center given their emphasis on ideology,
the center remains relatively unstable.
Aguiar's conclusion concerning the Portuguese case is
that it remains between the categories of "extreme
Pluralism" of the "moderate pluralism" variety and "extreme
Pluralism" of the "polarized pluralism" variety with a
multipolar structure. Because Portugal is still in a
period of flux time, will eventually tell in which
direction will evolve.
Since a party does not currently dominate the
political center, even though it exists electorally, there
is a possibility that a new party may emerge to take
advantage of the center (perhaps the newly formed Eanista
party - PRD)
.
As rightist and leftist policies fail, the
PSD and the PS may gravitate toward the center, given that
the division is not electoral but ideological. As the the
CDS on the right and the PCP on the left each gain less
than 20 percent of the vote, the ideological debate, as it
intensifies, will gradually push the PS and PSD toward the
center. 37 Until now the parties have avoided the center to
prevent criticism from either of the extremes. Although
electorally the center is desirable, politically it is not.
Given the recent formation of the Eanista party, Aguiar was
correct when he concluded that Portugal either had one
party too many or too few. 38
The primary difficulty in classifying Portugal is that
the parties are still relatively immature and harbor
maximalist desires. Because historical and ideological
positions weaken over time, in many older party system it
is possible to rely more heavily on typologies to help
explain the system. in that case one focuses on the new
positions of the parties, not their historical ideological
beliefs. However, in the newly emergent party systems
history is still a very important part of analyzing the
political system and party strategies. 39
The Portuguese Party System: Conclusions
What conclusions should we draw from the Portuguese
political system? According to Aguiar, it is difficult to
analyze the system in the traditional or normal manner.
First, because the Portuguese system is still evolving and
in a state of flux (not to mean that other nations party
systems are static but that they are more stable) . Since
the Portuguese system is new it is still highly
unpredictable and much more dynamic. Second, many aspects
of the Portuguese system may appear "normal" or similar to
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other systems but are in fact "abnormal." Many crises in
Portugal would not be crises given the same circumstances
in more stable and "mature" systems. Relatively minor
issues are blown up into major headlines and shrouded with
unnecessary publicity. This is partially because of the
sheer energy and the personal ambitions behind partisan
decision-making. National leaders like to take age old
problems, which in older systems are trivial and mundane,
and present them to the citizens as if these problems are
unique to the system when in fact they are quite common to
all systems and are resolved in other systems without the
political "turmoil" or "excitement." 40
One of the greatest problems in the nation continues
to be the immaturity of the party system in which each
party seeks a maximalist position and is unwilling to
compromise with its competitors. 41 When a system has
matured politically it is stable and the relationships with
other parties have been formalized. The crucial changes or
developments in a mature system revolve around politics
rather than the "rules of the game." Change comes as a
result of previously unforeseen political occurrences which
were not dealt with in party programs or as a result of new
solutions to age old problems. The central goal in these
older party systems is to wean one party's traditional
electorate or the "independents" over to another party. In
a system parties spend more time defending and emphasizing
their independence and individuality rather than listening
to and trying to "win over" potential voters or exploring
coalition potentials. 42
Aguiar concludes that the organic structure of parties
has always received minimal attention in Portugal. As
previously stated it is doubtful that the country can
really be said to have had modern political parties until
relatively recently. Partly as a result of this the people
are not used to many of the traditional organic roles which
conventional parties fulfill such as "communication," or
"canalization."' During the dictatorship, they felt that
parties should be allowed merely because they were
elements which signify democracy, but not for any of their
organic or functional roles. 43
The revolution was not the result of a search for an
organic party system which had been lacking under the
dictatorship. The revolution was, instead, carried out to
meet the MFA' s personal grievances. The parties,
therefore, did not emerge to provide functions for which
the Portuguese felt an urgent need. For this reason the
parties are more concerned with the types of questions and
problems which existed at the turn of the century than they
are with the current realities and problems which the new
polity has to face. At the turn of the century the
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ideological barriers were often rigid and parties were a
mere reflection of one strong leader. The banning of
parties and democracy during the dictatorship deprived the
Portuguese of a half-decade during which they could have
expanded and developed a sophisticated party system.
Without the opportunity to evolve the parties must today
deal with the trivial and often "childish" political games
which dominate early party systems. With time this may
pass
.
One of the elements of the current system which will
hopefully diminish is the focus on individual leadership.
The problem in the system is that the division between the
parties is not great and that many of them are highly
fractionalized. These are the types of circumstances which
often require strong leadership to hold the party together
and help distinguish it from a rival party. Although
leaders may act according to early twentieth century
models, they are measured by late twentieth century
standards which, gives the system an unstable character.
The parties, rather than focusing on representation and
other organic functional concepts, focus instead on
intensifying their ideological differences vis a vis rival
parties
.
The system tends to be made up of fragmented, highly
fractionalized parties, which makes it especially difficult
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to negotiate bi-partisan or multi-partisan agreements.
Fortunately the highly frationalized party system is not a
total reflection of the less fragmented electorate, of
which enough remain in the center of the political spectrum
to provide a shifting majority. The problem has been that
the country either has one party too many or too few, not
that it lacks a stable center on the part of the
electorate. The parties are divided more to differentiate
themselves from one another than to reflect society. is
Portugal a centrifugal society or a centripetal society?
Although it is still early to come to definite conclusions,
the society appears to be centripetal while the parties
are centrifugal (we will see if the new "Eanista" party
resolves this problem by becoming a strong fifth party in
the political center and thereby stabilizing the system). 44
In this chapter (and chapter two) we have examined the
environment within which the PCP must work in order to
achieve its ultimate goal - the control of the Portuguese
government. All of the aspects (the historical, regional,
cultural, etc.) examined here are essential if we are to
understand the variables the PCP analyzes when it
formulates its strategy to win (or seize) control of the
government. We have especially focused on the national
party system since it is within this system that the PCP
must struggle if it is to defeat its competitors.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY: BEGINNINGS TO 1974
Introduction
The first three chapters have been crucial in the
analysis of the PCP. The first covered the theoretical
bases of political parties and party systems. By examining
the commonalties which all systems share we can better
understand where the Portuguese system is headed. The
third chapter discussed the Portuguese party system which
is still dynamic and in its infancy. Systems theory cannot
help us forecast the systems' future path unless we are
familiar with the socio-political background (discussed in
chapter two) which distinguishes the Portuguese system from
other national systems. In this vein the third chapter
serves as a transition from the general systems and
national analyses to the specific analysis of the
Portuguese Communist Party's role in Portugal.
In this transitional chapter we focus on the evolution
of the PCP from its roots and its formation in 1921,
through the undisciplined years of the twenties, the
Bol shevi z at ion of the thirties, the Stalinizat ion of the
forties, the years of clandestine existence under the
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Salazar dictatorship, the Maoist and Trotskyite splinter
groups of the sixties, to the party's legalization in 1974.
The focus is on those events, personalities, strategies,
and organizational structures which, when poured into the
mold provided by the Comintern (IC)
, left the PCP with a
unique "mask" (the PCP's character as a party)
distinguishing it from its namesakes in Europe and the rest
of the world. All Soviet supported communist parties are
made from the same mold but the materials used for the mask
vary, dependent upon each party's national characteristics
and past. Let us examine the ingredients which compose the
PCP's mask by glancing into the obscurities of its past.
For only in this manner can we best analyze its strategy
for power during the seventies and eighties.
On March 6, 1 98 6 the PCP celebrated its 65th
anniversary which makes it, along with the Masons, one of
Portugal's oldest political institutions. Based on our
discussions of what constitutes a political party it would
be difficult to qualify the PCP, without reservations, as
the oldest political party in continuous existence in
Portugal since 1921. Although many political observers,
including the PCP, often make this claim, its validity is
questionable. Throughout its 65 year history, for example,
the party has claimed a mass working-class base of support
despite its occasional reductions in membership,
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activities, and organization to insignificant levels as a
result of internal problems and external repression (at one
time it dwindled to less than 50 members)
. We could also
question whether the PCP which is currently active in the
political scene is only forty-five years old rather than
the sixty-five it claims. After all, the current PCP
really dates from the reorganization of 1940-41, which
differed from its predecessor reorganized in 1929, which in
turn differed from the original party founded in 1921.
Even the Comintern officially dissolved the PCP in 1939.
Furthermore, after the reorganization of 1941 there were
actually two communist parties claiming to be "the" PCP.
Are we therefore discussing a sixty-five year old party or
instead three or more parties of which the latest, a forty-
five year old party, is a third generation relative to the
original PCP?
The party's past is full of many similar instances
which should be considered when making generalizations
concerning the PCP as a political party. Since we discuss
the reorganizations and historical background of the PCP
below, let us accept that it has been a political party
since 1921, as most political observers do. In any case,
the major disagreement centers on the question when one
begins counting since even if we took 1941 as the birth of
the PCP it would still be, at forty-five years, the oldest
political party in Portugal. Another way to avoid the
controversy is to recognize that regardless of the PCP's
status as a party nearly every individual who was active in
the opposition to the dictatorship either passed through
the party's ranks or at least through its ancillary
organizations. Almost every action of resistance or
opposition to the dictatorship from 1927 to 1974 was
planned or carried out through the PCP whether worker
struggles, electoral campaigns, armed activity, or even
military coups were concerned. The major exceptions were
the terrorist type activities carried out beginning in the
sixties by leftist PCP splinter groups from which the PCP
disassociated itself.
Despite the long history of PCP activity, it is the
least known of the major Portuguese parties. The mystery
is partially a result of the deliberate barricades set up
by the PCP to prevent historians from competing with its
"official" history. Just as the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) has purged and revised its own history
according to the image which it would like to convey, so
too the PCP allows only its own selective history to be
presented to the public. According to Jose Pacheco
Pereira, a Portuguese expert on the PCP's history, the
leadership is very reluctant, and even hostile, when asked
to provide information or answer questions concerning its
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history and organization which probe beyond the official
line. Any party, of course, has a right to produce its own
official history and present it to the public as the
correct and only history. However, as he correctly
emphasizes, what the party does not have the right to do is
to block access or sabotage projects designed to study the
available historical documentation and attempt to arrive at
the truth. The party has gone so far as to falsify,
destroy, or hide documents; pressure witnesses to keep
silent; and use its political weight to prevent the free
discussion or criticism of the official history. "l
Pereira's primary difficulty is in gaining access to
documentation following the reorganization of 1929. The
communist publications were numerous yet they are difficult
to find. Access to these materials, including the copies
of a second Avante
!
(the official party organ) published by
the purged leadership following the reorganization of
1940-1941, would be of valuable importance in writing the
true history of the PCP but, the major sources for these
materials are currently inaccessible. Pereira claims that
the best source of information is found at the PCP's
private archives not only in Portugal but also deposited in
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern
European nations. These archives are not accessible to
most historians, often not even to historians who are
communist members, and if they were the accuracy of many of
their contents would be questionable. He adds that the
PIDE-DGS (disbanded secret police) also has significant
files on the PCP, but for political reasons they have not
been open to the public. Without access to these major
archival sources significant gaps persist in the materials
to support an "unofficial" history of the party because the
long years of clandestine existence and dictatorial
repression make these materials otherwise inaccessible. 2
According to Pereira, the 1925-39 and 1951-1960
periods are especially shrouded in darkness by the party.
During both of these periods Alvaro Cunhal, the PCP's
current Secretary-General, was not in a leading role within
the organization which helps explain why they are
secretive. Prior to the 1940-41 reorganization Cunhal did
not head the PCP, and during his imprisonment from 1949-60
an anarcho-liberal group emerged within the party. By
keeping these periods of internal upheaval under cover the
PCP can continue to proclaim that serious ideological
divisions have not occurred since the Bolshevizat ion of the
party. If the truth were known Cunhal would not be able to
control his version of events. In reality, emphasizes
Pereira, the party has been plagued throughout its long
history by internal divisions. The absence of any mention
of rifts which occurred during the numerous
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reorganizations, the conflicts with the anarcho-syndicalist
dominated General Confederation of Workers (CGT) of the
thirties, the attitudes of communist prisoners, known as
the "Group of Disaffected Communists" (GCA) imprisoned in
Tarrafal, the criticisms of the "personality cult" and
arguments for the "via pacifica" of the fifties, and the
extreme-left splinter groups of the sixties, should make us
question the official PCP account of its own history.
3
After all, an essential aspect of democracy is the freedom
to seek the truth, and to question the official line. Even
democratic governments and institutions cannot be trusted
to always release the truth. The reluctance and hostility
of the PCP concerning its history should make us question
its intentions (as well as its commitment to democracy)
.
Communist Currents Prior to 1921
When compared to the paucity of material available on
the PCP prior to the 1974 military coup, the 1921 to 1926
period provides abundant evidence to support accurate
analyses of the PCP's organization and activity during the
Republic. According to Pereira, this is partially a result
of the party's legal existence which allowed open, rather
than clandestine, participation in the labor movement as
well as in the political process. The freedom to publish
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the official party organ ( 0 Comunista ) and publicly
distribute propaganda produced bountiful material for
scholars to analyze. in addition, Humbert Droz, an IC
representative who played a leading role in the development
of the PCP, provided an invaluable source of information on
the twenties when he left his detailed personal papers to
the International Institute for Social History in
Amsterdam.
By the time of the Russian revolution Portugal had
already developed a lively labor movement and a political
atmosphere which was uniquely Portuguese. The working
class was represented by a diversity of parties and
movements which were engaged in an old debate concerning
workers exploitation by the capitalists. The PCP,
therefore, did not emerge to fill a void in worker
representation as it claims but emerged instead into a
field of contenders which had much more in common than in
divergence
.
But regardless of the successes realized in this
period [1914-1920], the working class is lacking
a revolutionary class party, which defines with
clarity its historical mission, congregates
around itself all the exploited and oppressed and
transforms the popular discontent into consequent
political action. That step is stimulated by
the example of the Great Socialist Revolution of
October
.
4
Today the PCP peers into the past and distinguishes
itself from the anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists
of the twenties by emphasizing its revolutionary
commitment. But there was little novelty in its
revolutionary commitment. By the time of the PCP's
formation in 1921 the continuous debates concerning the
labor movement's pursuit of a revolutionary path were not
novel. Ever since 1913 anarchists and syndicalists had
been debating whether syndicalism alone could end worker
exploitation by capitalism. Many concluded that syndicalism
was a good approach to confront capitalism although it was
not the correct method to succeed in its overthrow.
5
According to Pereira the successful revolution in
Russia had five major impacts on this debate and infused
into it a new sense of urgency:
1) pressures emerge to reevaluate the 'ideas and
practices' of the past while keeping in mind the
experiences of the Russian Revolution (especially
concerning the feasibility of the working class
carrying out a revolution)
.
2) the infusion of ideological fragments and 'new
words' into an old argument.
3) the varied groups in Portugal whether anarchists,
syndicalists, maximalists, Soviets, or bolsheviks,
draw from the experiences of the Russian Revolution
and in the process make it very difficult to
distinguish the difference between these various
groups
.
4) an increased emphasis is placed on the need for
unity among the working classes (especially by the PS,
anarchists, syndicalists, and maximalists)
5) an initial support by these groups of the Russian
Revolution and of the 'Reds' versus the 'Whites.'
5
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The Workers League for economic Expropriation and the
Economic Council of the CGT (the latter served as the model
for the PCP's own Economic Council) were two of the
responses to the urgent need for a successful revolution.
They were formed with the goal of unifying the struggle
against capitalism and attracting the anti-capitalist
elements which were not represented in the syndicalist
movement (e.g. intellectuals!
, non-unionized laborers,
etc.). This was the syndicalist response to the straight
jacket which kept the syndical movement out of
revolutionary activity. 7
But discussion in the syndical movement was not
limited to these apparently non-revolutionary actions. In
the light of the 1917 successes in Russia these seemed
insufficient changes, especially following the failure of
the general strike of 1918. 8 More radical measures were
discussed to carry out the revolution through the shortest
path available.
9
The PCP cannot claim that its emergence and novelty
focused on the need for a revolutionary vanguard
nonexistent in the political scene. After all, the diverse
elements of the syndical movement had been discussing, in
embryonic stages, the "vanguard" role and the "dictatorship
of the proletariat" for some time. The first bolsheviks
could be found at the extreme left of the Portuguese
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syndical movement. As a result of the successes of the
Russian revolution, of the failure of the 1918 general
strike, and of the impasse which the syndical movement had
reached, the syndical movement split in two with one
section moving toward reformism and the other moving
further toward r e vo 1 u t i o n . 1 0 The des ire for an
organization which was swifter and more flexible, implying
the need for a cadre membership and homogeneity, was less
communist than it was "Blanquist."
The Portuguese Maximalist Federation (FMP)
especially focused on the need for swifter revolutionary
organizations
.
the syndical organisms, while they become
stronger, and more potent, also become more
cumbersome, more immovable, not acting with the
brevity and urgency which is required of them,
almost always losing the opportunities [for
revolutionary action]
. And we do not want to
lose any moment which comes within our grasp. n
The FMP emerged from the anarcho-syndicalist movement in
1919. From the start the maximalists were distinguished
from the anarcho-syndicalists because they claimed to be
Soviets and Bolsheviks. The major difference was in their
concept of the transition of the dictatorship of the
proletariat developed from Lenin, Stalin, and others. The
anarcho-syndicalists were more attached to Marx and Bakunin
and criticized the authoritarian character of the
Bolsheviks. 12 The FMP, especially through its official
° rgan Bandeira Vermelha (Red Flag), emphasized that its
attempts to bypass the lethargic revolutionary syndicalist
movement was not an attempt to replace the syndical
organizations. What the working class movement needed was
unity among the syndicalists, anarchists, and maximalists.
The FMP would leave to the syndical organizations the
implementation of the economic reforms while it would
immediately carry out and then defend the revolution.
Their activities would be focused on the political realm
while the syndicalists would be concerned with the economic
realm. 13
The FMP was committed to an immediate revolution
modeled after the experiences of the Russian revolution for
it felt that conditions were ripe given the misery which
shrouded the Portuguese working class. The goal in forming
their extra-syndical organization was to seize the
bourgeois state violently and implant the dictatorship of
the proletariat. Electoral or other activity which might
lead to participation within the bourgeois state was
prohibited by its statutes. The FMP was primarily
dominated by workers and individuals from the popular
movement and despite the appearance here that it was a
cohesive group that was not the case. Having emerged from
the ranks of anarcho-syndicalism debates concerning
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reformism or revolution continued within the FMP and would
later emerge again in the PCP. Despite all of the
revolutionary rhetoric in Bandeira Vermelha the FMP focused
on the ideology behind the Russian revolution more than the
implementation of revolutionary tactics. 14
The FMP found its niche in the gaps which divided the
anarchists from the syndicalists. The formation of the
FMP was welcomed by the various anarchist groups and
newspapers as one more avant-garde group whose only
distinctive feature, as far as they were concerned, was its
relationship with the Russian revolution. 15
The novelty which the communists and their maximalist
predecessors in the FMP introduced, therefore, was not the
concept behind the "vanguard party" or the "dictatorship of
the proletariat" but instead the application of the theory
into reality. The concept that conditions were ripe for
revolution therefore the party must be ready to act as a
vanguard so it could exploit the moment of weakness when it
arrived. It viewed the upcoming revolution in Portugal in
concrete terms, even if it did not carry it out, while the
syndicalists viewed it in vaguer, more ideological terms
which would happen "some day" in the indefinite future.
The question of power and how to gain it was the focus of
the maximalists. That victory was near and not a nebulous,
vague notion. 1°
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The FMP disbanded in December 1920 shortly after the
arrest of its secretary-general and is considered by the
PCP as a transitional party to that glorious date of which
the PCP is so proud:
On the sixth of March of 1921, in the home office
of the Association of Office Employees, inLisbon, is realized the Assembly which elects theleadership organs of the PCP. The PortugueseCommunist Party was founded. Decades of
suffering and struggle of the Portuguese working
class, the lessons of the great victories of theinternational working class, the teachings ofMarx, Engels, and Lenin all converged on it.
With the foundation of the PCP the Portuguese
working class finds its firm and secure
vanguard. 1 '
The PCP is the first to admit that it could have chosen an
earlier date as the formal beginning of the PCP. It could
have chosen December 28, 1928 when the organizational
committee selected the party's name and approved its
political program, or it could have chosen March 1, 1921
when the organic bases of the party were formed. But it
prefers March 6, 1921. 18 Although the FMP had a
significant impact on the formation of the PCP, the PCP
only mentions it in passing since to acknowledge the FMP's
full impact would rob the PCP of some of its glorious
image. Similarly, the PCP also downplays the role which
the Socialist Party (PS) played during the PCP's formation.
The origins of the party as discussed above show that
unlike most other European communist parties the PCP was
not born from a PS splinter group. The PCP appears to take
great pride in this fact since it allows it to stress its
differentiation from the PS.
Contrary to what occurred in most of the European
nations, the Portuguese Communist Party did notform itself from the Socialist Party butfundamentally, with militants who came from the
ranks of revolutionary syndicalism, which,despite its errors, represents that which was
most energetic, valid and combative in thePortuguese labor movement.
"29
and
The Socialist Party's influence disappears from
the Portuguese labor movement, as it develops an
action predominantly parliamentarian, preaches
the conciliation of classes, and is constantly
agitated by internal conflicts. 2 o
The PCP's emphasis on the diminished role of the PS prior
to 1974 and that it had nothing to do with the emergence of
the PCP has become widely accepted in Portugal. Although
the PS existed in a different ideological and
organizational plane that does not mean that a relationship
or influence did not exist between the two. With the
formation of the PCP many PS members transferred their
allegiances to the new party (especially the members of the
Socialist Youth) . In addition, the creation of a new party
which in many respects held ideological views similar to
the PS increased the internal ideological confusion which
already plagued the PS. The PS was constantly vacillating
to external conditions and pressures (often instigated by
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the PCP)
.
Discussions were even held concerning the
dissolution of the PS and its integration into the PCP. A
good example that the PS was not as isolated from the PCP
as it likes to claim is that some of the first sessions of
the PC were held in the main office of the PS. 2 i
At the time of its founding the PCP was to be a
federalist and decentralized organization with the
following goals:
1. The organization of workers on the triple base of
political, syndicalist, and cooperativist
resistance;
2. Unconditional support to the CGT;
3. International understanding and action among
communist parties and syndical organizations;
4. Collaboration of technicians, specialists, and
scientists with the working classes;
5. Preparation and promotion for the complete
emancipation of the indigenous peoples of the
colonies
.
The ultimate objective of the party was the socialization
of "the means of production, circulation and consumption,
that is, the radical transformation of the capitalist
society into a communist society" which was to be achieved
through a radical revolution when conditions were ripe. 22
At first the PCP did not appear to differ from the
FMP . The articles which appeared in 0 Communista , the
official PCP organ, were similar to those which had
appeared in Bandeira Vermelha . Among the themes were the
usual calls for a unitary front of the varied workers
groups and the need for immediate revolution (we emphasize
unitary front to distinguish it from the united front.
While the former would focus on a unity of workers for
syndical and revolutionary activity the latter would imply
an electoral or formal unity for participation in
"bourgeois" democratic politics)
. Relations at the start
between the CGT and PCP were fairly good, as they had been
under the FMP
.
For several reasons, however, the PCP and
the CGT soon began to drift apart. A drift which had
already begun under the FMP and had now intensified to the
point of outright rhetorical hostility. One reason was
that many of the Young Syndicalists joined the newly formed
Young Communists (JC) which led to strains with the CGT.
In addition, the CGT accused the PCP of dividing the labor
movement. An accusation which especially became common
after the PCP's publication of the 21 conditions in 1921
and its increased accusations that the syndical movement
should reserve its activity to the economic sphere and
leave the political arena to the PCP. The PCP was
especially vicious in its conclusions that on balance the
syndical movements' political successes were negative and
that its leaders were misguiding the workers. What was
needed was an end to the sectarian air which surrounded the
movement and a move toward a unitary movement. The
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movement should be fighting for a decrease in the high cost
of living for all rather than trying to increase workers'
salaries . 23
Although the FMP had received warm support from the
syndical movements this was a result of the FMP's emphasis
on working alongside the syndical organizations rather than
trying to undermine them. The FMP had also benefitted from
the novelty of the Russian revolution which had subsided by
the time the PCP was formed. The repression of Russian
anarchists had led the anarchist press to push for a clear
distinction between anarchists, maximalists, Soviets, and
Bolsheviks. The acceptance of the PCP as an extra-syndical
organization ended once the party moved toward competition
in the political arena along with the "bourgeois" parties.
Participation in elections, in parliament, in government,
and in alliances with other parties or groups, were taboo
for the anarchists and syndicalists. In fact, if the PCP
wants to emphasize its uniqueness vis a vis other labor
parties and movements it would have to be in the realm of
terminating a 20 year tradition of exclusive devotion by
the labor movement to syndical activity when it began
experimenting with parliamentarian tactics which the
syndical movement considered heresy. 24
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A fuller discussion of the often microscopic
ideological divisions which distinguished the diverse
political parties and movements of the first republic and
made the Portuguese labor movement unique can help us
understand the evolution of the PCP which becomes
especially complex in the final years of the FMP and in the
early years of the PCP. Perhaps the clearest analysis of
the uniqueness of the Portuguese labor movement and the
distinctions between the various parties and movements is
offered by Pereira. He insists that the key to
understanding the complex ideological threads which bind
the various movements lies in the organizational sphere
rather than in the ideological sphere. Because the PCP
and communism in general evolved from grafts of the
indigenous labor movement rather than as a result of the
IC; because communism evolved outside of the spawning
grounds of the social-democratic left from which sprouted
most European communist parties; the "original" PCP was
endowed with very singular characteristics when compared to
the rest of the international communist movement. As
communism evolved spontaneously out of the Portuguese labor
movement it found only two organizational vehicles
available through which it could conduct its activities.
One vehicle was the Republican (bourgeois) political
organizational model and the second was the anarchist model
pursued by several different Portuguese labor
organizations. Both options had themselves evolved
internally within Portugal to fulfill the needs of the
working classes as representational or " channe lment
-
vehicles vis a vis bourgeois capitalism. 25
Reflecting the Portuguese labor movement of the time,
Portuguese communism was severely f r act i onal i z ed . The
communists had their advocates of reformism, of
revolutionary syndicalism, and of bolshevism. As a result
early Portuguese communism oscillated between the two
indigenous vehicles of worker "representation" with the
early bolsheviks forming autonomous groups represented by
certain magazines and newspapers. Early communism as
represented by the FMP and PCP, therefore, was highly
decentralized and federalist in nature as was still evident
at the first party congress held in 1923. 26
As the anarchists began to distance themselves from
the early communists the latter sought to organize
politically and initially chose to form Communist Centers
which were political "clubs" similar to the republican and
socialist centers. It is clear, therefore, that early
Portuguese communism was a melange of communist ideological
strains accustomed to a lively internal debate, a lively
external debate with its rivals, and a loose
organizational structure. When Pereira emphasizes the
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organizational sphere of Portuguese communism his point is
that the ideological divisions internally were less
important than the organizational since the early
communists had all evolved from the same tradition. The
problems within the movement which underlie the various
"grands tournants" up until the reorganization of 1929 are
focused not on the ideological differences but on attempts
to impose an external Bolshevik type of organization with
all of its trappings (e.g., democratic centralism) on an
internal, decentralized type of organization with a higher
degree of autonomy inherited from the early communists"
anarcho-syndicalist roots. This is not to say that
ideological, tactical, and political differences did not
accompany the organizational problem but they were not the
major issue. 27
The PCP in the Twenties
No doubt the complexity of unraveling the intertwined
ideological threads which permeate early Portuguese
communism is now more than evident. The PCP has attempted
to simplify its historical roots especially concerning its
founding. The PCP only mentions the FMP as its precursor
and even then only in passing. What Pereira has uncovered
is that the early PCP's antecedents are much more complex
than to claim that in 1921 the PCP is born from a
"reorganized" FMP
.
in terms of the membership of the PCP
the prevailing belief has been that it was made up
predominantly of maximalists from the FMP, but in fact the
membership is just as characteristic of the syndicalist
base as it is of the maximalist. While it is true that
ex-FMP members composed about 45 percent of the new party
that is not a majority (and only 19 percent of FMP members
chose to join the new PCP)
. The remaining 55 percent were
drawn primarily from syndical activists which leaves the
PCP with a radically different flavor than previously
believed. The FMP member tended to be more radicalized in
ideological terms since he had originally been drawn from
the anarchist strain of the Portuguese labor movement. The
maximalist, therefore, was closer to anarchism than he was
to communism. The syndicalists tended to be more radically
active in the social sphere (e.g, strikes) than in the
political or ideological sphere which goes a long way
toward explaining the internal rifts which would soon
emerge in the PCP. 28
Although the early membership of the PCP was not
dominated by ex-FMP members if we focus on the leadership
and the active militants we find a larger influence from
ex-FMP members than from the base membership discussed
above. However, even at this level the largest influence
comes from old syndical leaders rather than from anarchists
or anarcho-syndicalists. it is most likely for this
reason that Bento Goncalves, one of the heroes or founding
fathers of orthodox Portuguese communism, refers to the
leadership of the party at this time as dominated by
bourgeois collaborators. Especially when we consider that
several, although not a majority, of the leaders had
succeeded in a small degree of upward mobility placing them
somewhat above the majority of workers which dominated the
party
.
29
The PCP leaders, therefore, as well as the active
militants until the purges of 1926, were old, seasoned
syndicalists with 15 to 25 years of experiences including
those of the 1910 to 1912 syndical struggles. Furthermore,
they either participated in or had close connections with
the republican movements and the "civil revolutionary"
activism, with the masons, participated with "anarchist
interventionism, " with the Carbonaria, with conspiratorial
movements, and with the Radical Party, or the Democratic
Left
.
30
To conclude, contrary to the belief that the formation
of the PCP in 1921 was primarily made up of former FMP
members the largest representation of party membership was
drawn instead from syndical activism. The truth is that
those members with a background in the FMP brought with
them much more radical ideological rigidity and were closer
to the anarchist movement than those which were more tied
to syndical activism and social concerns or changes. 31
Once again these conclusions emphasize the divergent
ideological strains which were still active within the PCP
.
But the major confrontation came not from within the PCP
itself but from the JC which had been formed independently
and attempted to seize and control the PCP's directive
organs at the first party congress in 1923.
The JC was much more cohesive than its parent the PCP.
The majority of its members had come either from the Young
Syndicalists or the Socialist Youth and brought to the JC a
tradition of political extremism, violence, and criminal
activity such as counterfeiting, terrorism, bombings, and
the elimination of enemies. The experiences and views which
the young members brought to the JC differed radically
from the traditions to which the PCP members were
accustomed. The JC members were not concerned with the
liberalism and internal democratic debates which the older
PCP members had experienced in the Portuguese syndical
movement and which they felt were a crucial aspect of
democratic centralism. Lacking the concern for internal
democracy, to the JC "democratic centralism" meant the
ability to expulse members who disagreed with the
leadership. Because the JC had been officially recognized
by the IC the JC leaders assumed the recognition gave them
a power similar to "judicial review" whereby their
interpretation of the IC s directives was the correct
interpretation. Discussion was minimal and disagreement
intolerable. To the JC the open debate which still
occurred within the parent was sacrilegious. Their view
was that the party should be centralized and
ultraconspiratorial in the mold of the secret societies or
terrorist groups in which a few individuals were able to
hold total control of the party. In fact, at times they
seemed to be more concerned with personal power than even
applying the IC's directives since when their views were
put in question they disregarded both the directives as
well as the rules of democratic centralism . 32
The confrontation between the JC and the PCP erupted
at the first party congress of the PCP. As the JC members
aged they became members of the PCP. Jose de Sousa, a
former leader of the JC, was already in a PCP leadership
position prior to 1923. In addition, the JC's views were
mirrored by Caetano de Sousa who was also in a leadership
position within the PCP. Toward the end of 1922 Caetano de
Sousa and Pires Barreira (Secretary of the JC) left for
Moscow to participate in the Fourth IC Congress. The PCP
continued to be a decentralized organization with little
evidence of the bol she vi z at i on process which the IC
163
expected of its affiliated parties. Trips to Moscow by PCP
individuals would usually mean additional moves toward
bolshevization upon the delegations' return. Such was the
case upon Caetano de Sousa's and Barreira's return. 33
By the time of their departure the confrontation
between the two communist groups had already begun.
According to Humbert Droz, when Caetano de Sousa and
Barreira returned from Moscow they had misinterpreted the
IC's directives as giving them license to purge the party.
In their excitement to apply their interpretation of the 21
conditions on a heterogeneous party they risked destroying
the party. On the initiative of the JC a reorganizat ional
committee was formed, but in keeping with the undemocratic
views of the JC the committee did its work in secret
without subjecting itself to the views of the majority of
the party stretching from the directive organs down to the
rank and file. The Central Committee which was set up by
the JC "fraction" was rejected by the majority of the party
who regrouped around the leadership of Carlos Rates, their
choice for Secretary-General. As a result of these
disputes Portugal actually had two competing PCPs. The JC
group continued acting as it had always done in the past,
purging any one who disagreed with it, and soon found that
it's PCP (SIC) (the JC group attached to the party title
the words International Communist Section to distinguish
itself from what it considered the illegal PCP) had been
reduced to abysmal levels. Because it was not succeeding
in implementing its interpretation of the IC's directives
it literally disbanded the PCP by proclaiming that it
would cease its activities until the IC intervened and
resolved the dispute. Meanwhile The majoritarian Rates
group continued the party's activity by publishing the
party organ, by continuing to analyze the Portuguese
situation through its interpretation of the IC's
directives, and by continuing to strengthen the party
organizationally . 34
In August of 1923, Droz found himself compelled to
resolve the dispute. He sided with the Rates fraction
which, despite all of its imperfections, continued party
activity while the JC group lingered waiting for the IC's
intervention. It was better to maintain the party's small,
heterogeneous base in tact and attempt to discipline it
later according to the 21 conditions than to risk weakening
the party any further. Droz also sided with Rates' group
because of the JC s terrorist and criminal activities
through its participation in the Red Legion and because
Caetano de Sousa's expulsion of dissenters had reduced his
party to minuscule levels. Droz feared that Caetano de
Sousa's and Barreira's heavy handedness would not allow the
IC to control the group. The JC was too intransigent and
sectarian which was a major difference from Rates' group.
Caetano de Sousa was frank when he told Droz that he had no
interest for the syndical activity which the IC required of
the communist party and that his major concern was in the
political realm. As a result Caetano de Sousa found that
his group did not have support nor influence among workers
or in the syndical movement. How could one expect him to
carry on the party's work without the support of the
workers? With Droz's support the newly reorganized PCP by
passed the JC by forming a rival "official" JC
organization. 35 However, this same intransigence on the
part of the younger JC communists and their decreased
emphasis on democracy within the party made them the ideal
group to bolshevize the party. This would help explain
their gradual reintegration into the PCP and successful
seizure of the leadership positions in 1926 which we will
discuss below. 36
In his December 1923 speech to the Central Committee
Droz emphasized that the party must convince the
anarcho-syndicalists that the PCP way was the only way.
Merely seizing the factories and economic base of the
nation was not enough without complementing the seizures
with the conquest of political power. Neither would
social-democratic methods work because only through a
revolution led by a disciplined PCP which followed the IC's
methods would the workers succeed in their goal of
conquest. 37 Most likely the reason for the speech was to
emphasize the superiority of the IC's official tactics vis
a vis the competition from other worker representational
movements and parties (especially the anarcho-syndicalists
and social-democrats)
.
Droz must also have been trying to
convince a highly decentralized and federalist PCP on the
imperatives of following the 21 conditions which meant
steering clear of both the anarchist and syndicalist
traditions which were still strong within the party. The
fraction which Droz backed in opposition to Caetano de
Sousa was, as he recognized, imperfect in terms of its
adherence to the 21 conditions.
One of the major debates during the first PCP congress
of 1923 revolved around the party's participation in
parliamentary elections. This was an old, lively debate
carried on within the syndical movement as well as the FMP
and dating back to the teens. Within the FMP the
parliamentarians (or reformists) lost because one of the
party statutes clearly stated that participation in
bourgeois politics was out of the question. 38 During the
preliminary meetings called to form the "organic bases" of
the PCP this topic was once again a major concern. At
first the anti-parliamentarians won the debate when it was
decided at a February 1921 meeting that the PCP'
s
activities would be anti-parliamentarian. Nevertheless the
"provisional organic bases" for the party, specifically
"basis #4" left the field for parliamentary activity open
when it emphasized that the parties activities would depend
on the conditions within which it must act. 39 In this case
the parliamentarians vanquished and left the prohibition of
partisan activity out of the party's formal structure
leaving the road open for a move in this direction in the
future
.
Several decisions in 1923, including a full discussion
of the issue at the First Congress, favored parliamentary
activity although Rates was not partial to it. The
increased acceptance within the PCP for parliamentary
activity showed that the emphasis within the party on an
immediate victory or revolution had diminished and that the
party had moved toward social-democratic tactics (it
participated in the 1925 elections, e.g.) contrary to the
years of anti-parliamentarian stance of the Portuguese
labor movement. In the end the distinction between the PCP
and the other labor groups was the evolution of the party
toward "bourgeois" politics. This action was unique in
that it moved the party away from anarchism and syndicalism
and delivered a final, fatal blow to the "maximalist"
tendency within the party. It should be noted that the
party was made up of a myriad of tendencies and that party
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electoral activity wavered depending on the tendency with
most influence at a given time. 4 0
The uncentralized nature of the PCP is evident during
the three years between the first and second (1926) party
congresses. During these three years the party
participated in various attempted military coups; formed
alliances with the Radical Party, the Democratic Left, the
PS, and the CGT; witnessed an attempt to accelerated
bolshevization; was plagued by internal conflicts, purged
the majority of its historical leadership, created a
short-lived Popular Agrarian Party, participated in the
elections of 1925, and developed active syndical
participation. These occurrences help to explain why the
PCP diminished in strength until it was almost non-existent
in 1927.41
A major reason for the deterioration of the PCP as an
organization which brought it from 3000 members to less
than 100 in 1927 surrounds the policies pursued under
Rates. Rates and the leadership were convinced that the
momentum of the Russian revolution would deliver the
Portuguese government to the PCP on a silver platter. All
that the PCP need do to create a soviet nation was to issue
the revolutionary decrees and control the government which
would implement them. When the passive strategy to gain
control of the government failed, Rates turned increasingly
to "putsch" movements and involved the PCP in every
bourgeois "putsch" attempt between 1924 and 1925.42 Rates
believed Portugal was ripe for a Russian style revolution
but the new Comintern representative, Dupuy, insisted that
a "united front" was the correct path since the
"subjective" revolutionary conditions necessary for a
successful revolution had not accompanied the "objective"
in Portugal. 43 what he meant by Portugal lacking the
necessary subjective conditions was that the party was not
yet bolshevized enough for the IC to maintain control of
the revolution through a disciplined PCP. 44
The excitement which the Russian success had brought
to the Portuguese was slowly diffused by the "united front"
policy imposed on the PCP by the IC. The "united front"
sapped the PCP of its revolutionary energy and left it ill
prepared for the approaching years of clandestine
existence. The "united front" strategy was the final stand
for a group of aged syndical leaders which had been at the
forefront of the Portuguese labor movement. Although Rates
and his group were forced to pursue "bourgeois" tactics,
they were later stripped of their leadership positions and
were blamed for incorrectly analyzing the Portuguese
situation even though they were following the IC's orders.
Because the bourgeois parties with which the PCP was
competing had similar ideological views, the PCP became
increasingly indistinguishable from its rivals so that
toward the end of the republic many of its militants and
leaders had rejected the PCP for other parties (especially
for the Esquerda Democratica and the Partido Radical). 45
According to Pereira, Rates does not dominate the
party until 1926 as the PCP would have us believe. After
his return in the summer of 1924 from a visit to the Soviet
Union his power began to wane, and by the end of that year
he no longer played a determining role in the party. In
early 1925 he had been replaced as the Secretary-General by
Ferreira Quartel. If we examine the PCP's analyses during
Rates' leadership we find that the party was giving an
accurate account of the Portuguese situation while avoiding
the ideological or dogmatic blinds which were biasing the
analyses of the rest of the labor movement. According to
Pereira, Rates' views held the worst as well as the best
features of the Portuguese labor movement. He epitomized
the generation of militant workers which emerged from the
1910-12 strikes and disappeared during the first few
decades of the "new state." Rates' analyses were full of
the contradictions which might be expected from a
self-taught man but they were also free of the dogmatic
constraints which colored others' analyses. His was a
realistic assessment of the Portuguese situation. He had
been a revolutionary syndicalist, a maximalist, a
communist, and a cooperat ivist
. His influence was evident
in the major debates surrounding Portuguese communism from
the 1913 debate concerning the revolutionary potential of
the syndical movement to the 1923-24 debate concerning the
need for syndical unity and the role of the peasant^ in
the Portuguese revolution. Rates was purged not only for
his disdain of a centralized and disciplined party but also
because he thought for himself and was a product of the
generation which emphasized the free expression of ideas
and opinions. He wrote what he thought and felt with
little regard to ideological discipline which helps explain
why the official PCP organ 0 Communista is so lively from
1923-24 and so cumbersome from 1925-1926. 47
By 1926 the same JC members who had been purged or
suspended as a result of the 1923 confrontation finally
succeeded in gaining control of the PCP leadership
positions from their older comrades who had been entrenched
in the syndicalist tradition. By late 1924 the IC had
reinstated them with full privileges and by the end of 1925
they already held key positions. A quick glance at the CC
membership of Red Aid (an ancillary organization) shows the
resemblance with the 1923 CC of the JC . The internal
changes were clearly a tactical move by the IC to
"bolshevize" the party. The same intransigence and
sectarianism which had earlier led Droz to back the
expulsion of the Caetano de Sousa faction was now a
valuable asset welcomed by Dupuy and later Codovilla, the
new representatives of the IC. 48
The "bolshevization" of the PCP, claims Pereira, was
accelerated in the second half of 1925 and its effects were
already evident at the 1926 Second Congress. The large
decline in membership which followed the accelerated
bolshevization was largely a result of the party's emphasis
on discipline and centralism. The reorganization of 1925
imposed certain conditions of membership which many of the
communists were not willing to accept (for example, like
Rates they preferred the open debate within the party which
they expected of the syndicalist tradition)
. Furthermore,
the party was faced with the contradictions that IC
affiliates faced throughout the world. In the course of
applying the directives imposed on the party from above
which were designed to achieve the international goals of
the IC the party often neglected its obligations to the
Portuguese. The IC directives would often conflict, yet
take precedence, over the party's own analyses of the
domestic situation. This is apparent when we compare the
First and Second Congresses of the PCP for while the First
discusses many of the national problems of Portugal the
Second merely appears to be a translation of the IC's
directives which could have been written for any communist
party in the world. The original analyses for which Rates
became known were also cleansed from 0 Comunista and
replaced with ideological arguments that lacked references
to original Portuguese problems. 49
The reorganization of 1925-1926 created a party which,
at the time of its Second Congress, was alien to the PCP
which emerged from the First Congress. It was difficult to
find any traces of its legacy. The Second Congress is
among the most secretive in PCP history. One of its major
goals was to cleanse its ranks of the contradictions which
plagued the labor movement. This meant that the purges
which accompanied the bolshevizat ion of the party resulted
in a minuscule, unstructured, unorganized PCP which was
unable to combat the newly installed military dictatorship
for the coup came before the new leadership had the chance
to rebuild the party it had just destroyed. A realistic
account of the Second Congress would show the personal
rivalries which were splitting the party as well as the
increased role which the IC was playing in the party's
organization . 50
In 1926 a right-wing military coup ended the first
Portuguese Republic and initiated the regime which would
postpone the second republic until 1974. According to
Pereira, the 1926 coup was not the major factor in the
catastrophic decline of PCP strength since repression did
not intensify until a few years later. The coup did,
however, alter the ideological and political context
within which the party had to function which in turn
required new tactics. The new hostile environment fed the
"boslshevization process" which created a new type of
communist militant that epitomized the militant of the
thirties. The new militant was still radical as under the
JC but the realities of the day required an increased
discipline, an acceptance of political about-faces, and
less debate than even he had been accustomed to. He was
not yet the "perfect" Stalinist which epitomized the party
after the 1940-41 reorganization, but he was, nevertheless,
more disciplined than his predecessors. He developed a
better understanding of the value of administrative and
bureaucratic solutions. Slowly the commitment to the
working-class movement that the members had been so
reluctant to ignore in the 1920' s was replaced by the ideal
that the "party" was "above" or more important than the
movement. The members became much more pragmatic and much
less ideological
.
After the 1 926 military coup the PCP continued its
activity especially in Porto where Bandeira Vermelha
continued to be published without being censured. The PCP
participated in both bourgeois republican "putschist"
attempts directed at the newly installed military
dictatorship. Although the PCP also took its share of
punishment, the first "putsch" of early February 1927
resulted in a wave of repression which was mainly directed
at republicans and the labor movement. Many of its
militants were imprisoned and others went into hiding in
the provinces. In March 1927 the PCP was reorganized
under the leadership of Jose de Sousa and Silvino Ferreira,
but the party's activities did not change. On June 20 the
PCP participated in a second aborted "putsch" and bore the
brunt of a new wave of repression. 52
The Portuguese delegation to the Tenth Anniversary of
the Bolshevik Revolution returned to Portugal (it had been
away from October to November of 1927) with the task of
reorganizing the PCP once again. The newly reorganized
party, however, was primarily devoted to the development of
quadres and was inactive and increasingly isolated. A PCP
cell of naval arsenal workers where Bento Goncalves (who
did not become a communist until 1928) was a member
demanded that the party either renew its syndical
activities or face a new reorganization. Since the cell
did not receive a response from the CC it decided to
reorganize the party even though the CC had the backing of
the IC. The successful reorganization of 1929 ended the
phase which focused on an immediate revolution. The second
phase which began under Bento Goncalves' ^ leadership
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focused on defensive tactics as a result of the repressive
atmosphere under which it was forced to work. its new goal
was to work toward partial victories which would ultimately
lead to the overthrow of the "fascist" regime through a
"national and democratic revolution." The new focus
required new tactics which included a shift from the
worker-peasant alliance to the formation of united fronts
and electoral participation whenever possible. 54
The discussions above have introduced the history of
the PCP up until 1929. It is crucial that we understand
the party's past to understand its activities during the
dictatorship. It is crucial that we recognize and
understand the determinants behind its transformation from
the complex, chaotic, republican period when the
heterogeneous PCP was but one representative of the labor
movement to its undisputed role during the dictatorship as
the sole "party" or labor representative which continued
the struggle to end the dictatorship and bring to the
working masses "that which they deserved." The current
leadership of the PCP has preserved the "official" history
which emerged after the 1940-41 reorganization since they
were the creators of the "official" history.
The history which we discuss above is not the
"official" history which is referred to, analyzed, and
debated by the party. The official party history has been
cleansed of any facts or events which do not correspond to
the image it wants to convey to the "rank and file" and to
the Portuguese working class. Most communists are not
aware of "our" history. When confronted with our
contradictions to the "official" history the communist's
initial reaction is that only the party knows what its true
history is while the "rival" history has been created by
"anti-communists" trying to weaken and divide the party.
Since we can learn as much about the party by analyzing its
"official" history, by analyzing what it has included as
well as what it has excluded, our next focus is on the
official party line with emphasis on the omissions and
changes to the actual facts. The PCP's early history has
been reconstructed as accurately as possible but there are
still many areas, especially as we approach 1929, which are
not completely clear for lack of evidence.
According to the PCP's official history the internal
divisions which we discussed above are occasionally
referred to but only if they support the party's criticisms
of the pre-1929 leaders. The discussions we had above
concerning the complexity of the labor movement and the
various ideological threads which divided it are usually
replaced in the official communist press with just one or
two paragraphs which focus on only those aspects which they
would like to publicize. The PCP states, for example, that
in 1921 the party published the 21 conditions and joined
the Comintern. This leaves the reader with the impression
that those conditions were adhered to yet, as discussed
above, it took several years to put the conditions into
effect and they did not begin to receive rigid adherence
until after the 1925-26 reorganization . 55
According to the PCP after its formation the party
focused on organizing and channeling the workers' strength
and activity in the correct direction (implying that the
CGT which was dominated by anarcho-syndicalists was
channeling it in the wrong direction) and trying to get the
workers movement to accept adherence to the International
Red Syndicate (ISV) (which it rejected since the ISV ran
counter to many of the CGT' s beliefs). The party
emphasized its activity in the organizational realm by
creating the JC, printing the official party press, and so
forth. The party also implies that the emergence of the
PCP led to a clarification of the muddled ideological
threads which dominated the movement. Although this may be
true it is not as a result of as favorable a response
toward the PCP as it would like us to believe but because
the PCP was having internal struggles of its own. The move
by the PCP toward parliamentary activity under IC pressure
had a lot to do with the clarification of ideology but in
the opposite direction. Many members and non-members found
it increasingly difficult to distinguish the party from its
bourgeois rivals. 56
What we begin to see is that the party omits whatever
unfavorably affects its image and includes only the
information which is favorable, much of it only half-truths
or implied untruths. Where is the "real" history which we
discussed earlier. A comparison of the "official" history
with the unofficial, but real, should make us question the
"official" line. During and in the months prior to the
PCP's first congress Caetano de Sousa attempted to seize
control of the party's directive organs. In the official
history what should be considered one of the most
interesting and lively congresses is reduced to only five
paragraphs none of which mention the reorganizational
attempt or the numerous ideological threads which still
characterized the party. The PCP prefers to emphasize the
congress's devotion to the agrarian problems and the image
that the congress was democratic and free of internal
struggles. The PCP declares that a representative of the
IC was present at the First Congress but never is there any
mention of Droz's full role. After all the IC was often
deciding not only party policies but even choosing the
members of its directive organs which it continued to do
during the clandestine era. Why is the IC s full role not
mentioned?^
The PCP prefers to mention the inclusion of
representatives from the First International in their
Congresses as examples of international solidarity and the
recognition of their links with the international
working-qlass movement, but they are not as eager to
uncover their full role in the PCP's history. Although
Droz was the first member of the IC to routinely intervene
in PCP internal affairs, there had been previous informal
links with the IC through Jesus Ibanez and Joaquin Maurin,
two Spanish representatives of the ISV, who tried to
influence the PCP with the "Moscow" line. 58 As with other
communist parties the PCP's history is marked with IC
interventions which have been a determining factor during
ideological shifts, purges, and other incidents. Besides
Droz's role in the 1923 schism, the turnover of 1926 at the
Second Congress in which the previously defeated group of
1923 became the victor was a result of the new IC group's
(Dupuy and later Codovilla) intervention in PCP affairs.
At the time the new IC goal was to accelerate the
bolshevization of the party and increase its relations
with the IC s international organizations such as the ISV,
the International Communist Youth, Red Aid, and the
International Peasant's Council. With the party's plunge
into the clandestine era the IC became especially
instrumental in influencing the party's direction. All
indications appear to show that the IC directly intervened
in the directorship of the party throughout the thirties
until the PCP was expelled from the organization in
1938/1939 (the IC was disbanded in 1943 and the PCP was not
accepted back into the international communist family until
its recognition in 1947 by the Cominform) . 59 The obvious
reason why the PCP would attempt to conceal IC intervention
is that it would back critics' arguments that the PCP is
not really a national party but is instead a puppet of
Soviet international policy. 60
The PCP has purposefully deemphasized the role of the
first party congress in 1923 and has especially concealed
the participation of Droz and the heated divisions which
surrounded the congress for reasons which will be more
fully developed below. The party criticizes the period of
Carlos Rates' leadership as one in which his strategies
did not go beyond parliamentary negotiations and the
support of radical military coups. The PCP was unable to
gain a firm base among the working class because the party
could not evade .right wing opportunist influences. The
reason the party gives for Rates' incorrect analysis of the
situation is that he "thought that the working class was
condemned to serve as a maneuverable mass [bargaining chip]
for the democratic petit bourgeoisie, since he did not
believe in the possibility of elevating the proletariat to
be the leading and promoting class of the Revolution of
October." what the party fails to mention is that Rates'
policies in the "bourgeois" parliamentary sphere were as a
result of a direct order from the International . 61
The PCP reduces the dominant aspects of the
inter-congress period into criticisms of Rates' policies
until 1926 (but he only led the party until the end of
1924) and a discussion of the increased repression directed
at the working class. As far as the PCP is concerned the
workers could not capitalize on their devotion and struggle
because of the opportunism of the anarcho-syndicalists who
dominated the CGT and were not mobilizing the workers for
revolutionary action. Because neither the PCP nor ISV were
sufficiently organized nor influential enough to lead the
working classes to victory the party's activity was reduced
to the distribution of propaganda and attempts to organize
worker activity in the correct direction. 62
It was in the midst of this atmosphere of
disorganization that the Second Party Congress was held but
the party never got much of an opportunity to deal with the
critical problems as a result of the military coup of May
28, 1926 which overthrew the first republic and replaced it
with a right-wing military dictatorship. Given the weak
organization of the party and its low influence among the
workers, the party was not able to organize resistance to
the coup. As far as the party is concerned, the 1926
congress was insignificant because the PCP claims that the
congress never really met like other congresses or dealt
with the crucial issues because it adjourned early as a
result of the military coup. The PCP, as we shall see, has
very important reasons for keeping this congress in the
dark for the Second Congress is much more important than it
would have us believe. 63
According to the party, with the prohibition of its
legal activity the PCP was close to ending its existence
because it was not prepared or organized to continue
working in the repressive atmosphere which required a
clandestine party. The reason why the party was caught off
its guard was because of the incorrect lines of action
which not only the syndicai leaders but even the PCP
leaders prior to the 1929 reorganization carried out.
The majority of the militant workers which
emerged among us after the Russian Revolution,
with few exceptions, disappeared in the deluge
[wave of repression] of 1926. The majority of
them rose to the surface of the labor movement as
a result of the emotional state created by the
victory of the Russian workers. The majority of
these militants, without any socio-political
tradition behind them, and on top of that
uncultured, remained at the head of the working
masses and of their syndicates [unions] while
that seemed an easy task and not dangerous, in
the expectation that the end of the bourgeois
world was imminent. 54
As long as they could continue their leadership on the
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momentum of the Russian revolution all was well. So long
as the atmosphere of the imminent collapse of bourgeois
capitalism continued these leaders did nothing to lead the
masses in the revolutionary struggle, but once the
repression and difficult times arrived they no longer cared
to lead. The labor movement from 1926 to 1929, as
previously, was dominated by the anarchist movement which
meant that their activity was insignificant. Successful
strikes were not held because they were outlawed and the
anarchists pursued policies of capitu 1 i z at i on and were
still influenced by bourgeois ideals. 65 The workers were
exploited by these syndical leaders as well as by the
leadership of the old PCP who actually led the party into
its near liquidation so that by 1929 only 40 members and
two cells remained. The PCP was led by opportunists until
1929. Then party leader Augusto Machado preferred to play
it safe and not publish the party official organ, not
develop political and syndical activity, and not recruit
members. He reduced party activity to occasional
publications of propaganda and the reduction of its
syndical activity to studies and stat ist ics . 66
By keeping the realities of the Second Congress and
its aftermath in the dark the party can continue to make
such comments and prepare the scene for the introduction of
Bento Goncalves as the party's saviour. With the party's
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role in the workers movement reduced to abysmal levels and
the "militant" workers crying out daily for new forms of
organization adapted to a clandestine existence, Bento
Goncalves stepped in and worked toward reorganizing a party
capable of continuing its activity while underground . 67 The
only factory cell which still belonged to the party was the
Navy Arsenal cell in which Bento Goncalves was a member.
This cell took the initiative and purged the party of its
opportunist members through a reorganization of the
party. 6 8 He wrote a letter to the CC emphasizing the
necessity of reestablishing regular connections with the
syndical movement, the need to analyze political events on
a daily basis, the need to expand the number of communist
cells, and the need to establish a clandestine party press.
Since his letter remained unanswered a meeting was set up
to discuss the problem and the CC was asked to attend. 69
From within the Central Committee (CC) Manuel Pilar
also worked toward the reorganization of what was now an
inactive party by criticizing the sectarian spirit which
existed within the party. As a result a Conference for the
Reorganization of the PCP was held by 14 party militants
who decided to reorganize the de facto non-existent CC
.
The political views of Manuel Pilar and Bento Goncalves
replaced the views held by the CC before the
reorganization. 70 According to the analysis made by Bento
Goncalves, prior to the reorganization the PCP had been
suffering from very serious problems. The membership of
the party had declined to abysmal levels as had the CGT's
influence on the workers. Among the working class, petit
bourgeois ideas were increasingly infiltrating and
corrupting the working-class ideals. The PCP no longer had
the least bit of influence nor carried out any activity.
The Socialists were directly and indirectly playing into
the governments hands. The dictatorship was consolidating
its power. The new capitalist economic crisis was ripe and
ready to burst as witnessed by the deteriorating conditions
of the working classes. 71
Bento Goncalves is considered the first "hero" of the
"current" PCP. He is technically considered the "founding
father" of the party as well as the first "bolshevik", the
model "Stalinist," and the perfect worker. Among the
party' s few theoreticians only Cunhal can compare in the
crucial analyses which put the party back on track with the
reorganization of 1929, after years of bourgeois
opportunism by uncommitted leaders, and for his influence
in the reorganization of 1941. Goncalves is considered a
cut above the party's other heros (for example, Alfredo
Dinis, Germano Vidigal, Catarina Eufemia, Maria Machado) 72
who usually achieved martyrdom as a result of their
resistance to the dictatorship or through political
assassination by the PIDE (secret police)
. As far as the
PCP is concerned the party did not really begin until
Goncalves reorganized it in 1929. 73
According to Pereira, the official early history of
the party is based, almost word for word, on Goncalves'
writings. This brings us to the analysis of the PCP's
history and why, so far, the party line appears to be so
distant from the actual history which we discussed above.
The most obvious inconsistencies in Goncalves' writings are
the chronological errors, a result of his lack of access
to historical supporting documentation at the time of their
writing. 74 But Goncalves' writings are also very
polemical. His analysis of the party's history until 1929
distorts the reality of the situation. The party, in turn,
has accepted his analysis and distorted or purged any of
the facts which run contrary to the "official" history it
offers the Portuguese.
Goncalves praises the Caetano de Sousa faction, which
he considers the left wing of the party, and criticizes the
majority of the party behind Carlos Rates' leadership,
which he considers the right wing. According to Goncalves,
the left wing of the party defended the struggle of the
working classes against the bourgeoisie, even though it
often turned to adventurism and terrorism. Rates, even
though he controlled a majority of the party, was playing
into the hands of the bourgeoisie with his emphasis on
elections and putsches. 75
Goncalves is just as critical of Droz for his support
of the Rates faction. As he states:
Rates and Droz formed an irresponsible and
grotesque duo. ... it was not difficult to see
that^ they were shameless opportunists. It is
difficult to admit that the I.C. ignored [the
true face] of this horde. Rates continued in the
party despite all. ... it was for the sectors of
the petite and medium bourgeoisie that he worked
with his politics, dragging with him the party. 76
According to Goncalves the PCP does not really have a
history as a communist party (bolshevized) until the latter
part of the twenties and in the official history it is
Goncalves who saves and gives the party new vitality.
A comparison of the two PCP histories which were
discussed above leads us to wonder why there are so many
factual differences between them. Why especially is the
early history based on Goncalves usually a complete
opposite of what really occurred during this period? The
obvious answer is that the group which has controlled the
party ever since the reorganization of 1 940-41 considers
Goncalves to be the ultimate hero of the party and the
PCP's founding father. Therefore, rather than adapt their
views to conform with the historical facts, they have
chosen instead to alter the historical facts to preserve
the "sanctity and purity" of Goncalves. Because the PCP
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bases its history on Goncalves' writings, we can best
understand the discrepancies in the early history by
uncovering why Goncalves insisted on reversing the roles of
the players so that the JC becomes the heroes and Rates'
majority become the bourgeois right-wingers during the
disagreements of the twenties. 77
According to Pereira the discrepancies (except for the
chronological mistakes) were purposefully distorted by a
Goncalves faced with a difficult task. In order to
strengthen the party's discipline to the levels necessary
to make a clandestine party viable and to impose upon it
the IC's directives, he found himself compelled to look
into the party's history in a search for the roots to the
policies which he would be pursuing in the thirties. The
only group he could draw form would be the Caetano de
Sousa-Jose de Sousa faction with the small basis of JC
support behind it. In order to do this he had to recreate
history, blaming Rates and Humbert Droz for many of the
organizational problems for which they were not totally
responsible. But according to Pereira, Rates and Droz
cannot be blamed alone for the parties decrease in strength
to 1929. Rates' and Droz' s actions were only one of the
factors leading to the loss of membership of the late
twenties. After all the party already suffered from
internal conflicts as a result of the contradictions within
the anarcho-syndicalist worker's movement from which it had
been formed. 7 ^
Goncalves and the current PCP declare the JC faction
the heroes and ignore the terrorist activities they were
carrying out. They extend Rates' leadership to 1925/26
when by the end of 1924 his power within the PCP was
already waning. They keep the truth of the 1923 conflicts
and the reorganizations of 1923, 24
, and 25 undercover.
They even try to pass-off the Second Congress as not having
dealt with any major issues because of the military coup,
but this is all far from the truth. The second congress
is most likely secretive to preserve Bento Goncalves' role
in the reorganizat ional crisis of 1929. 79
As we discussed earlier, Pereira argues that the
majority of the rifts within the party until 1929 (the
Rates/Caetano de Sousa rift, the agreement between the PCP
and the International Red Syndicate, the return at the end
of 1924 of members purged in 1923, the PCP's relationship
with the radicals and social- democrats, and the
reorganizations of 1923, 24, 25 ) were based more on
organizational lines than on political or ideological
divisions. The major factors behind the PCP's disastrous
decline in membership from 3000 members in 1923 to only 40
members in 1928 can not be laid only at Rates' and Droz's
doorstep. It is true that Rates' turn to putschist
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tactics with the bourgeois republicans led to a decline in
members as did the "united front" policies imposed on the
party by the IC beginning in 1924. The membership figures
show a clear decline in the size of the party from 1921 to
1929.
1921 400-1000 pep members and 260 Young
Communists
1922 2900 members (1702 paying membership fees)
1923 (early) 3000
(November) 500
1924 700
1928 70
1929 49 (the PCP claims there were only 40
members)
With each reorganization the party lost large numbers of
its members through voluntary termination of membership or
as a result of expulsions. As Rates led the party closer
to the Democratic Left or the Radical Party, whether it was
in the politics of putsches which he preferred or the
"United Front" policies forced upon him by the IC, the end
result was the same. In either case the party became less
distinguishable from the bourgeois parties which led
members to abandon the party for the anarcho-syndical
movement or for the rival parties. 80
Immediately after its formation in 1921 the JC did not
lose as many members to rival movements and parties as did
the PCP because of its greater militancy. in its early
days the JC's involvement in the Red Legion's terrorist
activities made it distinguishable from or at least an
equal to its rivals. But although the party did not lose
members as a result of similarities with the other parties
it was considerably weakened by the terrorist activities
which sapped its membership through "death, imprisonment,
and deportation." An example of the JC's militancy was its
attempt to takeover the PCP in 1923 but it was subsequently
weakened as members abandoned the JC and as a result of the
creation of a new youth organization parallel to the JC by
the PCP. 81
Another important factor behind the declining
membership of the party was the increasingly repressive
atmosphere which followed the military coup of 1928. The
most important factor, however, appears to be the
accelerated bolshevizat ion policies which were implemented
beginning with the reorganizations of 1924. The
conclusions based on abundant information are that the
struggle which Goncalves described between the worker
"left" and the bourgeois "right" was not an ideological one
but instead -one based on the decentralized nature of the
PCP. Two nuclei existed (JC versus ex-syndicalists) with
different origins struggling to control the organization.
Based on class there is no basis to Goncalves' distinction
between a bourgeois group and a worker group because both
factions had similar class backgrounds. Caetano de Sousa's
JC was too small to be considered an equal to Rates
majoritarian group. This organizational struggle was the
result of the bo 1 shevi z at i on process. As Pereira
concludes, ideologically both groups were "Blanquist . " We
could venture to say that the JC faction was composed of
"leftist" Blanquists with their interpretation of
democratic centralism and attempts to achieve power via
terrorist activities while the PCP was composed of
"rightist" Blanquists who focused instead on putsches and
alliances with the bourgeois republicans. 82
Armed with this analysis of the party's early history
it becomes easier to uncover the reasons behind the party's
falsification and manipulation of its history. If
Goncalves is the "hero" of the PCP, then either his truths
must be accepted and the realities of this history altered
to back them up, or the party must recognize that Goncalves
erred and alter his history so it is supported by the
facts, or Goncalves must be rejected as a hero altogether.
The latter is unthinkable for he is too close to the hearts
of the Stalinists who reorganized the party in 1940-41. To
renounce him would be similar to renouncing themselves.
Similarly the PCP prefers to keep Goncalves' inaccurate
analyses of the early history because they support their
own analyses which follow the 1940-41 reorganization. The
only option which remains, therefore, is to conceal, alter,
or destroy the vestiges of the real history from Portuguese
society or at least from its militants.
The complexities of the early period are covered with
white or black paint because militants have an easier time
determining what is "good" from what is "bad" when the
complexities have been obscured. This is true in any type
of propaganda whether it comes from a communist party or
from an administration of any country. It is more
difficult for propagandists to successfully manipulate the
real, complex aspects of the truth (the grays) so
everything is reduced to blacks and whites. You are either
with us or against us. The complex, real history is not
recognized in the official PCP history or by Goncalves
because to do so would mean to recognize that Goncalves'
heroes within the JC were already in control of the party
prior to the 1929 reorganization and that the decimation in
terms of membership was largely a result of the
bo 1 shevi z at i on process rather than the other more
convenient reasons which the party provides (Rates' and
Droz's errors)
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Structure and membership
. According to the official
PCP history based on Bento Goncalves' analyses, in 1923 the
PCP was "bourgeois" while the JC was "proletarian."
Although the distinctions between worker, employee, and
intellectual are vague and difficult to determine, the
party appears not to be bourgeois, as the reorganizers
would like us to believe, because both the JC and the PCP
were dominated by workers. This is especially true of the
JC which only after the thirties began to register a larger
enrollment of students (intellectuals). We can say,
however, that when compared to the anarcho-syndicalists (of
which the JC at the time was more representative because a
majority of its members came from the Young Syndicalists)
the PCP's "workers" were based in sectors which were more
"conscious of class divisions" or "enlightened" (cashiers
rather than leather workers, for example) .84
Pereira has only found limited data for the membership
of the PCP and JC during the first republic but based on
the information available for 554 members he reaches some
conclusions on the organization and membership of both.
The major difficulties in analyzing the data surrounds, for
example, how to determine the class make-up of the party
based on the limited employment information available. The
membership of the PCP appeared to be drawn primarily from
railroad, arsenal, civil construction, and metal workers,
and similar positions. The classification of many
individuals as worker, employee, or intellectual is
questionable. Railroad office employees were considered
workers equal to those that worked in construction and
maintenance. Self-employed barbers (or even those with one
apprentice) were considered workers as were many of the
ex-syndicalist leaders, like Carlos Rates, who had been
workers but had climbed some rungs of the social ladder.
Most likely the reason the Caetano de Sousa faction and
Goncalves labeled the PCP bourgeois was a result of the
"empregado" sector (office workers and so forth) and the
recently upward mobile members. 85
The PCP was a predominantly male organization with a
minuscule female participation of .7 percent (and even that
participation is questionable given the sexist society
which existed in Portugal)
. During the latter part of the
clandestine years the party would make a strong effort to
widen the role of the woman beyond the traditional
"housekeeping" mentality under which they were categorized
by the males. 86
The PCP during its early years was weak in grass root
membership and was basically a "notable" party. The party
was primarily an urban one centralized in Lisbon. It was
not yet strong in either the Alentejo or the Setubal
district which later became among its most important
regions of strength. Until the 1923 reorganization as
demanded by the Comintern, the PCP was based on Communist
Centers which were political clubs. The reorganization
initiated the "commune." In 1925, the party was again
reorganized into "cells" with special emphasis on factory
cells, but in reality most were local block or street cells
because Portugal was not very industrialized at the time.
This remained the case until 1930. 87 Until 1929 the party
was directed by a Central Commission (CC) elected at the
party congresses. In the party's early years the CC was an
equal partner with other directive organizations such as
the National Junta or the General-Commission of Education
and Propaganda as was the tradition in the Portuguese labor
movement. Slowly, especially after the accelerated
bolshevization of 1925-1926, the leadership of the party
drifted toward greater centralization. 88
The PCP in the Thirties
After the 1926 military coup the PCP was the only
party able to resist fascism and continue its activities
underground. The PCP's transition from a legal party to a
clandestine party was the major focus of the 1929
reorganization. Bento Goncalves, according to the PCP,
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played a decisive role in the reorganization of 1929. He
struggled to decrease the anarchist tendencies which still
existed within the PCP, to connect the party with the
working classes, and to bolshevize the party. He helped
form the directive organs, the ancillary mass
organizations, and the diversified clandestine press
necessary to implement the party's clandestine strategies.
The PCP's successful transformation to a clandestine party
eventually attracted the confidence of the working class
and catapulted the party ahead to become the workers'
vanguard. 89
The reorganization of 1929 found the party in dire
straits in terms of its clandestine experience, in terms of
its ability to combat repression, in terms of its
ideological preparation, and in terms of its finances. The
few members that remained in the newly reorganized party
were mainly militant workers with long years of experience
within the syndical movement. When it became evident that
the fascist regime supported by the military and police
forces could only be overthrown by a strong popular
movement led by strong well organized, combative political
organizations the party worked in that direction. Some of
the unitary or partisan organizations which it set up were
the Revolutionary Organization of the Armada, International
Red Aid, League of Friends of the USSR, and League against
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War and Fascism. 90
In order to improve its links with the working classes
the PCP focused on leading strikes and demonstrations in
favor of the workers (especially during 1931-32). 91 in
September of 1930 it set up the Inter-Syndical Commission
(ISC - a relative of today's Inters indical ) to counter
government attempts to control the unions. According to
the PCP the ISC quickly contested and replaced the CGT as
the major representative of the revolutionary syndical
movement which had been exploited for decades by the
anarchists. 92 By 1934 the PCP praised its successful
syndical strategy by declaring that the membership in the
Intersindical had increased to 25,000 as compared to 15,000
in the anarcho-syndicalists CGT and 5,000 in the socialist
FAO
.
9 3 This meant that the PCP increased the membership in
Inter-Syndical by 67% in only one year since at the XII
congress of the Comintern the PC claimed to have only
15, 000. 94
The official party organ 0 Communista had been closed
down by the government since 1926, so the PCP began using
the national and legal 0 Proletario as its major vehicle
for communication of the official party line. Initially
the paper was printed in Porto where the censors were more
lenient than in Lisbon, but by the mid-thirties the paper
was moved to the capital city and became more openly
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communist. Goncalves is credited with writing many
important analyses in the paper concerning the reformism of
the PS and the radicalism of the anarchists who were
pursuing the wrong path and serving the interests of the
bourgeoisie rather than the revolutionary working class. 95
The crackdown and imprisonment of the papers' major
editors, Bento Goncalves and Jose de Sousa, led to its
shutdown in late 1930 (it was reissued later as the
clandestine organ of Intersindical )
.
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By 1931 the presses were running again but this time
clandestinely as the first series of Avante
!
rolled off the
presses in February. Although the paper had planned to
publish bi-weekly it only managed to publish about nine
issues (most in 1931) up until 1933. Under the wave of
repression which began in 1932, Avante
!
was replaced by
Frente Vermelha (Red Front) for two issues before it
returned in 1933 (most indications are that only one issue
was produced in that year) . 97 The PCP proclaims Avante
!
,
the official party organ, to be one of the greatest
clandestine newspapers in the world. It was important in
strengthening the internal organization of the PCP, in
expanding the party's influence, and in battling the
anarchist and the "reviralhistas " (putschists) that were
sapping the popular movement of its strength. Through
Avante! the party conveyed the "correct" ideological and
tactical methods to fight fascism. 98 with the formation of
a clandestine press the party's abilities to implement its
analyses improved tremendously. The party was now able to
communicate with the masses regularly since the press
provided a vehicle of party propaganda directed at their
enlightenment and organization. Avante
!
was the major
party publication but the PCP also printed a number of
affiliated publications for various trades and
syndicates . 99
In 1933 the PCP's "Antonio" outlined the party's
progress and evaluated its deficiencies at the XII Plenary
Session of the IC. The reason for the major difficulties
within the party was that its organizational strength was
much weaker than its actual influence in Portugal. The
party's cadres were primarily young, inexperienced
individuals who still harbored anarchist tendencies and
occasionally resorted to terrorist activity. The party's
major tasks in 1933 were:
1
. to purge the anarchist tendencies which remained
within the party,
2. to strengthen the bonds between the agricultural
laborers and the industrial workers by creating a
strong unitary organization.
3. to shift the basic organizational unit to the
factory cell from the neighborhood cell.
4. to continue to strengthen its activity in the
syndical movement.
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5. to devote more time to dealing with the problems ofthe agrarian poor.
Antonio went on to criticize the IC for not being more
supportive of the PCP because Portugal, although small,
played an important role in terms of international
communism. 100
In the mid-thirties the major role of the PCP as
dictated by the IC was to entrench itself in the society as
a clandestine organization and, if possible without
imperiling itself, to enlighten and prepare the masses for
the inevitable revolution. 101 Although the PCP will not
admit it, the action at the time focused on propaganda,
especially through large runs of the clandestine press.
The goals of the PCP and the FJCP (Portuguese Federation of
Communist Youth or JC ) were to continue the struggle
against the bourgeoisie at the fascist dictatorial "front"
and at the socialist and anarcho-syndicalist "front." The
PCP emphasized that it would not align with any of the
other parties or movements since that would endanger the
PCP's revolutionary and working class base. Neither would
the party cooperate in bourgeois putschist tactics because
bourgeois fascism was as bad as any other danger which
would emerge from the bourgeoisie. In battling fascism the
party was battling only one facet of bourgeois capitalism.
If fascism ended but bourgeois liberalism continued
203
the party's struggle would also continue because the
ultimate goal, to socialize the means of production and
change private ownership into collectives, would run
counter to liberal interests. 102
Social-democracy, a label which was also applied to
the bourgeois "collaborators" (the anarchists), was
considered to be the primary obstacle toward developing a
revolutionary movement especially during 1929-1933. To the
PCP, in keeping with the IC's views, social-democracy was
considered "social-fascism" for those who are not with us
must be against us. The solution which the PCP chose to
combat social fascism was the workers' unitary front in
which the PCP would attempt to wean socialist workers away
from their social fascist leaders. 103 These policies were
the PCP's interpretation of the Comintern's "class versus
class" tactics which dominated PCP strategy from 1928 (the
Sixth IC Congress) to 1935 (the Seventh IC Congress) .
Under the class versus class tactics the deteriorating
economic conditions would increase the number of
proletarians and decrease the number of bourgeois
capitalists. The latter would have to increasingly resort
to force to repress the masses as the balance of power
shifted toward the working classes but in the long run the
masses would rise and overthrow the yoke of their
oppressors
.
10 ^
In theory the party preached the class versus class
strategy but in reality the Portuguese proletarian base was
small and the party often worked along side the bourgeois
elements. Although the party was against participation in
the bourgeois putsch movements which it labeled
"reviralhista" it was evident that despite the party's
efforts many communists continued to participate in the
putsches (as is evident from the number of communists
imprisoned after their participation in the 1931
putsch) .105
The increased repression of 1932 and the arrests of
several leaders of the PCP and JC led to a decrease in
output of the party press. About this time the party began
to shift its emphasis from mere agitation to political
action through the organized class movements such as
general strikes in the move to fulfill workers economic and
political demands and to end the repression under which the
Portuguese lived. The shift of emphasis from mere
agitation to organization of the masses became especially
evident after Bento Goncalves' return from prison in 1933.
In this manner the party moved closer from the mere
theoretical discussion of action in propaganda and the
party press to organization and preparation for action. 1° 6
A comparison of the tactical shifts discussed above
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with the decisions made at the XII Plenary Session of the
IC's Executive Committee in 1932 shows a close correlation
and will help reveal why the transition began when it did.
Throughout Europe class struggles for economic and
political reasons were numerous as the great depression
approached its most difficult years. The grave crisis was
reflected in the polarization of the classes which was
paralleled by the increasing strength of fascist and
communist parties. The IC analyzed the increasing turmoil
throughout Europe and concluded that the communist parties
needed to organize the workers; they needed to strengthen
the unity of the working classes especially between the
employed and the unemployed; and they needed to fight for
the fulfillment of workers demands even if it meant
expulsion of sectarian tendencies within the party. 107
This helps explain the party' s increased involvement
in syndical strikes and activity such as that of January
18, 1934 which attempted to block the dictatorship,
s
efforts to replace free unions with state dominated ones
(similar to Mussolini's actions) .108 According to
"Queiros, " after the June 1933 attempt to do away with free
unions and replace them with national (fascistic) unions
the ISV attempted to set up a unitary front to combat the
government's moves. This attempt succeeded in bringing
together the central organizations of anarchist, communist,
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reformist, and independents under the first unitary front
of these organizations in Portugal. The unitary front's
call for general strikes and demonstrations throughout the
major points of the nation led to the protests of January
18, 1934 against the fascistic decrees of the government.
In Marinha Grande the demonstrations and a two-day general
strike moved beyond demonstrations to insurrectional
attempts. With the support of the populace the
insurrectionists were able to seize control of the city and
overpower the police forces for a few hours. These errors
which the PCP claims were committed by the anarchists as
well as anarchist tendencies within the PCP undermined the
policies of the united front. The move beyond
demonstrations to action combined with other anarchist
errors destroyed the campaign to stop the fascist izat ion of
the unions. However, it did show the masses that they
could demonstrate against fascism so long as they
maintained unity. 109 The PCP also concluded that it should
focus on organizing partial strikes since total strikes and
insurrectional attempts could lead to backlashes from the
government .HO
One result of the repression which followed the
January 1934 demonstrations was that all activities of the
PCP moved into the clandestine arena for the first time.
Prior to 1934 the party was able to continue legal and
quasi-legal (in addition to clandestine) activities partly
as a result of the disorganization of the repressive organs
(censors and police)
.
During this period, which coincided
with Avante
!
' s second series (June 1934 to 1938), the
communist press and its affiliated organizations published
more material than during any other period of its
clandestine existence. The publication of Avante
!
became
one of the major duties of the party and by 1 937 it was
being published weekly. In fact, toward the end of the
decade the printing presses became almost the only activity
which the party was carrying out. The party's almost
exclusive devotion to the printing presses sparked
criticism within the party's ranks. The criticism
eventually led to internal divisions and the chaos which
followed the 1941 reorganization of the party. 111
In the discussion by Queiros to the Seventh IC
Congress (1935) following Dimitrov' s speech, the PCP was
already suggesting the need to attract petit bourgeois
intellectuals who were dissatisfied with the dictatorship,
republicans who had turned their backs on putschist
attempts, and the need to build up a united anti-fascist
popular front which would include the anarchist and
syndicalist movements. Participation in the united front
did not mean allowing members of those groups into the
party since the discussion, in addition to the emphasis on
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building a united front, also emphasized cleansing the
party of sectarian and opportunistic views and of
increasing, reinforcing, and widening party strength in
the working-class by defending working class interests.
The party was especially concerned in developing stronger
links with the peasants, the unemployed, the women, and the
youths who had received relatively little attention up
until then. 112 The major shift to come out of the Seventh
IC Congress was the abandonment of the "class versus class"
strategy for the "popular front" strategy. 113
According to the party, in 1935 it already numbered
400 members. The PCP was recognized by the workers as the
only party which represented its interests. It was at this
point that it began to make inroads into the Alentejo, The
Algarve, and Marinha Grande. Goncalves stated that:
Prior to 1929, when the masses spoke of
communism, they referred to the French
communists, for example. After 1929, they
referred to us. In the space of three years,
we have built a party recognized by and dear
to the workers. The correlation of forces in
the syndical movement has shifted in our
favor. We have had many activities in
intellectual and student circles. We created
a strong organization of sailors. We began
being taken seriously . ]_ ± 4
As a result of the party's increased activity during the
thirties and its increased ancillary organizations the
fascist state became increasingly vigilant of the PCP and
focused its repression and propaganda on the communist
209
threat. With the arrests of the secretariat members (Bento
Goncalves, Jose de Sousa, Julio Fogaca) in the mid-thirties
the activities of the party were profoundly affected
because the organization of the party was centered on the
Secretariat. Nevertheless the PCP continued its activity
forming a central committee in 1936 which included Alberto
Araujo and Manuel Rodrigues da Silva (who also belonged to
the secretariat) as well as Alvaro Cunhal and Pires Jorge.
Avante began being published weekly until 1938. The party
supported the republican forces in Spain and many members
of the organization joined the fighting. One of the
landmarks of history of which the PCP is proud is its
involvement in 1936, through its ancillary organization the
Revolutionary Organization of the Armada (ORA)
, in the
mutiny aboard three Portuguese war ships to prevent them
from helpirig Franco's troops. 115 The increased repression
with more sophisticated methods learned from Nazi
specialists forced the party to be more cautious while
under clandestine conditions. Party activity began to
wither although many of the party's roots remained intact
and sprouted as a large national party with a more solid
base after the reorganization of 1940-41.
i
1 ^ By 1939 most
of the leaders of the party had been arrested bringing the
party to a virtual standstill. The discovery of two of the
clandestine presses in 1938-1939 ended the publication of
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the second series of Avante! until the presses were again
started two years later. 117
As we have seen, with the reorganization of 1929 the
PCP began its metamorphosis as it spun the cocoon within
which it would continue its clandestine existence. An
essential element in the parties clandestine operations was
a well organized, bolshevized party. The first
unsuccessful attempts at the bolshevizat ion of the party
began at the first party congress of 1923 although it was
not until 1925-26 and the Second Congress that the PCP
became seriously engaged in the party's bolshevizat ion; by
the 1929 reorganization, the Bolshevik influence was
decisive and after the 1934 insurrectional strikes it had
an incontestable hold over the party. The bolshevizat ion
process helps explain why it is difficult to find pre-1929
PCP members among the party ranks at any level after the
reorganization of 1929 (and this is especially true after
the 1940-41 reorganization) . In effect the party of 1929
was a different party than that of 1921.
For the most part, the historical account of the party
discussed above is based on the party's official history
which when compared to the real history inevitably results
in contradictions needing explanation. Unfortunately,
unlike the republican era little is known of the party's
clandestine existence, especially during the periods when
Cunhal was not heading the party (1929-1940 and 1949-1960)
.
Nevertheless, enough information is available upon which to
base some conclusions.
As its clandestine activity progressed in the
thirties, the party went through a long period of
instability in its directive organs as a result of
repression, imprisonments, and disorganization. Every
indication shows that during this period of hardship the
IC played a determining role in the directive organs until
it broke relations with the party in 1939. The title of
Central Committee (CC) was only begun to be used in the
thirties and it coexisted with other directive organs such
as the Executive Central Commission, and the Secretariat.
In reality it is often difficult to determine which of the
organs was running the party at a given moment in time
because after waves of repression it was not uncommon to
find the quadres or even militants of the party directing
the organization since there were times when they were the
only ones to escape the repression. During 1929, for
example, the momentum behind the party's reorganization was
not in the hands of individuals in positions of
leadership .119
Despite the special position which the PCP holds for
its martyr Bento Goncalves, Pereira claims that the real
individuals credited with the reorganization of the party
into a clandestine party in 1929 were Jose de Sousa and
Julio Cesar Leitao.120 According to Francisco Ferreira, an
ex-PCP member, Goncalves was a bad organizer with little
initiative or motivation, although he was very intelligent.
When compared to the activity which was pursued by Jose de
Sousa who was in charge of the syndical sector, Goncalves'
activities, who was in charge of the party, are dwarfed.
The differences which would emerge by the end of the decade
between the two leaders began to be apparent at this time.
Jose de Sousa focused more on propaganda and agitation at
the syndical level while Goncalves focused on imposing
centralized hegemony on the party. These differences could
even be seen in the party press. While Goncalves'
sectarian group had to make a tremendous effort to publish
the 3000 copies of Avante
!
on schedule, Jose de Sousa
appeared to have a much easier time publishing the much
more numerous p a r t y - a f f i 1 i a t e d , syndical related
publications .121
Bento Goncalves' masterwork, Duas Palavras
, of which
the PCP is so proud was written in the Tarrafal detention
camp in the Cape Verde Islands. We have already discussed
some of the major analyses of the PCP's early history which
Goncalves included in the work and have seen their
contradictions with the "real" history. An understanding
of the period during which the book was written will give
us considerable insight into the problems facing the PCP at
the end of the thirties. We should understand that Duas
Palavras was written as a series of dispersed notes in
reaction to texts highly critical of the parties activities
from 1929-1935 which were being circulated within the
prison walls by the "Group of Disassociated Communists"
(Grupo dos Comunistas Afastados - GCA). 12 2
According to Perreira, the edition of Duas Palavras
which is now available from the PCP press has been
"censored" by the party to present a favorable image of
Bento Goncalves and the PCP's early history. A split among
Tarrafal' s communist prisoners resulted in the expulsion
from the PCP of the GCA by Goncalves' Organization of
Tarrafal Communist Prisoners. The major impetus for the
split appeared to be the resentment by the GCA toward
Goncalves' collaborationist policies with prison officials
- the so called "politica nova" (new politics)
. Jose de
Sousa was one of the members of the GCA. Most of
Goncalves' support came from ORA to which most of the
prisoners at Tarrafal belonged. The division could be
traced back to Goncalves' attempt to impose IC directives
on the party after he returned to Portugal from the Seventh
IC Congress in 1935. At that time he moved to disband the
clandestine Int er-Syndical Commission through which the
party channeled most of its syndical activity and replace
it with activity within the corporative syndicates
controlled by the government. His attempts infuriated the
more radical members within the PCP centered around
syndical activity. Goncalves' imprisonment after his
return from Moscow prevented him from carrying out his
policy so that the divisions remained within the party. As
the "inter-syndicalists" or "anarchists" were arrested from
1935 to 1937, they took with them to Tarrafal the vestiges
of an internal split which was never resolved until these
two views confronted each other in prison. 12 3
The final break revolved around the "politica nova,"
pursued by Goncalves within Tarrafal, and the "politica de
neutralidade" (politics of neutrality) pursued by the
reorganized PCP of 1941. Both of these "politics" revolved
around the official PCP position toward WWII. WWII was
categorized by Goncalves as an inter-imperialist struggle
similar to WWI
.
The party's position, according to
Goncalves, was to place Portugal's independence above
partisan differences and to maintain a position of
neutrality in the war. Goncalves went so far as to present
the Tarrafal prison officials with a document outlining
these views and offering the PCP's collaboration toward
achieving both goals. The collaboration was unacceptable
to the "syndicalists" who distanced themselves from
Goncalves and became increasingly critical until they were
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expelled from the party in 1941.124
The divisions were not limited to Tarrafal. At home
the PCP was also struggling to break free of its internal
splits. The official leadership of the party (Velez
Grilo-Vasco de Carvalho) also found itself confronted by a
reorganized PCP in which Julio Fogaca and Alvaro Cunhal
played leading roles. The indications are that the PCP
aligned with the GCA while the reorganized PCP sided with
Bento Goncalves. The reason little is known of the
"politica nova" is that the reorganizers vanquished and
took control of the PCP. References to Goncalves' position
were extinguished since after the USSR's entrance into the
"imperialist" struggle Goncalves' martyrdom would have been
dealt a black mark. The reorganized PCP, which is the same
PCP we know today, has used all of its powers to maintain a
favorable image of its two "cults of personality" - that of
Goncalves and that of Cunhal, the new PCP leader. 12 5
The incidents surrounding the 1940-41 reorganization
of the party are not completely known for lack of
information but some initial conclusions can be drawn until
more of the missing pieces to this puzzle are discovered.
We know that in 1939 the IC broke relations with the PCP so
that in terms of an IC affiliation Portugal did not have a
communist party. Indications are that relations were cut
with the party because of the PCP's position during police
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arrests (especially concerning Pavel's escape). m any
case, from 1939 to 1941 two communist parties struggled to
attract the support of the IC criticizing each other of
revisionism. 126 The Grilo grQup immediately followed the
IC's directives and declared the need for national unity
after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union while the
"reorganizers" continued their policy of neutrality . 127
Despite the "reorganizers" having wrested control of the
party from the Velez Grilo group, the Grilo group continued
to publish its own Avante
!
until 1945 when the group faded
away . 128
The years of 1939 to 1941 were difficult ones for the
party not only because of increased domestic repression but
also because of problems within the party spurned on by the
Nazi-Soviet pact and other foreign actions. 129 The
reorganization began in 1940 with quadres recently released
from Tarrafal. Julio Fogaca was one of the most active
"reorganizers" after his release. He had been in the CC
beginning in 1935 and would return to the Secretariat in
the fifties. 130 it was at this point that Alvaro Cunhal
began to advance in the party hierarchy . 131 According to
the party, Cunhal was the Secretary-General of the JC in
1934. Already in 1939 Cunhal was showing himself to be a
Stalinist. When asked to write a manifesto for the CC
explaining the Nazi-Soviet Pact Cunhal came up with a
document unacceptable to the CC which was hardline and
doctrinaire (also proven by an article he published in 0
Diabo which supported the pact) .132
The membership figures for this period are highly
variable ranging from 40 to 50 in 1929 to between 50 and
7 0 0 in 1 933 depending on whose information is used.
Pereira, who has always been a reputable source, provides
the following membership figures:
1928 70 (50 in Lisbon and 20 in Porto)
1929 49 (29 in Lisbon)
1935 400+ 133
The PCP in the Forties
The reorganization of 1940-41 finally brought the
party under firm control of orthodox communists who viewed
socialism from a perspective similar to the Soviets.
Although Soviet support was denied the newly reorganized
party at first, the new leaders continued the party's
Stalinization . The enforcement of "democratic centralism"
and insistence on the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
became entrenched in the party. The orthodox leaders
became so dedicated to the preservation of "socialism in
one state" (the Soviet Union) and so committed to Stalinism
that they ultimately rejected Khrushchev's critique at the
XX PCSU Congress (in 1956) of Stalin's "cult of
personality .
"
The PCP's link to the Comintern during the
reorganization of 1940-41 was through the American
Communist Party. Julio Fogaca described in his letters to
the Comintern the reasons behind the PCP's reorganization
which included the arrests of cadres, a lack of
conspiratorial work, and suspicions that even the
leadership of the party had been infiltrated. The
Comintern had been aware of these problems as early as 1939
when it cut off relations with the PCP. Once reorganized
Julio Fogaca was upset that the Comintern abandoned the PCP
despite the party's attempts to get IC recognition . 134
The reorganization of the party had not been easy
because the former leaders (e.g. Vasco de Carvalho and
Francisco Sacavem) had been reluctant to give up their
positions. In addition, the suspicious arrests of many of
the best militants complicated the reorganization.
Nevertheless, the party tried to continue its work. With
information from its imprisoned leaders and members, it
uncovered and purged suspected informers. According to the
PCP, the newly reorganized party was formed from the best
militants (including Julio Fogaca) . The reorganization was
carried out so secretively and successfully that many of
its leaders only learned of it when the newly reorganized
PCP denounced them as unworthy of the support of the
masses .135
As additional proof of the successful reorganization,
Fogaca emphasized that after one year of activity the party
had not suffered from any new imprisonments. According to
Fogaca, the party had not yet reached a significant
influence among the masses (especially of the peasants),
but it had gained the confidence of the "revolutionary
proletariat" and the party leadership was primarily working
class. Despite the legacy which the new PCP inherited it
was making daily gains among the workers. The new party
was made up of disciplined revolutionary militants and
leaders devoted to the principles of international
communism. Even if the IC had never given the party much
attention or support before or after this latest
reorganization (for which Fogaca delivered a long, scathing
criticism of the IC) the new party would show it the PCP's
commitment through its future successes. The new PCP was
committed to a bolshevized party and was doing all in its
power to uncover its enemies and to make it a mass party.
If errors were made it was only for lack of experience and
not for lack of revolutionary spirit. 136
Fogaca gave us an understanding of the conditions
surrounding the reorganization.
Have you considered our situation at the start?
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When we were but a dozen comrades, most freshly
released from prison, we lacked direct links tothe masses. Confronting us and our work was thefascist police which had liberated us after longyears of detention, and an organization full ofprovocateurs calling itself the PCP. And,
meanwhile, we arrive without contacts with the ICleaders, without a clear understanding of theirdecisions, without money, without direct links tothe masses. During the fascist terror, wedecided to reorganize the party, leading to thedisappearance of those remnants still known as
the party. We denounced the provocateurs before
the workers, and building all which exists today,
so that, even though it is still not much, it is
already a testimony of our past work and a hope
for greater activity in the future. 137
Amidst the external environment of WWII and the
internal problems of repression in Portugal of which the
PCP bore the brunt, the party was resurrected after two
years of limited activity. The reorganization of 1940/41
created a new clandestine organization based on the hard
learned lessons of the past. The new party was capable of
eluding the police and maintaining stable activity as a
result of its new directive organs and its mobilization of
the masses. 138
Julio Fogaca discussed in his letter to the IC the
hardships of beginning and maintaining a clandestine press
without the necessary funds, because the economic hardships
of the workers made it difficult for them to fund the
party's activities. Fogaca asked the IC for money although
he emphasized that the party would continue the presses and
the struggle whether or not the help arrived. !39 j n August
1941 the printing presses were started up again after a two
year absence of Avante! which was forced upon the party
after successive waves of repression which began in 1936
and continued until several clandestine presses were
discovered by the police in 1939. The party claims that
its past experiences provided the reorganized PCP with its
new strength and allowed Avante ! to be a source of
"wisdom." The reorganized party was:
a politically mature party, armed with a secure
orientation, and tactics able to guarantee the
continuity and development of mass action, and
organizational bases able to resist the hard
conditions imposed by the fascist
dictatorship. 14°
The party conveniently omits any reference to a second
PCP headed by Velez Grilo which competed with the
"reorganizers" for the official recognition of the IC.
Neither does the PCP mention that a rival Avante
!
was
published by Grilo' s PCP until 1945, nor the "zig-zag"
policies pursued by both "PCPs" as they mirrored Soviet
policy shifts concerning WWII, nor of the reorganizers
adherence to the "neutrality" politics even after one year
of Nazi attacks on the Soviet Union.
The "official" history, which we have discussed so far
and will continue to discuss, is a product of the 1940-41
reorganizers that had firm control of the party by the
Third PCP Congress held in 1943. They controlled the
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release of information concerning the party's history so
that those periods during which Alvaro Cunhal was not in a
position of leadership, and during which the party tended
to pursue lines which he was not happy with, are especially
left in the dark. Therefore, more official information is
available from the PCP for the forties and sixties than the
fifties or thirties when Cunhal was not in charge. 14 !
At the Third Congress in 1943 the party began to
pursue policies of "national and international unity" or
"united front" which were directed against fascism. Under
this strategy the PCP worked with other anti-fascist forces
including republicans, socialists, and even masons. One of
the major vehicles was the National United Anti-fascist
Movement (MUNAF) which lasted until 1949. 142 The United
Democratic Movement (MUD) was created in 1945 as a
semi-legal unitary organization to complement the
clandestine activity of the MUNAF. The MUD was composed of
anti-fascists from various groups who participated in legal
means to publicize anti-fascism. One of these vehicles was
the opposition's campaign of Norton de Matos for president.
Norton de Matos withdrew from the race at the last minute
after the Salazarist regime refused to meet three of the
oppositions' conditions: freedom to campaign openly, an
honest voter registration, and opposition surveillance at
the polls to insure free elections. In 1946 the Youth MUD
was formed to expand the anti-fascist tactics to encompass
the youth movement
.
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With the disappearance of Grilo's PCP in 1945 the
"reorganizer party" was able to continue its activities
virtually free of internal opposition for about a decade.
The party moved to reopen or strengthen its links with the
international communist organizations which replaced the
IC. With the reorganization of 1940-41 the party, for the
first time in its history, succeeded in creating a stable
leadership which maintained a hegemonic organization and
pursued coordinated party policies. Until a new wave of
repression began in 1949 the PCP was able to maintain the
reins of power in the hands of a few clandestine
functionaries. As Pereira declares, "For the first time
since the beginning of the clandestine period one can speak
of an effective Central Committee and a Secretariat truly
directing the party, with a definite composition." It is
for this reason that the "real" history of the PCP has been
difficult to uncover because the new control by the
"Stalinist" reorganizers altered the history in their
benefit. The history of the PCP is their history, and the
martyrs are those they chose as martyrs, with many
individuals who would otherwise have deserved their place
in history thrown into the rubbish heap of "traitors."
Those names would for ever be extinguished from the
"official" history making it difficult for outside
observers to uncover the "real" history. 144
At the Fourth Congress in 1946 the PCP reaffirmed its
commitment to the MUNAF
. The congress was held in an
atmosphere of success given the increased activity of the
anti-fascist movement. The fall of the dictatorship was
seen as a certainty. Organizationally the reorgani zer s
'
unquestionable domination of the party was strengthened
with the emphasis on the principles of democratic
centralism. The forties were years of increased growth for
the party and it was during this period that the party
reached its membership apex of the clandestine era.
1943 1200 members
1946 4800 (approximate)
1947 7000 (approximate) 145
The party's popularity was a result of the
anti-fascist alliance between the western democracies and
the Soviet Union; the shortage of food as a result of grain
speculation and grain sales to both sides of the war which
caused unrest at home and serious difficulties for the
regime; the party's collaboration with the anti-fascist
forces within Portugal; and the organizational strength of
the reorganized party. By the end of the decade, however,
the tide had turned. The food shortages ended; the Allies
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supported rather than chastised the Salazar dictatorship
thereby smashing the hopes of the anti-fascists that
Portugal's dictatorship was bound to collapse under Allied
criticism (for example, Portugal was accepted into NATO in
1949 and the UN in 1955); the cold war broke the ties
which bound the communists and other anti-fascists in a
united opposition; and increased repression by the
government against the communists and other intellectuals
drastically reduced the renewed anti-fascist activity of
the forties. 146
The PCP in the Fifties
If the forties was the decade of hope (hope that the
dictatorship would crumble), the fifties was the "end of
illusion" (ending the "illusions" of the previous
decade). 147 Many of the anti-fascist personalities and
groups were disbanded, including the MUNAF
. The emphasis
changed from mass movements to the occasional participation
in "elections, " coup attempts, and a newly revived focus on
propaganda. Although a National Democratic Movement (MND)
was formed which supported the candidacy of Professor Rui
Luis Gomes for President, it did not get anywhere near the
support that the anti-fascist movements had attracted a few
years earlier. The MUD Juvenil continued but its
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anti-fascist mass basis was greatly reduced until its
membership was comprised primarily of communist youths.
PCP activities were also reduced as successive members of
the party's organizations fell into the hands of the
police. In 194 9 two of the three Secretariat members were
arrested (Alvaro Cunhal and Militao Ribeiro)
,
leaving Jose
Gregorio alone in the directive organization. Soon after
the addition of Sergio Vilarigues and Manuel Guedes to the
Secretariat in 1952 the latter was arrested. A decade of
stable rule under a cohesive Secretariat came to a close.
The Secretariat was expanded again to include Joaquim
Pires, Octavio Pato, and Julio Fogaca. 148
The party fell on hard times in the fifties. It
developed a bad case of "paranoia" which led it on a "witch
hunt" for infiltrators, informers, and spies at all ranks
of the party. The lower membership figures which followed
the "united anti-fascist" period were reduced further
through expulsions of the "traitors." During this period
the party is accused of executing three suspected
"traitors" whom it considered responsible for the police
crackdown. 149 By 1951 the party had been reduced to only
1 0 0 0 members. 150 j ^ became a closed, sectarian,
suspicious, and paranoic organization, with diminished
strength in almost every sector except in the Alentejo
where the party, through propaganda and ideology, more than
organizational strength, was able to mobilize strikes of
landless peasants in the early fifties. 151 As the PCP
approached the mid-fifties it attempted to reinvigorate by
concentrating on its previous success with alliance
politics, by renewing its organizational strength, and by
increasing its activities. To achieve this end it
disbanded the MND and the MUD Juvenil and substituted for
them the National Liberation Junta (JNL) which never
achieved great success but focused instead on imposing the
PCP's views on dissident JNL members. 152
Although in 1954 the party was still publicly
emphasizing the need for a mass uprising to overthrow the
dictatorship, by the Fifth Congress of 1957 the tactics had
altered considerably. The PCP focused instead on small,
contained uprisings for specific gains, which would attract
the anti-Salazar forces and lead to a peaceful transition
to democracy. The obvious reason for the shift in tactics
was the Twentieth CPSU Congress of 1956 which stressed
peaceful coexistence and criticized the cult of personality
as well as Stalinist crimes. Julio Fogaca, one of the
major activists and leaders of the PCP since the thirties,
was strongly influenced by Khrushchev's criticisms and
proceeded to apply these views to the party at the Fifth
Congress. 153 The shift in the Soviet Union invigorated
tendencies which had already begun to emerge within the PCP
in response to its decreased influence among the working
classes and to the growing isolationism which it faced in
relation to the anti-fascist forces. 154 Because of this
"rightward shift," the Fifth Congress has been enveloped in
secrecy by the "Cunhalists" who controlled the party. The
current PCP only refers to the Fifth Congress concerning
its role in delineating the PCP's criticisms of Portugal's
colonialist policies and the need for the immediate
liberation of the colonies. The congress is also
recognized as having approved the first statutes and
program of the party. But no mention is made of the
"right-wing anarcho-liberal shift" which dominated the
Fifth Congress and reflected the changes occurring in the
Soviet Union. 155
The PCP's attempts to patch together an anti-fascist
united front a la 1940' s to contest the 1958 presidential
elections were unsuccessful. Several observers argue that
the party could not have reproduced the united front
policies given the changes discussed earlier that were
compounded by the cold war, by the increased knowledge of
real conditions in the Soviet Union as well as of Stalin's
crimes, and by Portugal's improved economic climate as it
shifted toward development. Nevertheless, the PCP still
tried to mimic the successes of the forties. 15 ^ At the
time, however, the party made several analytical errors.
It lost touch with the desires of the rank and file and of
the Portuguese in general. The events of May and June 1958
were similar to the party's discarded strategy for a
"national anti-fascist uprising." Never before had the
Portuguese been so close to an insurrectional movement as
when led by the opposition candidate General Humberto
Delgado. The PCP had gone out of its way not to support
him because they distrusted his sincerity; instead it
rallied around alternative opposition candidates. The
party's policies, however, did not stop its militants from
disregarding party directives and joining in the
spontaneous strikes and armed revolts which followed the
fraudulent elections. The party later attempted to take
credit for mobilizing the strikes although the revolts were
criticized as "putschist tactics." 157
The PCP in the Sixties
On January 3, 1960 Cunhal and nine other political
prisoners (of which all but one were communists) made a
spectacular escape from the Peniche prison and fled the
country. 158 Soon after his escape Cunhal regained the
leadership of the party through his election as
Secretary-General (the top leaders directed the party from
exile) . Cunhal did not waste time in correcting the
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"anarcho-liberal shift" (also known as the "rightward
shift") which Fogaca had implemented. Through the
reorganization of 1960-1961 Cunhal returned the PCP to what
he considered the correct ideological path to end the
dictatorship
.
After the opposition's successful electoral campaign
(so successful that Salazar ended direct presidential
elections because even by altering the results he came
close to losing control of the electoral process) Salazar
tightened the government's repressive control of the
opposition. In 1959 the regime had begun a new wave of
repression against the anti-fascist forces. This
intensified the tactical crisis confronting the opposition.
The belief that fascism would inevitably fall led some to
focus on constitutional or peaceful solutions while others
turned to violence and putschist solutions. According to
the newly reorganized PCP the real solution to the crisis
was the building of a strong political force with a
revolutionary perspective. The masses harbored a strong
combative spirit following the elections of 1958 and it was
important to keep this spirit alive rather than allow its
continued deterioration through collaborationist or violent
solutions. The PCP had to regain its role as the vanguard
of the masses. 159
Cunhal' s escape from jail brought new life to the
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party. The major change was the replacement of the
"anarcho-liberal shift" with a new strategy focused on the
dismantling of the fascist regime and the gaining of
political liberties. The reorganization also included
minor changes concerning the formation of quadres, the
structure of the party, the wisdom of maintaining the
entire leadership within the nations borders, and the
reorganization and distribution of the party press. 160
The beginning of the independence movements and
guerrilla wars in Portuguese Africa produced the weak spot
in the regime for which the PCP was looking. Beginning in
1961 and continuing into 1962 a series of strikes occurred
to protest the African wars. In keeping with its new
strategy the party participated in the organization of many
of these strikes. 161
The party does not devote much attention in its
official history to the Trotskyite and Maoist fractions
which emerged within the party beginning in the sixties.
Confronted with mass street demonstrations which had
achieved unprecedented heights under the dictatorship (in
terms of the number of participants) the more radical
elements within the PCP analyzed the events differently
than did the Cunhalists. The extreme left concluded that
the time was ripe for putschist attempts. These attempts
had already started although the party prohibited its
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members from participating in them (for example, assault of
the Beja military base in which many communists were
involved)
.
The spontaneous strikes by students showed that
opposition could be carried out without the participation
of the PCP which helps explain why extreme-left groups
became a strong force at the universities. The leftist
fractions were also strengthened by the ideological
developments in the international communist movement such
as in China and Cuba. The PCP would not tolerate dissent
or leftism and began purging the extreme left fractions. 162
Despite the Cunhalists criticisms of the "anarcho-liberal"
shift and Fogaca' s policies of peaceful transition to
democracy, the only alteration under Cunhal was the
advocacy of a "military-liberal" uprising with mass support
to overthrow the regime. In principle, the party remained
dedicated to a peaceful transition. It ventured as far as
to downplay its theoretical commitment to the "dictatorship
of the proletariat" and criticized dogmatism. Beginning in
1963 it became increasingly orthodox and bureaucratic as
more and more of its cadres returned from their Moscow
training sessions to take up positions as party
functionaries .163
In 1965 the PCP held its Sixth Congress. It reinforced
the analyses and tactics put forth by Cunhal during the
reorganization of 1 960-61. The tactical focus was on a
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united front of anti-fascist forces to include the
proletariat (defined as industrial workers and rural
salaried agricultural workers), the peasantry
("campesinato" or small and medium-sized landowners),
employees (workers in the service sector), intellectuals,
the urban petit-bourgeoisie, and some sectors of the medium
bourgeoisie. The party advocated the use of political
force through strikes and demonstrations because it was
with the use of force that Salazar stayed in power. At
this congress the party officially approved the eight-point
party program for a "Democratic and National Revolution":
1. Destroy the fascist state and install a
democratic regime.
2. Liquidate monopoly power and promote general
economic development.
3. Implement an agrarian reform, delivering the
land to those who work it.
4. Elevate the standard of living of the working
classes and of the people in general.
5. Democratize instruction and culture.
6. Liberate Portugal from imperialism.
7. Recognize and affirm [our support for] the
people of the Portuguese colonies.
8. Pursue a [foreign] policy of peace and
friendship with all peoples.
Success in achieving a "Democratic and National Revolution"
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would require not only overthrowing the dictatorship and
granting liberties but altering the "substructure" of the
fascist system which was dominated by monopoly capital
associated with foreign imperialism and large landholding
interests ( latifundistas )
. Destroying fascism would not
solve the problem unless the political reaction's basis of
support was also changed. 164
According to the PCP, under its guidance as the
vanguard of the masses, the anti-fascist struggle continued
throughout the sixties as strikes and demonstrations
continued, as the economic situation deteriorated, as the
independence wars in Africa intensified, and as the regimes
national and international support waned. Although the
estimated PCP membership in 1967 was only 2, 000, the party
continued its act ivities
.
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5 with the death of Salazar in
1968, Marcello Caetano attempted to continue the
dictatorship and resolve its contradictions through the so
called "liberalization." The goal was to broaden the
regimes national and international basis of support,
attract the wavering sectors of the opposition, halt the
popular struggles, and generally give the impression that
the regime had the strength to maintain itself; yet all
this was done without actually changing the policies
pursued under Salazar. The new "image" which the regime
pursued fooled some (here the PCP takes a crack at the
Socialists considering them among the fooled) but not the
party which saw the maneuvers for what they were. The PCP
warned the workers not to be bought. The fact that the
regime was changing its tune proved that it had reached a
crisis and by maintaining the struggle the regime would
soon collapse. 166
The PCP intensified its control of the labor movement
after eased syndical election regulations allowed
communists to work their way up to positions of leadership
within the corporative unions. The struggle intensified as
strikes and demonstrations became ever larger and more
numerous. The PCP claims that the pseudo-revolutionary
threat (extreme left) and the "constitutionalists" saw
their strength diminish while the PCP's support continued
to increase. In 1969 the Democratic Electoral Commission
(CDE) was formed to carry out opposition to the regime by
legal (electoral) means when possible. By 1973 there was
general unrest as a result of the deteriorating economic
conditions brought on by the colonial wars. The number of
strikes increased consistently until the liberation of the
Portuguese in April 25, 1974. 167
Despite the party' s inferences that it was somehow
behind the military coup of April 25, the coup was as much
of a surprise to the party as it was to most political
observers. The military was never expected to play the
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dominant role in the overthrow of the dictatorship. At the
Third Democratic Opposition Congress held in Aveiro in
1973, the PCP reaffirmed the need to continue the united
front of anti-fascist forces but nowhere on the list of
these forces was the military mentioned as part of the
"united front." The struggle by the "popular masses" was
to be the "engine of revolution" which would lead to a
national uprising and popular insurrection. Putschist
solutions would not end the dictatorship, implying that
neither could a coup by the military achieve the same end.
A mere month prior to the revolution (and after the
military uprising in Caldas the Rainha) the Executive
Commission of the CC declared that the regime would neither
fall on its own nor from the actions of a handful of
soldiers. Only a national uprising and an armed "popular"
insurrection could bring down the regime. A quick end to
the regime was not expected, but rather would come as a
result of hard work and a long, continuous, widening
struggle by the "united front." Putschist solutions would
only rob the movement of its strength and provide false
illusions . 168
Although in the post-revolutionary era the PCP has
tried to hide its previous analysis of the military's role
it is clear that the party did not expect an Armed Forces
Movement (MFA) to end the regime. When the national popular
uprising took place it was expected to neutralize a large
percentage of the military forces and attract a small
number of soldiers to the peoples' side who would then aid
the people in overthrowing the regime. Never did the PCP
expect the opposite to occur with the MFA leading the
overthrow and succeeding with the help of the people. 169
The PCP implies that the people set up the necessary
preconditions for the MFA' s success through decades of
continuous opposition and strikes which when combined with
military preoccupations surrounding the colonial wars led
the MFA to organize and carry out the coup. 17 0
Summary
An understanding of the PCP's clandestine years are
essential if we are to understand the party in the
post-revolutionary period. The anarcho-syndicalist roots
of the communist party made the bol shevi z at ion process
extremely difficult. For more than a decade after its
formation the Portuguese "Bolsheviks" and the IC struggled
to extinguish a "democratic" interpretation of "democratic
centralism" and replace it with their own "correct"
interpretation. In many ways the military coup of 1926
actually helped the party to become a more disciplined,
bolshevized organization because only that type of
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organization would be able to survive in the underground.
Towards the end of the 1930' s the bolshevization process
had been completed and the "Stalinization" of the party
began. Increasingly the PCP's policies were tied in with
the international concerns of Moscow, as was evident from
the policies surrounding the Nazi-Soviet Pact and WWII.
The "official" history of the PCP is a "Stalinist" history
in that it has been edited and spliced together by the
reorganizers of 1940-41, of whom Cunhal is presently the
best known.
It is in the contradiction between the "Stalinist"
history and the "real" history that we can best understand
the evolution of the PCP to the present time. It has had
to face many of the same "events" (at least in terms of
international communism) which led the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE)
,
Italian Communist Party (PCI)
, and French
Communist Party (PCF - to a more limited extent) toward
Eurocommunism; yet it has chosen to remain an openly
Stalinist organization rejecting the view that socialism
may be achieved through democratic means. A major reason
why the PCP has not "democratized" itself is that the
"Stalinists" have been able to retain control of the party
ever since the reorganization of 1940-41.
Under Fogaca, especially from 1956 on, the party had
begun to move toward "Eurocommunism" in its emphasis on the
democratic road toward overthrowing the dictatorship. The
conditions necessary for the "united front" which Fogaca
wanted to capitalize on were not ripe given the situation
discussed above. In 1960, Fogaca's democratization was
given its final blow when Cunhal and other Stalinists
escaped from Peniche (could it be that their escape from
jail was especially urgent in 1960 to return the party to
the correct path?)
.
In the 1960's the party was again threatened by
internal dissent from the "pseudo-revolutionaries" or
extreme leftists, but the party handled that crisis without
serious problems. What has especially allowed the party to
remain Stalinist has been its ability to avoid the
contradictions raised by the WWII shifts of policy, the
Hungarian invasion of 1956, and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, because all occurred while the
party was still functioning in the underground. Thereby it
minimized the impact and the open debate which occurred in
many of the other communist parties. The Polish crisis led
to the first real open debate within the PCP and even that
did not have a large impact, as we will discuss in later
chapters. But why would the Spanish party pursue
Eurocommunism when faced with many of the same conditions
as the PCP? Although a fuller discussion will be presented
later, the initial answer appears to be because of the
leadership differences.
An understanding of the party's past is essential if
we are to understand its future. 171 A close reading Qf the
party press will also emphasize the importance which it
places on its own "Stalinist" past. It capitalizes on its
historic role as the only party which survived the
"fascist" era. In many ways its emphasis on the hardships
of clandestine life, the difficulties of maintaining an
underground press, the prison terms, the torture, the
martyrs, and the neo-realism - all this is in keeping with
the Portuguese fatalistic nature which often seeks its
solutions in the glories of the past rather than in the
possibilities of the future. It is to an analysis of the
PCP after the "Portuguese revolution" that we will turn in
the final chapters of this study although our analysis will
often return to the dark reaches of the past because that
is where explanations will often be found.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION: APRIL 25, 1974
TO NOVEMBER 25, 1975
The revolutionary period in Portugal began with the
military coup of April 25, 1974 and ended with the aborted,
ultra left-wing military coup of November 25, 1975. This
19 month revolutionary period can be divided into major
phases. The first opened with the coup of the Armed Forces
Movement (MFA) against the Marcello Caetano dictatorship
and ended with President Spinola's attempted "march of the
silent majority" on September 28, 1974. During this
initial phase, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was
cautious as it analyzed the political situation,
strengthened its organization, and presented an image of an
organized, disciplined party which favored democracy and
close adherence to the MFA program. The attempted march
initiated the second phase which continued until an aborted
right-wing coup of March 11, 1975. The major differences
between these first two phases were an increase in
revolutionary rhetoric and the struggle for syndical
"unicidade," a sole labor confederation, through the PCP
dominated Intersindical
.
The third phase began with the backlash to the aborted
coup and culminated with the formation of the sixth
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provisional government in September of 1975. As the MFA
nationalized major sectors of the economy, the PCP
developed an increasingly revolutionary strategy which
brought the nation to the brink of civil war. The final
phase commenced in September and ended with the aborted
left-wing coup of November. in the final phase, the party
realized that the opportunity for revolution had
diminished, at least temporarily, and attempted to reunite
the divided forces of the left. As it focused on
consolidating gains rather than extending the revolution,
its strategy became cautious once again.
We discuss each phase from four perspectives. First,
we examine the party's official line: its analysis of
events, its major themes, and its rhetorical arguments.
Second, we discuss organizational problems. Third, we
place the "official" description in context with major
events of that phase. Fourth, we analyze the party's
strategy and tactics. What were the party's real
intentions? How closely did the party's rhetoric match its
actions? Did the party alter its strategy during each
phase or was the strategy coherent throughout all four
phases? Did only the tactics change?
The fourth perspective implies that the party's
actions and rhetoric mask an ulterior motive or master
plan. In the conclusion we argue that, after the initial
phase of the revolution, the PCP opted for
transition to socialism rather than a
Eurocommunist transition. 1
a "putschist"
democratic or
Phase I - April 25, 1974 to September 28, 1974
Following the April 25, 1974 military coup, the PCP
became the best organized political party in the nation.
Because the party consisted of less than 3000 members prior
to the revolution and most of the leadership was in exile,
the strength of the PCP was especially noteworthy. The PCP
was able to make a quick transition to the new political
situation and profit from the power vacuum. As purges of
the old regime progressed, the PCP infiltrated the unions,
the press, the civil service, and the local governments.
The party's success did not mean the Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP) was involved in the coup. The Armed
Forces Movement (MFA) surprised the PCP, as well as the
rest of the world, when it launched the successful coup.
The MFA was initially comprised of approximately 200 junior
officers who wanted to remedy specific professional
grievances, democratize Portugal, and end the independence
wars in the African colonies. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the PCP had always mistrusted the military.
Although officially it would not admit it, the party did
not expect the military to be the major force behind the
dictatorship's fall. 2
Because the officers belonged to the bourgeoisie,
which Cunhal criticized in Q_R_adi calismo Pequeno-Burgues De
Fachada Socialista ,3 t o many political observers PCP
support for the MFA was ironic. The irony disappears,
however, if we focus on the party's analysis of the Chilean
experience from which it drew many lessons. A major lesson
concerned the key role which the military played in the
1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende's government. Even
though the PCP was suspicious of MFA motives from the start
and proceeded with caution, it also realized that
advantages could be reaped from a left-wing military
organization. For this reason, while the newly formed
parties were often quick to criticize the military, the PCP
rarely did so. It preferred to improve its links with the
MFA to demonstrate its discipline and organization (traits
which soldiers understood and valued) , and to gain the
MFA' s confidence so that it might influence the officers'
policies. The PCP was aware that dangerous schisms divided
the military, so it advocated strengthening the MFA to
guard the revolution from counter-revolutionaries. With a
strong MFA, the revolution need not be endangered by the
military as it had been in Chile. 4
One of the pillars of the PCP's strategy to push
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forward the revolution became, therefore, the "people-MFA
alliance." in the quote below, for example, the party
states that the revolution would result from a movement
"supported by force of arms" not led by force of arms.
Although with time the PCP became less cautious when
referring to the military's role in the revolution, in the
initial months the party played it safe by supporting the
MFA whenever possible. Avante
!
wrote:
Radicalized by decades of struggle againstfascism and by the circumstance of a long and
unjust colonial war, the patriotic soldiers
understood that only a movement
. . . supported byforce of arms would be able to remove the
anti-popular and a n t i - n a t i ona 1 regime of
Salazar/Caetano/Tomas and . . . open the nation to
democracy, independence, and liberty. ... an
essential condition for the democratization of
Portuguese life ... is the alliance of the
popular movement of the masses and democratic
forces with the Armed Forces Movement. 5
Forced to recognize the officers' unexpected role, the
party implied that a military victory could not have
occurred without the people's support. In addition, and in
keeping with its claim to be the vanguard of the working
class, the PCP insisted that only under its guidance could
the coup be transformed into a socialist revolution. The
party press was, and still is, inundated with declarations
that the PCP and the masses played the key role in
liquidating "fascism"^ and restoring liberty to Portugal.
^
Avante
!
often printed statements such as:
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The fascist regime was defeated on the 25th ofApril because it never had roots in the people-because it was debilitated by decades of popular
struggle for bread, peace, and democracy as well
as by the struggle of the peoples ofGuine-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola for their
national independence. It was finally defeatedbecause a profound patriotic and democratic
sentiment influenced its major supporter - the
armed forces - and transformed them from abulwark of the reactionary forces and fascism to
one of the most serious guarantors of democracy
in Portugal.
°
According to Cunhal, the nation was facing major
problems in three general areas: the economic, the
colonial, and the political. As to the economic, the
working class had the lowest standard of living in Europe;
so it was "urgent, necessary, indispensable" that workers
struggle to improve the conditions of their lives.
However, Cunhal emphasized that economics could not be
isolated from politics. Although in the short term workers
deserved wage increases, a successful revolution was of
greater importance and could only be reached in the long
term. Because the unity of all workers was more important
than the improvement of conditions for individual workers,
this meant they would have to moderate their demands. To
Cunhal the freedom to strike was an important gain, but it
was a right to be used in moderation. The strike should be
used as a threat during negotiations, yet only resorted to
after every possible alternative had been explored.
9
Among the party's major concerns throughout the
revolutionary period, and especially during the first three
phases of the revolution, were the moderation of workers'
demands and the avoidance of strikes. In keeping with its
cautious nature, the party preferred partial assured gains,
such as work slowdowns or stoppages, to total strikes that
risked defeat. The PCP rationalized its calls for minimal
strike activity by appealing for worker solidarity with
other workers. Only in this manner, it claimed, could the
long-term goal of socialism be achieved. Workers should
not strike or make unreasonable demands of management since
that would strengthen the reactionary forces. 10 According
to Cunhal, one of the best weapons the reactionary forces
had was to encourage its u 1 t r a - 1 e f t i s t allies
(pseudo-revolutionaries) to make unreasonable demands. The
demands would ruin Portugal's delicate economy and allow
the return of dictatorship to insure political and economic
order .
H
Cunhal warned the workers that they should be
especially wary of pseudo-revolutionary cries for the
immediate achievement of long-term goals, for socialism
now. Those were the cries which the reactionary forces
wanted to hear. The PCP would eventually achieve long-term
goals but every action had to be carefully analyzed in the
context of short and medium-term goals. How could the
pseudo-revolutionaries know what was in the workers'
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interests when they didn't support them during the long,
repressive dictatorship as the PCP had?12
The PCP insisted that its long dedication to the
working class meant it could be trusted to draw the
correct conclusions and analyses from the unfolding,
complex situation. Conditions were far from ripe to
achieve the long-term goal of a socialist society. The
initial goal should be to consolidate democracy and
liberty. Despite the workers' low standard of living, it
was important that they realize the limitations of the
economy. It was unrealistic to think they could achieve
wage increases, work hour decreases, and paid vacation time
increases simultaneously. The demands transgressed the
nation's economic capabilities.
The policy was expected to prove that the PCP could
control its members, the workers, and the "popular masses"
- all essential to complete the revolution. A disciplined
party would hopefully attract not only MFA support but also
additional workers and democrats to the party while
decreasing the appeal of the ultra-left. It would give the
PCP time to assess the new political situation and the
MFA' s intentions.
The initial caution and moderation of workers' demands
drew scathing attacks from ultra-leftists, who pushed for
increased labor demands and the seizure of unoccupied
262
apartments by squatters. They criticized the PCP of having
become a bourgeois party; a criticism which the party
continues to face although the extreme-left was only a
threat to it in the initial years of Portuguese democracy.
The party diminished ultra-left support among the workers
by claiming it was allied with the reactionary forces, a
vaguely defined group of undesirables which initially was
comprised of monopoly capitalists, latifundistas,
collaborators of the previous regime, and extreme-leftists
(especially the Maoists of the Movement for the
Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat - MRPP)
.
According to Cunhal, the second major problem facing
the nation was the colonial problem. The goal was the
independence of the colonies as they were a heavy burden
for the nation. They were robbing it of lives, holding
back economic development, creating inflation, continuing
low standards of living, and generally exploiting the
workers. Until the peoples under Portuguese domination
were liberated, the Portuguese themselves could never truly
be free. The Africans had to be self-autonomous and
independent. A quick resolution to the conflict had to be
pursued. 14
Such a resolution of the colonial problem would have
favored the communist national liberation groups. Because
it was the richest of the colonies and interested the
Soviets the most, the PCP was especially interested in
resolving the Angolan conflict. A quick resolution favored
the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
. The
timely independence of the Portuguese colonies, which
allowed communists to take power, is considered one of the
PCP's greatest contributions to international communism.
The third problem confronting the nation concerned the
new freedoms and liberties brought to the people by the
"courageous and decisive action" of the MFA. Despite the
freedoms, a "truly democratic regime" had not been
established. Cunhal declared that the danger of a drift
back to the dictatorship was real because of the alliance
between the ultra-left and the reactionary right. He
reminded the people that the nation was still in
transition despite the recent gains in democracy and
liberty. The revolution was not irreversible. It took
Chilean reactionary forces one year to begin serious
counter-revolutionary activity after Allende's victory and
three years to succeed in his overthrow. 15 The
counter-revolution was alive in Portugal and its strategy
was six-fold:
1. divide the popular movement and break its alliance
with the MFA,
2 . create economic problems which would lead to a
government crisis and popular unrest,
3. provoke problems within the working class and the
middle-class to create instability and anarchy,
4. increase political provocations,
5. infiltrate the new regime to slow democracy,
6
'
couple
3 right-win<? government or lead a right-wing
The PCP, PS, Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP)
,
Movement of the Socialist Left, Democratic Women's
Movement, and Young Worker's Movement were considered key
organizations in the revolution and were expected to act
alongside the people in alliance with the MFA. The PCP
declared that the elevated consciousness of the working
classes would keep them vigilant and prevent the
reactionary forces from returning Portugal to
dictatorship. The workers had to help strengthen the PCP's
organization since only a strong PCP could insure a
democratic regime. 17
The three major problems discussed above were not the
PCP's sole concerns. The party also tried to give the
workers a feeling of superior intelligence and analytical
abilities through Avante
!
,
rallies, posters, and so forth.
In many ways the party was responsible for creating the
sectarianism which it criticized in August 1975 (and
especially after November 1975) as detrimental to the
revolution. It fed the workers' egos by declaring that the
Portuguese workers, in general, were aware of the complex
political situation; they were aware that they could rely
on the PCP to weigh the alternatives and make the difficult
analyses for them. 18
The PCP also claimed that its vigilance within the
government as an equal partner insured and protected
democracy and workers' rights. The PCP participated in the
provisional governments not, as the pseudo-revolutionaries
argued, because the party sold-out to bourgeois politics,
but because its participation was in the workers' best
interests. Only with the PCP in government could the
nation continue on a democratic course. Without the
party's participation, the workers risked upsetting the
political balance and losing an essential democratic
element within the government. The government was not a
"worker/peasant" government, a "popular front," or even a
government of the "left." Each party still preserved its
own positions. !5
The PCP claimed it had the solution to the economic
crisis, but for its implementation it was necessary to
create profound social reforms which would affect the
monopolist groups and the large latifundistas . The party
emphasized that the government was a large coalition which
agreed to create a democratic regime but not to implement
the necessary social reforms. Reforms, therefore, could
only come after free elections were held and fascists, who
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remained at various levels of the political, economic, and
social organization of the country, were purged. 20
The party preferred to present complex problems in
terms of black and white choosing to avoid the subtleties.
In this case, for example, either the party participated
within the government in the worker's interests, or it
risked allowing the restoration of the dictatorship. The
party insisted there were not any other choices; the
correct decision had been made. Critics of this position
were only interested in a victory of the reactionary
forces
.
According to the PCP, after the military coup the
pseudo-revolutionaries continued their collaboration with
the right and had a negative impact on the revolution. The
ultra-left tried to ruin the democratization process,
worked against the popular masses and the MFA, chose as its
primary enemy the PCP rather than the reactionary forces
and fascist forces, and in this manner worked with the
reactionary forces either consciously or unconsciously . 21
The calls for a stronger party organization to
withstand reactionary forces and pseudo-revolutionary
attacks to democracy imply that the PCP suffered from
similar psuedo-revolutionary attempts within its own
organization. Further evidence is found in the party's
constant struggle to curtail worker involvement in
pseudo-revolutionary strikes. The quick increase in party
membership allowed many inadequately disciplined militants
into the party's ranks. The inability of the party to
control its militants at the grass-roots level was evident
throughout 1975. They often disregarded the party's
directives and took matters into their own hands.
The PCP's concern with pseudo-revolutionaries was not
a new one. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
threat to the party from pseudo-revolutionaries had begun
in the 1960's as Trotskyites and Maoists broke away from
the PCP. By 1970, the concern with the extreme-left was of
sufficient concern to warrant Cunhal's authorship of 0
Radicalismo Pequeno-Burgues de Fachada Socialista (Social
Fascist Petit Bourgeois Radicalism) published in 1971. As
the introduction to the third edition (1974) emphasizes,
although many of the conditions under the dictatorship had
changed, the threat from the pseudo-revolutionaries had
not. The editors wrote in the preface that the threat was
a result of the ultra-left's:
inability to analyze political events and develop
appropriate policies, repulsion for struggles
with immediate concrete objectives, eagerness to
'jump stages' [of revolution], insistence on
violent forms of struggle, disdain of the working
classes and of the masses, boasts attributing
to small petit-bourgeois 'active minorities' the
dynamics of the revolutionary process ...22
The ultra-left remained a major concern during the
revolution for it kept the left divided and sapped the
party of much of its strength, especially among youth. So
long as the PCP had to compete with "revolutionary" rivals
on the left, the party had a difficult time controlling the
popular masses and the direction and pace of the
revolution. The PCP criticized the ultra-left's analyses
for advancing to the socialism/capitalism axis when they
should still have been on the democracy/fascism axis. 23
The' analyses had to be based on the realities of the day
not on abstract theories. Only marxist-leninist scientific
methods could produce accurate analyses of the national
situation . 24
To succeed in its design for a socialist Portugal the
party needed time to correctly assess the revolution's
progress. The ultra-left robbed the party of time and
produced an image of the PCP as a conservative party
holding back the revolution rather than leading it. The
party often found itself dragged into activities it would
have preferred to avoid. For this reason the PCP was
always antagonistic to the pseudo-revolutionaries. To
discredit them the party insisted that they were aligned
with the reactionary forces.
At a plenary session of the CC on June 20, 1974, the
PCP summed up the Portuguese situation after two months of
democracy. As a result of the actions by the MFA and the
provisional government, fascism had been overthrown and the
PIDE (Portuguese secret police) dismantled; the corporative
organs and the fascist organizations had been disbanded;
initial purges had been carried out at state, local, and
national industrial sectors; fundamental liberties had been
restored, censorship had ended, political parties had
emerged along with syndical movements; freedom of assembly
had become legal and a provisional government had been
formed; there had been some improvement in working
conditions; negotiations had begun with the colonies;
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations
had begun; and the CC thanked the MFA for April 25 and
looked forward to the constituent elections. It
congratulated the working classes, popular masses, and
democratic forces for their role in democratizing
Portugal . 25
According to the CC certain tasks had to be carried
out immediately in the political and economic realm. In
the political realm, the need to institutionalize civil
liberties and civil rights, to assure that new governing
organs worked, and to end the colonial war were crucial.
Although it had insured the continuation of democracy, the
provisional government had not reformed corporative
structures to their roots. The government, therefore,
should not attempt to solve long term problems until the
more immediate ones were solved. The new freedom of
association, of assembly, of the press, and of syndical
organization had to be used wisely, not abused. 26
The tasks in the economic realm included the need to
improve the living standards of the masses and middle
classes, to stabilize and develop the economy, and to
insure financial equilibrium domestically and in the
balance of trade. The CC sharply criticized monopoly
capital for the capital flight it was instigating, which
was at the root of many of the economic problems that
Portugal faced. The MFA was not overseeing the management
of national banks or the major industries but they might
have to if economic sabotage continued. In short, the PCP
was giving the MFA its approval for further intervention in
the economic affairs of the nation. 27
The environment for small and medium enterprises and
farms was of special concern to the party. Another of the
lessons the PCP had drawn from Chile was that the party
must not lose the support of the middle classes, because
they had been a major factor in the defeat of Allende. The
government must take measures to help the middle sectors -
such as the expansion of the domestic market, increased
credit availability, and increased trade with the
socialist nations. 28
With the return of liberties to Portugal, the party
warned that they were being abused, especially by the
reactionary forces and the ultra-left. It implied that the
MFA might have to curb the liberties if the reactionary
forces continued to use them to destroy democracy through,
for example, the instigation of unnecessary political
strikes. At times, regulation was necessary to curb
extreme abuses. The party also announced that the
liberties which were given to the people after the
revolution should be officially written down as rights and
institutionalized. 29
Although this statement appears straightforward, in
context with its other positions the party appears to
remind the MFA that until rights are institutionalized, the
MFA has a free hand to curb them if it deems necessary. It
is clear that the party accepts some restraint liberties, a
preview of its position if it were to reach power. When
conflicts arise between society and the individual, the
individual's rights can be expected to suffer. "The people
are conscious and responsible and will drown out the
individuals and small groups. "30
After April 25, one of the party's major themes was
the need for unity if the revolution was to be successful.
"0 povo unido jamais sera vencido!" (The people united will
never be defeated!) became the rallying cry. Cunhal
emphasized that the solution to the problems which faced
the nation could not be implemented by any party or
faction. The solution lay in the actions of all those
forces interested in a democratic Portugal. Unity between
the working class and the popular masses, the parties and
democratic organizations, and the popular movement and the
MFA,31 was necessary to solve Portugal's problems and
institutionalize democracy. Communists had not only to
speak of unity but live, breathe, and portray it at public
demonstrations and in contacts with the people. "We must
select our words very carefully when dealing with subjects
which the party considers of priority. ... The party today
has the conditions to implant itself in the firms, in the
farms and rural areas, and in the cities." The conditions
were such that the party could unite and lead the masses
and the working class. 32
The need for a strong unitary group was drawn from the
Chilean experience. The disunity of the parties and the
various classes was decisive in the fall of the government.
For this reason the PCP was especially critical of the
ultra-left which kept the people, and especially the left,
divided
.
In the interests of unity the PCP attempted to broaden
its discussions and contacts with other parties and
democratic groups. The discussions were to focus on what
unified and divided the groups and were to be held behind
closed doors to facilitate negotiations. The reason for
closed sessions was, more likely, to keep the negotiations
secret so that the extreme left would not criticize the
party for selling out to bourgeois politics at the expense
of the workers. 33
The PCP's insistence throughout this period that it
did not have a dual strategy (one in government and one
outside), was meant to reassure its supporters that it was
working in their best interests even when negotiations were
behind closed doors. The party wanted its members to
understand this; it repeated it in almost every issue of
Avante
!
throughout 1974
. The reason for its concern was
that it was indeed pursuing a dual strategy, as we will
discuss in the conclusion, and because other parties were
criticizing its dual strategy.
In late August the PCP provided one of the most
comprehensive analyses of the Portuguese situation since
the military coup. The PCP's focus was on the strategies
and tactics used by the reactionary forces to undo the
conquests of April 25. As early as May, it claimed the
reactionary forces began instigating strikes (for example:
postal workers and bakers) by infiltrating and exploiting
the ultra-left. (Because it does not blame them directly,
the PCP was easier on the pseudo-revolutionaries than in
the months afterward) . 34
The PCP had been included in the fragile, new
government by President Antonio de Spinola in hopes that it
would diminish labor unrest. The PS also supported the
PCP's participation; it believed that its rival and
potential ally was committed to democracy; and it did not
want the PCP to remain outside of the government to
capitalize on the unfavorable measures which the government
would be forced to impose to deal with the economic and
political problems. Throughout most of 1974, unlike 1975,
the PS and PCP agreed more than they disagreed on the
direction which the revolution was to pursue. 35
In keeping with its cautionary policy, and because it
was a member (Aivaro Cunhal was a Mini ster-Without-
Portfolio and Avelino Pacheco Goncalves was Minister of
Labor)
,
the PCP rarely criticized the First Government
while it was still in power. Once out of power, however,
the PCP became more critical of the government. According
to the PCP, with the resignation on July 8 of the Palma
Carlos Government (First Provisional Government), the
reactionary forces attempted a different tactic to break
the path toward democracy and halt the decolonization
process. The reactionary forces launched what the PCP
labeled a "constitutional coup" to disband the MFA. The
goal of Palma Carlos was to decrease the collegiality
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within the government and begin a rapid regression in the
democratic process. In the end, the Council of State (the
directive body of the MFA) rejected Palma Carlos' demands
for more power. Instead it created a Second Provisional
Government which was unfavorable to the reactionary forces
and which "consolidated the forces of democracy, peace, and
social progress. "36
The resignation of the First Provisional Government
was a result of Palma Carlos' and other right-wing
elements' dismay at the pace with which the PCP was
infiltrating the civil service and local governments. When
Palma Carlos' demanded that the MFA increase his powers,
and the MFA rejected the demand, the government resigned.
According to the PCP, the new Provisional Government
differed from the First in two major ways: members of the
MFA participated in the government for the first time, and
conservative elements who placed the democratic process in
question were distanced from the government. 37 The Second
Government would only be able to resolve the crisis created
by the First Government because the PCP continued to be a
member. (Although in the Second Government only Cunhal
retained his position.) 38
The PCP emphasized that it accepted participation in
the government because it consisted of a broad political
coalition of the PS, MDP, and PPD which was in the best
interests of democracy. Because it was not a cohesive
whole and was made up of various individual parties with
varying opinions and solutions, decisions would be
difficult to reach. The PCP insisted that as long as
government collegiality was affirmed and the MFA program
was firmly applied, it would participate in the
government . 3 9
The party reminded the people that the political
situation was full of "originalities" and contradictions
which had to be considered in defining the proper
solutions. "The government is an expression of a broad
coalition of forces with a major objective - to lead to the
election of a constituent assembly." To resolve the
crisis, the government would have to institutionalize ample
liberties and rights of citizens, to assure their exercise,
and to. defend the democratic order; to end the colonial
war; and to take urgent measures to confront the grave
economic problems. 40
Despite all of these problems, the forces
participating in the government were pursuing a favorable
course to assure democracy and end colonialism. The party
warned that quick solutions and decisions would not be a
product of the government. The solutions would be slow,
complex, and occasional. Those that preferred an "all or
nothing" strategy did not understand the complexity of the
situation and would not contribute to the defeat of the
reactionary forces, the creation of a democracy, or peace
in Africa. 41
Avante
!
wrote:
"The current government is not a 'populargovernment' but it is serving the peopleDespite the large coalition and the occasionaldecisions favoring the reactionary forces, onbalance, the provisional government's measureshave been democratic and progressive. Thegovernment has an important role despite what
'demagogues and ultra-leftists' claim. The
alternative at this time could only be agovernment of the reactionary right not a popular
government
.
" qz
"The current situation calls for malleability,
serenity, evaluation of forces, a correctdefinition of objectives. In a revolutionary
process as irregular as the current one, it is
necessary to know how to advance and retreat. to
know how to consolidate one's successes, to know
how to find the correct solutions of the day to
day problems, to insure that the path to a
democratic regime continues" [which implies that
the current regime is not yet democratic]. 43
It was important to be able to distinguish between an
enemy, friend, and ally. This meant that the people had
to remain vigilant of the right, which was where the real
threat was coming from.
In the economic realm the party claimed the problems
were a result of:
1) the unfavorable alliance between Portuguese
economic interests and world capitalism,
2) the heavy legacy left by the dictatorship,
3) and the absorption of the colonial and African
problems
.
The budgets which the previous governments under the
dictatorship presented as balanced had been fictitious; the
state had used its power to help many large companies which
were otherwise unprofitable (an ironic statement because
the PCP's preferred model of economic development is the
East European, which also protects large, often inefficient
companies); and the colonial wars aggravated the economic
problems by diverting funds which could have been applied
to economic development. 44
The PCP added that a new government could not correct
the problems with one swoop and maintain a healthy economy.
Purges similar to those applied to the government after
April 25 were necessary in the economic sector, but they
would take longer to implement. Because monopoly capital
was still strong and threatened democracy, the purges had
to be carried out if democracy was to survive. 4 ^
In its efforts to return the nation to dictatorship,
the reactionary forces were using economic sabotage by
blocking credits to small and medium enterprises, closing
factories, dismissing workers without just cause,
paralyzing shipment orders, ending further investment
,
4 6
burning grain fields, demonstrating against the provisional
government, instigating "artificial" strikes, occupying or
paralyzing services, and creating general insecurity. 47
The goal was to intensify the economic crisis and create a
social crisis which would end the people's trust in the
provisional government. The capitalists were willing to
take on immediate losses because they could recoup them
later. 4 8
According to the PCP, the struggle against economic
sabotage was crucial to preserve democracy. Economic power
still lay in the reactionary forces' hands and they would
use it. 49 As in Chile, the CIA was also involved in the
sabotage, as was foreign monopoly capital such as ITT. 50
Although the PCP agreed that economic stability was an
important goal, austerity for the workers was unacceptable
unless it was shared by the large financial groups. "It is
not fitting for the workers to remove the chestnuts from
the fire so that they will be eaten by those who exploit
them." 51 The party recommended that banks be nationalized
as called for in the MFA program, and that government
representatives should be placed in all credit institutions
to regulate their activity with efficiency. Measures had
to be taken to help those sectors which were in crisis such
as civil construction. Credit had to be provided for small
and medium-sized enterprises
.
5 ^ Although the MFA program
did not provide a socialist solution, the PCP emphasized
through its economic program the current and more urgent
problems could be resolved. 5 ^
As the months progressed, the PCP increased the
rhetoric against the reactionary forces, claiming that
their activities were on the rise and that their links with
ultra-leftists were intensifying . 54 The party even claimed
that the reactionary forces were at work in France
spreading rumors of cholera outbreaks and violence in
Portugal to decrease tourism. 55 The reactionary forces,
the PCP claimed, were carrying out a conscious effort to
restrict the freedoms recently gained and to blame
democracy and the working class for the difficulties which
had arisen since April 25.56 It was trying t0 diminish
worker strength by creating parallel unions and by
preventing alliances between workers and peasants. 57
The PCP warned that the ultra-left was very active;
but it was unfair, and unwise, to curtail only its actions
while allowing the reactionary forces to continue operating
freely. The real danger was the reactionary forces, who
were using the ultra-left as a smoke screen for their own
activity. The counter-revolutionaries were recruiting,
conspiring, and preparing a coup to suppress the newly-
gained liberties and create a new dictatorship. The
people, along with the state organs and the democratic
forces, had to increase their vigilance. They had to
quickly inform the military authorities, the PCP, and other
democratic forces if they suspected any abnormal
developments, whether it be a meeting of the reactionary
forces, contacts in hidden places, anti-communist posters,
and so forth. 58
The party reminded the state that the people had the
power to identify and stop the reactionary forces. If the
reactionary forces succeeded in their plans chaos would
result and many Portuguese would be killed. The
reactionary forces' strategy was similar to a wolf's in
sheep's clothing. They gave the appearance that they were
accepting the rules of the game when in fact they were
using the press, creating false parties, and pursuing an
anti-communist policy. 59 The decisive victory between the
reactionary forces and the democratic forces still remained
to be fought. 60
The PCP insisted that additional purges of the state
apparatus and the economic sector had to be carried out.
The calls for the purges intensified by August of 1974.
According to the PCP, the reactionary forces were still
using the formal state apparatus to their advantage.
Although the PCP and MDP had begun to purge local
government organs of ex-fascists who used and manipulated
the workers and people, the purges had not been
completed. 61 "The people can sow change at the local
level. But before we discuss what we will sow or how to do
it we must take care of the soil which until now has been
in the hands of the people's enemies. We must pull out the
weeds, clean it [the soil], prepare it, bring to it the
initiative and interest of all that must really work it."
This was a task which affected all of the people, so
unitary action was needed by the masses not only by
political organizations. The political organizations had
to work together through the base organizations,
neighborhood committees, and so forth, to "win local
governments to serve the people, win the people to build
local governments." The masses could not wait for the
government to take all measures. They could help
themselves and take the initiative to improve their own
conditions . 62
Organization
.
In organizational terms the party was
burdened with immense amounts of work after the April coup.
With its legalization, the PCP began the quick
transformation from a cadre party of less than 3,000
clandestine members to a mass party. The party claimed
that since April thousands of Portuguese had "sympathized
with, shown confidence in, and joined the Portuguese
Communist Party. "63
In keeping with the party's methods, this was a vague
way to announce the party's increase in membership. There
was not an obvious distinction between a "sympathizer,"
"confident,
»
or "member" ("militant"). Did the party mean
that thousands had followed this progression to become
members, or were the thousands made up of three separate
groups?
The "sympathizers" are individuals from any class or
level of education, who although not PCP members,
consciously support it at least in spirit. The
"sympathizer" might also be an individual not yet
officially a member but in the process of becoming one.
The PCP member is considered the "militant." (Sometimes
"militant" distinguishes the active member from the member
that rarely participates in party activity. The only way
to be certain of the distinction is from context.) Party
"functionaries" or "cadres," whose lives are devoted to the
party and who are nominally paid bureaucrats at various
levels of the party organization, are also "militants" but
with higher commitments to the party.
The boundaries for these categories are not always
clearly defined, and many individuals fit into more than
one. Classification becomes even more complex if we
discuss other categories which the PCP often mentions, such
as "the students, the workers, the women, the technocrats,"
and so forth. Among this terminology, however, we do not
find the term "confident." Most likely the party just used
the term in passing since it is rarely used on other
occasions. Although the confusion sheds some light on how
the party manipulates language, it does not matter in the
long term, because it is evident the party's membership
exploded to high levels when compared with its cadre status
prior to the coup.
Other distinctions that the PCP usually makes include
"reactionary forces," from the bourgeois right, who reject
the party and the revolution to the extent that they
attempt to stop it and return politics to its dictatorial
past. The "ultra-left" or
-pseudo- revolutionaries " are
also considered bourgeois. Their wild, rhetorical,
idealistic views of socialism are labeled unrealistic and
dangerous to the revolution if not openly reactionary. The
party often claims there is an alliance between the two
bourgeois groups. Next, there is a large group of
individuals who are referred to as the "people." They are
not necessarily counter-revolutionary or anti-communist in
spirit but, for lack of education and freedom, still live
in a pre-revolut ionary environment and continue to believe
whatever arguments the reactionary forces feed them. Often
the "people" also refers to the Portuguese as a nation in
the context of a unified group seeking a common goal - a
socialist nation. It is often difficult to distinguish the
"people," when used in the latter context, from the
"popular groups, " as described below. The "democrats" are
unconnected to the PCP; they are usually middle-class
members of other democratic parties who also believe in
democracy and the revolution (at the time the PS was still
considered democratic). The "popular groups" include
workers, peasants, students, and other groups not
affiliated with the party but also in favor of the
revolution and democracy.
People gravitated toward the PCP for various reasons.
While other parties were just beginning to organize and
formulate a program, the PCP was already organized and had
a clearly defined program. For many who had been
sympathizers during the clandestine years, membership in
the party was the logical next step when the party became
legal. For others, the belief that only the PCP could
bring socialism to Portugal led them to seek membership.
Despite the lack of internal democracy, but because they
saw a chance to finally work "for" something (socialism)
after years of struggling "against" something (the
dictatorship)
,
many who quit prior to April 25 rejoined the
party. Because the PCP had always protected and supported
the workers during the difficult years of the Portuguese
dictatorship, some joined from a sense of duty. Others,
especially after the revolution intensified, joined for
opportunist reasons. They believed that commensurate with
the party's new power and lack of cadres, it would be
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relatively easy to benefit in the spoils of power
distribution at the local level, as public functionaries,
and so forth. These and other reasons often combined in
varying degrees to bring the individual to the party as
either a militant or sympathizer.
Since the forties, the PCP had been strongly organized
and disciplined, but the new influx of members weakened its
organization. With the infusion of new blood, the party
often faced a chaotic situation as it attempted to keep the
new membership in line with its directives. The new
complications affected the party for several years before
it sufficiently trained additional functionaries to
maintain control.
The large increase in party membership required the
streamlined formation of new cadres. The party initially
encountered sectarianism between the "old guard" members
and those who joined the party after April 25. The
leadership insisted that new cadres who "in only two months
developed years of revolutionary experience" be promoted
swiftly. They were given an abbreviated indoctrination
consisting of the minimum required information to make good
cadres of them. This indoctrination included the basic
history of the party, its political orientation, and the
principles of party organization (the program and
statutes)
.
The PCP's desperation for new cadres is further
evidence of its limited membership at the time of the April
coup. it was desperate enough to risk integrating
relatively "unknown" individuals into positions of
responsibility. The inevitable result was cadre mistakes,
and deviations from the official line. The damage of such
an action would especially become evident in the struggle
with the ultra-left. 64 *
The PCP restructured its organization beginning in
July to accommodate the flood of new members. The new
structure was to correspond more closely to the
administrative divisions of the nation. The five Boards of
Regional Organization (DORs) and the large Regional
Committee would continue to be at the top of the
geographical hierarchy, followed by the 22 District
Committees, the Municipal Committees (Comissoes
Concelhias), the Parish Committees (Comissoes de
Freguesia)
,
and the various other organizations which
existed below this level (see chapter 7 for details on
organization)
. It was clear that the restructuring had
just begun because only four District Committees and tens
of the hundreds of possible Municipal and Parish Committees
existed. The new geographical center of organizational
activity would become the Municipal Committee (probably
because the party was expanding into new regions where it
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did not have enough members to support Parish
Committees) . 65
Despite the flood of membership applications, the
party was having a difficult time integrating new members
and issuing them cards. To do so, biographical data on the
applicant had to first be collected from colleagues,
neighbors, and acquaintances. This was a slow process,
especially because the party had a shortage of cadres. The
shortage did not, however, halt recruitment activity. The
party emphasized that even though it had built dozens of
"Labor Centers," communists could not rely on prospective
members to approach the centers on their own. It was the
militant's duty to recruit individuals who would make good
members . 66
The PCP also emphasized that militants had to actively
participate in a party organization, which should be their
work cell. The organizations and cells should elect
directive organs once they had enough members. They had to
meet regularly, make resolutions, and put them into effect.
Organization was essential because that was what
distinguished the PCP as a Marxist-Leninist organization
from the other parties of the left. 67
The PCP emphasized that the Municipal Committees
should create cells in every important company in their
jurisdiction. If a Municipal Committee did not exist in a
municipality then it should be created as soon as possible.
This was a difficult goal but it could be achieved if
members used their relationships with friends in those
regions to attract new members and eventually start a
Municipal Committee. Members who returned to their
homelands during vacations could be especially useful in
this task. The Municipal Committees should include members
from the most important companies in the area. 68
Parish committees were also important because many
agricultural workers were organized at that level. If
necessary the Parish could be subdivided into subordinate
Local Cells. Cells for intellectuals, domestic servants,
and miscellaneous sectors also had to be organized or
expanded. Working youths should be attracted to the party
and organized at that level even though their primary
activity would be in the Movement of Young Workers. For
students all activity should be in the Union of Communist
Students (UEC)
.
Party influence should be strengthened in
the unions, peasant associations, unitary movements
(Movement of Democratic Women, MDP, and so forth) , in local
governments, cooperatives, collectives, and all mass
organizations. The creation of workers committees in the
"labor centers" to organize propaganda, fund drives, and
other activity was essential. 69
The restoration of discipline took time. The party was
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concerned with eradicating the "sectarian spirit," the
feeling that communists were somehow superior to other
Portuguese. Sectarianism was especially undesirable when
communists mixed with the workers, independent democrats,
and other "non-aligned" groups which the party wanted to
attract as sympathizers and possibly members. The party
was often responsible for creating the sectarianism itself
because it spoke to communists and sympathizers as if they
had analytically superior intellects. 70
From Avante
!
and the rest of the party press we get an
understanding of how the party operates. We learn as much
from the omissions as from the printed words. In many
instances it is clear that the party is responding to
criticisms from the left (for example, attacks on its
participation in bourgeois politics and the government),
but it rarely lets the reader know what the criticisms are.
In this manner it exposes those who have experienced the
criticisms and provides the official response should they
confront similar arguments again. Because they are not
repeated in Avant e
!
, the reader who has never heard the
criticisms remains safe from their negative influences.
The PCP concluded that the traditional areas of party
support (Lisbon industrial belt and Alentejo) were the same
areas where workers implemented the party's recommendations
accurately when confronted by "pseudo- revolutionary
adventurism" and other attempts from the reactionary
forces. The regions where the party had not established
strong roots were those where democracy was endangered and
the workers were being led in the wrong direction. it was
in those areas that the party had to strengthen its
support
.
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One of the strengths of the PCP is its ability to
mobilize support and a higher degree of devotion and
commitment from its members. Every communist, no matter
what his position in the party, is expected to be an
organizer and propagandist. It is his duty to hold
"enlightenment" sessions to increase the masses'
consciousness and inform them of the official party line.
As important as informing and enlightening is the role of
the militant as the "ears" of the party. The militant must
listen to the masses' problems, to their responses to party
positions and daily events, and relay these back to the
party. The militant must identify with the masses. 72
Conclusions . During the initial months of democracy,
the PCP's warnings of an attempt by the reactionary forces
to overthrow the new regime seemed to encompass everything.
However, because the threat allowed them to follow a policy
of mediating labor demands, justifying a disciplined work
force, and cautioning discretion, it was also welcomed by
the party leaders. The threat allowed the party to
emphasize the long-term over short and medium-term goals.
Only by moving slowly would the party be able to assess the
situation and outline its future strategy. with time it
could move into the recently purged local government,
expand its already dominant position in the unions, and
continue the formidable organizational task of becoming a
mass party with disciplined members.
In addition, a party which moved cautiously would gain
the respect of the MFA and hopefully the Portuguese people,
as a party committed to a democratic Portugal. The respect
of the MFA would also give the party more leverage in
influencing a peaceful resolution of the colonial wars
according to its plans for the new African nations. For
all of these reasons the party preferred to move cautiously
in the initial stages of the revolution.
As September 1974 approached, the party's warnings of
reactionary force attempts and of the extreme left's
alliance with the reactionary forces intensified.
Meanwhile, the PCP continued its assessment of the
situation and its slow penetration of local government and
the press.
Phase II - September 28, 1974 to March 11, 1975
After the MFA coup, moderates within the military and
the political groups, like President Spinola and Prime
Minister Palma Carlos, emerged to contest the nation's
drift to the left. The rifts between the moderates and the
left intensified as a result of several issues, of which
the major one was the colonial problem. Arguing that the
colonies were not ready for independence, President Spinola
preferred to hold a referendum which would incorporate them
into a federation of equal states. On the other hand, the
left, which at this time included the PPD, PS and PCP,
contended that the colonies were ready for independence.
Other issues intensified this basic division and led to
Palma Carlos' resignation in July. As the nation continued
to shift to the left, Spinola organized a "silent majority"
of conservatives and moderates to contest the left in what
was to be a massive demonstration in Lisbon on September
28, 1974.
This demonstration marked the end of the first phase
of PCP activity. The party portrayed the demonstration as
another attempt by the reactionary forces to move its
"conspiratorial counter-revolutionary activity" into the
streets of Lisbon. The massive amount of time, money, and
organizational infrastructure which the reactionary forces
294
devoted to the demonstration proved this. it was a coup
attempt to destabilize the nation so that Spinola could
increase his powers by declaring a "state of emergency."
Having portrayed the demonstration as a coup attempt,
it was inevitable that the party would call for vigilance
and mobilize the "democratic forces," including the state
security forces, to confront the reactionary forces.
(Transportation workers obliged by refusing to transport
demonstrators from the countryside to Lisbon) 73 The PCP
declared a great victory for democracy when the road blocks
they set up with the "unity of the MFA, the popular masses,
and other democratic forces" to stop the demonstration
succeeded. The party insisted that those found responsible
for the reactionary attempt had to be jailed. The
reactionary forces, it warned, had only been partially
defeated so vigilance and purges of those reactionary
elements still active in Portugal were necessary. 74
Frustrated with his inability to check the left's
increasing power, Spinola resigned as president two days
later and was replaced by chief of staff General Francisco
de Costa Gomes, also a moderate.
One of the major events during this Second Phase was
the PCP's VII Congress (Extraordinary) held on October 20,
1974. According to the PCP, a congress was necessary to
revise the party's program and statutes. Many of the
existing program's conditions had been fulfilled and the
statutes were designed for a clandestine cadre party, not a
growing mass party which already numbered 30,000
militants
.
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According to the PCP, of the eight conditions approved
at the previous (VI) Congress in 1965, the major condition,
on which the others were based, had been fulfilled - the
destruction and fall of the fascist state. The condition
of peace and friendliness with all nations had also been
fulfilled. The remaining conditions would be completed as
the democratic and national revolution evolved.
Decolonization, for example, progressed significantly even
if the pace had been slower than the party preferred. Many
improvements in living standards for the Portuguese
workers, such as a national minimum wage of 3,300 escudos,
were achieved despite the deteriorating Portuguese economy.
In the syndical realm, activity was lively; workers
discussed their problems and demands openly and went on
strike, if necessary. Purges progressed within the state
and military organizations, although they were not complete
and needed to be expanded to other sectors. Basic human
rights were achieved and political parties allowed to
function freely. This progress, claimed the PCP, showed
the accuracy of Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis. 7 ^
At the VII Congress the party approved a three point
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program in keeping with the new political situation:
1. the strengthening of the democratic state andthe defense of the new liberties,
2. the defense of economic and financial
stability with emphasis on development,
3. the continuation of decolonization.
To achieve these goals the party continued to espouse unity
of the peasants, small and medium business and agriculture,
the artisans, the intellectuals, and the workers. As the
representatives of the popular masses, they made up one of
the essential motors of the revolution; the other motor
being the MFA.
The party became one of the first communist parties to
drop reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
from its program. Cunhal emphasized that it was merely a
rhetorical adaptation to the drastic changes which had
occurred since April 25. In Portugal the word dictatorship
had a negative connotation resulting from 48 years of
dictatorship. For this reason it was being dropped but the
party had not changed ideologically . 77
Since it was an extraordinary congress, the agenda did
not include the election of new members but it did reveal
for the first time the names of the 36 full and alternate
members of the Central Committee (CC) . To emphasize their
connection with the working class, the party declared that
75 percent of the CC were workers (white collar workers
included) and that combined, they had lived 755 years as
clandestine members and 308 of those years as prisoners
under the dictatorship
.
7 8
After the congress, the party's major concern became
"unicidade," which it defined as the unity of syndical
representation through a sole labor confederation. The
party's goal was to continue its domination of the
unionized workers through Intersindical at a time when
other parties (especially the PS and ultra-leftists) were
attempting to create parallel unions and their own
confederations. The PCP argued that parallel, politicized,
partisan unions would weaken and divide workers and reverse
their recent conquests. 79 Since the PCP controlled a
majority of the more than 180 unions, its rivals complained
that it would also control Intersindical.
"Unicidade" was the first major issue which split the
PCP and PS. When the MFA approved Intersindical as the
sole confederation of Portuguese workers, the PCP organized
various rallies to celebrate the great victory. To soften
the blow, the PCP called for a PCP-PS alliance. The call
was often repeated as constituent elections approached but
was disregarded by the PS. The centrifugal forces which
pushed the two major parties of the left apart had begun. 80
Since the PS and the PPD convinced the MFA not to make
membership in Intersindical compulsory and to allow review
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of the legislation after one year, the PCP victory was not
total. Although many political observers warned that the
communists had control of the MFA, the conditions imposed
on Intersindical indicated that this was not the case.
Most MFA leaders were aware of the party's intentions and
did not follow PCP recommendations blindly. However, the
party's strategy of discipline to maintain good relations
with the MFA was succeeding. The MFA welcomed its support
and recommendations and resented PS and PPD eagerness to
push the military back to the barracks.
Once the MFA approved "unicidade" in January, the PCP
focused on other issues, such as the plight of the
agricultural sector. Avante elaborated on the problems of
the landless peasant of the south, of the self-sufficient
peasant of the north, of the medium land-owners; it
criticized in great detail latifundista economic sabotage.
It also advocated agrarian reform while assuring the small
landowners of the north that their properties would not be
affected. 81
The PCP also became concerned with the role of the
catholic church. It realized that without Catholic
support, large-scale communist influence could not spread
beyond Lisbon and the Alentejo. The Catholic Church was a
powerful force in the conservative north. It continued to
hold the revolution back. For this reason the party
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attempted to divide the Church leaders at the top of the
hierarchy from those at the bottom who understood the
peoples' conditions and problems and might be able to
mobilize support in the party's favor. The party announced
that it knew all Catholics were not working with the
reactionary forces. It emphasized that it would continue
to accept and recognize Catholicism even under socialism.
Catholics could also be Communists. PCP criticism that the
church supported the reactionary forces was not to be taken
as anti-religious, but merely ant i-react ionary . 82
The party began early preparations for the elections
scheduled for April 25, 1975. Because it suspected it
would not do as well in the elections as it hoped for, the
PCP prepared itself for a loss of power in electoral terms.
Although it wanted to maintain its democratic image, the
party also down played the importance of the elections
whenever possible. The strategy of close alliance with the
MFA intensified. It tried to convince the MFA to cancel,
postpone, or at least insure that the elections would not
nullify the MFA' s key role in politics. 83 Meanwhile, the
party tried to gain as many pro-communist measures as
possible (for example, Intersindical )
.
As early as November, when the electoral procedures
for the constituent elections were drawn up, the party
warned that the revolution had not reached many regions of
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the nation. Unless purges of conservative government
officials were carried out, free elections would not be
possible. With the approval of voter registration rules in
March 1975, the rhetoric intensified and the party insisted
that elections would not be free in many regions.
Nevertheless, it accepted the challenge and provided
candidates for every region, except for emigrant's
representatives. In that sector, it claimed, the election
could not be free. When asked why the party did not also
abstain in other regions where it claimed elections could
not be free, it side-stepped the issue by claiming that
circumstances were different there. 84
The PCP continued its calls to maintain the unity of
the popular masses and MFA amid talk from its right to send
the military back to the barracks after the elections. The
party emphasized that both the MFA and the popular masses
had been necessary to create a democratic Portugal on April
25, 1974 and that both would be necessary to continue
democracy. The two forces complemented each other and were
inseparable, so the MFA' s role had to continue after the
elections . 85
As election day approached, the PCP increased its
support of the MDP/CDE as an organization composed
primarily of individuals who were independent democrats.
The PCP supported the MDP's application for party status
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because its role in "Unicidade,
- unity, and alliances would
be necessary in the struggle for free elections, for a new
constitution, and for a democratic Portugal. 86
The Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) had been
formed as a unitary movement soon after April 25, 1974 to
attract individuals sympathetic to the PCP but, who for
various reasons, would not become militants. It was hoped
to especially attract members of the middle-class as well
as individuals in the north where the PCP was weak. The
MDP was a reorganization of the Democratic Electoral
Commission (CDE) created in 1969 to unite the
anti-government opposition. Like most opposition movements
during the dictatorship it was dominated by Communists; so
after the 1974 coup, both the PPD and PS quit the
organization complaining that it was a communist front.
The party also criticized what it claimed was a
growing an t i - c ommun i s t sentiment among the bourgeois
parties, which, including the PS, were grouped together.
They helped the reactionary forces by fighting the
principal enemy - the PCP. The reactionary forces' goal,
under the guise of social democracy, was to halt the
democratic process. The party claimed that even forces
which considered themselves liberal and democratic were
participating in the anti-communist wave.^ 7 On the other
hand, the anti-communists claimed the PCP controlled the
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unions through "unicidade," wanted to prevent the
elections, and controlled the media. 88 Although the PCP
criticized the anti-communists, it also exploited the
situation to portray itself as the persecuted underdog, an
image with which the Portuguese had been bombarded
throughout the clandestine years.
The party analyzed the political situation at the end
of January as approaching a decisive period, so it was
imperative that all political forces clarify their
positions. The upcoming elections were only constituent
elections and should not, under any circumstances, be
considered legislative elections because that went beyond
their authority. Clearly the PCP, concerned that it was
not going to have a good showing in the elections, did not
want them to be weighed more heavily than agreed upon. 89
The PCP contended adamantly that democracy as based on
Western European conservative, bourgeois, social-democratic
governments could never work in Portugal because they
allowed monopoly capital to continue in operation. PS
support for bourgeois democracy formed the basis for the
PCP's major criticisms against its rival's strategies. The
government had to be antimonopolistic and antilat ifundista
if Portugal was to be a truly independent nation. Its
solutions had to be geared to its own individual problems
rather than following models developed for other nations.
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The only accurate path to democracy in Portugal was via the
revolutionary path with mass popular support
.
9 °
The party announced that Avante
!
would be printed
daily during the campaign. it was the duty of every member
to know what the party's position was on the issues by
reading the newspaper. it was also important that the
party not rely on the commercial distribution of the paper.
To insure that it reached the masses, the communists would
distribute it themselves. 91
The emphasis on distributing and reading the paper
daily is especially important to a party which is
organizationally strong enough, as most communist parties
are, to make last minute reversals in its electoral
strategy. The press is a vehicle to mobilize its militants
and sympathizers. As we will see in later elections, the
PCP has successfully shifted its support on a moments
notice to a different candidate with the help of the press
on several occasions.
Increasingly, the party discussed the economic
problems which plagued the nation. Because the PCP was a
participant in the provisional governments, it tried to
show that the economic situation was not a result of
government policies. The policies of the dictatorship,
combined with the worldwide inflationary spiral caused by
international capitalism, were to blame. The PCP called
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for the nationalization of the banks to control capital
flight and help develop the economy. 92
Although the PCP continued to criticize strikes
without just cause, it also emphasized that workers could
not be expected to carry the full brunt of stabilizing the
economy; the PCP accepted more strikes as just cause. It
criticized those who blamed economic hardship on declining
productivity . 93
The "Day of Popular Defense of the Democratic
Conquests," which the PCP organized on October 6, was a
Sunday of national volunteer work in which workers showed
their support for the revolution. It was also intended to
prove that workers were not interested in decreasing
productivity. According to the party, the spirit and
devotion which workers felt on that day were similar to the
feelings workers had everyday in a socialist society. "For
the first time in Portugal, the salaried masses felt that
the product of their labor was not destined to benefit an
insignificant minority, but the collective. In that sense
the sixth of October was a window open to the future." It
showed that the workers wanted democracy and that it was
the reactionary forces which were interested in decreasing
productivity. The Portuguese voluntarily contributed one
billion escudos worth of work to the nation. It
demonstrated that work could be a "festival full of
happiness and pride. "95
The party addressed many other issues during the
second phase of PCP activity. The youth's role in the
revolution was considered important enough to create a
separate organization - Uniao de Juventude Comunista
(UJC).96 The party also devoted more attention to the
reform of the education system, especially through purges
and reorganization. It denied accusations that it
controlled the media, especially television . 97 The party
continued to warn of reactionary attempts and of the need
for vigilance. It discussed housing problems and other
local issues, emphasized the need to strengthen the
alliance between the workers and the peasants and continued
to pressure for decolonization. The PCP also ran stories
praising the achievements of the socialist nations,
implying that Portuguese society would be similar to them
after the transformation to socialism was complete.
Organization
. During this second phase of activity
the party continued to grow. It claimed a membership of
30,000 after only six months. The increase was attributed
to its struggle under the dictatorship which attracted
waves of new members. By the end of the year the PCP
claimed it was a mass party, and that a high percentage of
its members were workers. Sixty percent were industrial
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and agricultural workers, as well as fisherman, and 18
percent were white collar employees. To the party the low
percentage of peasants (small, self-sufficient landowners),
young workers, and women was unacceptable (the women
composed 15 percent of the militants but figures were not
provided for the peasants or young workers)
. New members
had to be enrolled in these three categories: peasants (in
order to advance in the north), women (because they
composed more than fifty percent of the population), and
youths (because they might be attracted to ultra-left
tendencies)
.
It especially wanted to recruit young workers
(so that intellectuals would not dominate its youth
organizations)
.
9 ^
A majority of militants were in the older age groups.
Twenty percent of the militants were above the age of 50,
45 percent were between 30 and 50, and only 35 percent were
aged less than 30. The party argued that older members
joined because they remembered the party's historical role
better. This was another reason why younger members,
especially workers, needed to be recruited to the party (a
party also needs to add young members to maintain active
militants since older members eventually become less active
and die)
.
99
The geographical organization of the party continued
to expand. At the top were seven Boards of Regional
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Organization (DORs) where previously only five existed:
Regional Organization of the North, Beiras, West and
Ribatejo, Lisbon, Setubal, Alentejo and Algarve, and the
Adjacent Islands. Next were District Commissions in each
of the 18 districts in continental Portugal; only the four
District Commissions of the Adjacent Islands remained to be
established. 100 Significant advances had been made in
expanding the organization to the municipalities although
much work remained to be done at that level as well as in
the parishes. The Parish Commissions were especially
important in the urban areas because it was at that level
that professionals and employees of small firms could
actively participate in the party. The parish commission
also played an important role in distributing the party
press .101
The executive organs elected by the assemblies were to
number between eight or ten members, although they were
often larger. The party insisted that the executive organs
be kept to ten members or less. If necessary, a larger
organ could be created to discuss general questions but the
executive organs had to remain small and should deal with
specifics. For the Municipal Commissions and organizations
which did not meet at least monthly, Executive Commissions
or Secretariats had to be created to make the daily
decisions . 102
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The party claimed it especially needed to expand in
areas where the reactionary forces were strong, where the
majority of Portuguese did not understand what freedom and
liberty were. Only a strong party could defeat the
reactionary forces. Strength was to be measured not only
quantitatively but also qualitatively. It required the
formation of additional cadres. Each militant had to
participate in the enlightenment sessions, in the
recruitment of new members, and so forth, as Lenin
prescribed. Each militant had to be given tasks to
fulfill which were to be evaluated by party organizations.
This required regular meetings at the bottom of the
organizational hierarchy to discuss the political
situation. The party emphasized that all communists,
regardless of when they entered the party, were equal (a
declaration which was to be repeated in the future implying
that within the PCP there was distrust and a division
between the pre-1 974 members and the post-1974 members).
Discipline was required within the organization to have a
strong party in qualitative terms. 103
Conclusions . During the five months of the first
phase, the party had proceeded cautiously as it assessed
the political situation. The failure of President
Spinola's massive street demonstration emboldened the PCP
during the second phase. its cautionary policies
continued, but for different reasons. Whereas during Phase
One it had moved slowly to buy time to analyze the
political situation, by Phase Two the initial analyses had
been completed and the conclusions drawn. As the party
progressed toward the Constituent Elections, it realized
that it would not do well. Combined with the party's
analysis that Portugal did not have the conditions
necessary to support bourgeois democracy, and the fact that
the PCP leadership was Stalinist to begin with, the party
rejected bourgeois democracy or Eurocommunism in Portugal
and prepared cautiously for revolution and a power struggle
according to more traditional Marxist-Leninist lines. For
the time being, the PCP continued its links with the MFA,
tried to weaken the impact of the elections, and continued
to work toward fulfilling other Communist goals.
PHASE III - MARCH 11, 1975 TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1975
The Third Phase of party activity was the
revolutionary phase. As it progressed the party
increasingly acted as if conditions were ripe for
revolution in Portugal.
March 11, 1975 became another historical date in
Portuguese revolutionary history; on that date former
president General Antonio Spinola led a military group of
conservatives and moderates in an attempted coup.
According to the PCP, the MFA with the support of the
people stopped the attempt. The party called for vigilance
by the popular sectors to prevent the reactionary forces
from unleashing further attempts against the revolution, a
call which the party continued throughout this phase, and
especially in August. Because in previous cases of
counter-revolutionary activity laxness had allowed the
reactionary forces to regroup and strike again, the PCP
emphasized that the reactionary forces had to be punished.
Additional purges within state organs (civilian and
military) were necessary, the military had to reorganize,
anti-monopolistic measures had to be implemented, and price
freezes and salary increases were necessary to meet some of
the economic problems facing the workers. 104 Most of these
measures were later implemented, including purges in the
military and the arrests of more than 1500 individuals who
were charged with complicity in the coup.
The attempted coup had several repercussions which
favored the PCP's political goals. A major victory was the
institutionalization of the MFA. Through the creation of a
Supreme Revolutionary Council as the MFA' s executive organ,
the military would continue its role in politics to direct
and defend the revolution. The MFA also forced all parties
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to sign the MFA/ party pact as a condition for running in
the constituent elections. The pact stated that the Council
would maintain veto power on all government decisions for
three to five years and that presidential candidates had to
be military men.
Like the three previous governments, the newly formed
government was a broad coalition. The Fourth Provisional
Government, however, was further to the left than the
previous governments. For the first time the MDP was given
ministerial posts. The PCP and MDP, with two posts each,
had representation equal to the PPD and PS. Goncalves
continued as Prime Miniaster and officers held several of
the ministerial positions.
Because of the changing political situation and its
inability to restrain the reactionary forces, the PCP
claimed that the previous government had outlived its
usefulness. The fourth provisional government would have
to correspond to the more dynamic political situation which
followed the thwarted coup. Because it considered the PPD
an a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c party, the PCP criticized the
participation of the PPD in the government. The party
emphasized that the reactionary forces had not been totally
defeated. It was still a force to be reckoned with.
Because the coup failed in its early stages, many
reactionaries hid to emerge later.
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The right-wing coup attempt gave the forces furthest
to the left within the MFA the upper hand. As a result,
the revolution moved to the left with the MFA' s decision to
nationalize domestic banks and insurance companies.
Because many of the banks controlled the assets of other
enterprises, the repercussions went beyond these two
sectors. Through the nationalizations, for example, the
state also gained control of many of the newspapers.
After the nationalizations, the PCP declared that
measures against monopoly and latifundio power were finally
beginning to succeed. The revolution was attacking the
roots of the problems in Portugal rather than wasting its
energies on secondary concerns. The nation had begun
moving toward socialism, toward the collectivism of the
means of production, toward agrarian reform, and toward the
improvement of workers' conditions . 106
With the institutionalization of the MFA and its
nationalization of 24 major firms in the basic sectors of
industry and energy, the PCP became more confident of the
destruction of monopoly capital and Portugal's progress
toward socialism. It called for vigilance in the
nationalized sector to prevent economic sabotage . 1 07
Cunhal later stated that without the nationalizations and
other revolutionary measures, the economy would have
collapsed and the liberties would have been dismantled
within a short period of time. 10 8
The party insisted that the elections scheduled for
April 25 had to be free; they could not undo the gains of
the revolution. It emphasized that democracy in Portugal
would consist of the broadest freedoms and liberties but it
would not be bourgeois democracy as in Western Europe. In
Western Europe monopoly capital continued to rule using the
veil of freedom to mask its exploitation of the workers.
Because monopoly capital would be destroyed in Portugal,
bourgeois democracy would not work. 109 By continuing its
claims that the revolution had not reached many regions of
Portugal, the PCP was creating a scenario to justify its
rejection of the elections as fraudulent and unreliable. 110
According to the PCP, the elections for the
constituent assembly showed voter support for the MFA/party
pact as well as for the PREC (Processo Revolucionar io Em
Curso - Revoulut ionary Process In Progress). The PCP
praised the MFA/party pact which it insisted would limit
the election's impact to the formation of a constituent
assembly as intended. The pact would also insure that the
new constitution would remain consistent with the MFA'
s
program and that it would not alter the revolutionary
process
.
1 1
1
After the elections, the PCP tried to downplay the
importance of the PS's victory (PS-38%, PPD-26%, PCP-12.5%,
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MDP-4%)
.
According to the PCP, the votes received by the
PS were not accurate measurements of its support; many
individuals voted for the socialists believing that the
MFA's program was connected with the Socialist Party, which
it was not. Many voters associated socialism with the PS
and communism with the PCP without realizing that before
communism could be reached a transitional socialist phase
had to be traversed. Even the Soviet Union had not reached
communism yet. As a result, many who voted for the PS
would have voted for the communists had they realized that
the PCP was also in favor of socialism. In fact, the PS's
brand of socialism was not pure socialism but bourgeois
socialism in which monopoly capitalism still dominated.
Social democracy or bourgeois capitalism was not what the
PCP or MFA envisioned. The PCP declared that the votes for
the PS in the south were in reality anti-revolutionary
votes while the votes for the socialists in the north were
cast by voters who were opposed to fascism but too
repressed to vote for the PCP .112
The electoral results, according to the party, proved
only that the Portuguese wanted to participate in the
elections, that they supported the revolution, and that the
reactionary forces and the right did not have as much
support as they claimed. The PCP did well in the
industrial zones and the southern agricultural regions.
315
The party declared that it did less well in the north and
in other regions where the anticommunist bias, a legacy
from the previous regime, was magnified by the undemocratic
atmosphere created by a "holy alliance" composed of
television, high-level religious leaders, the Vatican, and
foreign sources. Those that considered the percentage of
votes to be the only measure of party strength were
mistaken; because of its mass influence, its ability to
mobilize support, and its role in the revolution, the PCP
was much stronger. Despite their limited accuracy in
measuring party strength, the constituent assembly
elections were still important. 113
After the elections, the new goal was to consolidate
the revolutionary gains and expand the revolution to other
sectors. In the agricultural sector, for example, the
party encouraged the MFA to pass major agrarian reform
measures. Although they lacked "de jure" control, since
February agricultural workers in the south had been
assuming "de facto" control of the land through land
occupations. The PCP also advocated the absorption of
medium and small farmers into the revolution, the
fulfillment of agricultural workers' wage concerns,
vigilance to prevent economic sabotage in the fields, and
an increase in production through collectivism and the
formation of cooperatives. 114
On May Day the party analyzed the transition to
socialism in Portugal. For the transition to occur the
democratic revolution socially led by the working class and
politically led by the vanguard of the two motors of the
revolutionary process - the MFA and the PCP - required that
the workers quickly become conscious of their revolutionary
role. Because the MFA was neither a class nor a political
party, the working class was the most important social
force in the revolution. The rhetoric implied that
conditions were quickly ripening for the final assault. 115
By June it was clear to the party that the
revolutionary process was underway. Ever since the April
25 military coup, the party had often referred to the
evolution in Portugal as the "Democratic Process In
Progress," but as early as May the party began referring to
the evolution as the "Revolutionary Process In Progress."
According to the PCP, after the nationalizations, the
revolution had pursued a different course. The workers had
to be conscious of this and pursue a new line. The party
warned the workers not to expect an improvement in their
conditions overnight. The economic situation of the
country was very delicate as a result of years of
mismanagement and exploitation by monopoly capital and
latifundistas . Although the workers should expect a larger
role in the management of the economy through worker self-
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management, they should also work harder because the fruits
of their labor would be used for national and their own
interests rather than for the interests of monopoly
capital. They could not expect revolutionary change only
from above but also had to increase their commitment to the
revolution from below by increasing productivity. The
productivity improvements had to be quantitative and
qualitative through diversification and the elimination of
products which had a low demand. 116
The party's commitment to the productivity campaign
was reinforced by the coverage in Avante
!
of productivity
increases in the industrial and agricultural sectors. 117
The campaign included a day of voluntary work for the
revolution on June 10 which, like the previous day in 1974,
was praised and given great coverage. The PCP had begun the
"productivity battle," a major concern throughout the rest
of the summer. H%
Some measures were taken to improve the conditions of
the workers, such as an increase in the minimum wage to
4,000 escudos, a freeze of all salaries over 12,000 escudos
per month with a maximum wage ceiling of 49,900 escudos,
and an end to dismissal without just cause. To the party,
however, the ripening of the revolutionary process and the
call for the masses to be aware of the changing
circumstances was more important. Most of all, the workers
were not to be enticed by the reactionary forces' push to
strike for unreasonable demands which were designed to
create instability. 119
By the end of May the PCP increasingly criticized the
PS. Rather than working to bring socialism to Portugal the
PS was working against the MFA, declared the PCP. The
controversy over freedom of the press and the occupation of
the pro-Socialist Republica newspaper by communist workers
had escalated. The PS accused the PCP of controlling the
press, and the PCP accused the PS of controlling
Republica
.
12 Q The PS threatened to resign from the
government, an action which the PCP claimed would
strengthen the reactionary forces. Despite the criticisms,
the PCP left the PS room to maneuver by proposing
discussions between the two. 121 The PCP claimed that links
between the Republica affair and PCP antipluralism were
erroneous. The party had nothing to do with the affair.
The Republica incident had to be worked out between the
workers and the newspaper's editors. The answer to the
occupation of the Catholic Church's Radio Renascenca was
similar. The problem was not religious; it was between the
workers and the administration. 122
According to the PCP, during any revolutionary
process, when the attempt is made to replace one social
system with another, an inevitable confrontation emerges as
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the class doomed to extinction attempts to hold on to
power. Because Portugal was still at this stage, because
it was still moving toward the destruction of monopoly
power and the end to exploitation of man by man, it was
especially important that careful analyses be produced.
MFA moves toward socialism had dashed the hopes of monopoly
power. The MFA was committed to socialism via
pluralism. 123 The PCp reminded its rival parties that when
they signed the MFA pact they agreed to abide by the MFA
program and could not change it now or try to create social
democracy instead of socialism. The PS was attempting to
transform an assembly restricted to debate constitutional
issues into a forum for bourgeois democracy. 124
The PCP had become concerned enough with the pace of
the revolution and the reactionary forces' attacks
throughout Portugal, especially in the north, to make a
special plea for vigilance and readiness for mobilization.
The contradictions in the revolution were beginning to
emerge as the forces against it and those for it drew
sides. The only alternatives left to the Portuguese were
revolution or reaction. Portugal, insisted the PCP, to be
truly independent and continue a national revolution, had
to avoid foreign pressures and prescriptions. The rhetoric
which the party used became more radical than before. The
party especially focused on the Alentejo. It encouraged
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the MFA to include agrarian reform in its program hoping it
would do for agriculture what it did for the basic
industries of the nation. 125
The revolution, according to the PCP, was at the
turning point once again. The alliance with the MFA had to
be continued or the revolution would be endangered.
Apparently, the PCP felt that the showdown was quickly
approaching. The fact that the PCP called rallies of
support throughout the nation was an indication of its
concern. The PS and PPD resigned from the government in
July over the Republica affair, an action the PCP feared
would destabilize the political situation. The party
called on its militants to remain vigilant, put aside
sectarianism, and spread the warning. It was very critical
of the PS, warning PS members that their leaders were
working with the PPD and the reactionary forces, that they
were dragging the PS toward the counter-revolution, and
that the PS resigned from the government to destabilize
it. 126
The PCP claim that the PS attempted to bring
reactionary forces to Lisbon to create a right-wing
government shows that relations between the two had
deteriorated to the point where the PCP labeled the PS
reactionary and anti-communist. The PCP claimed that,
aided by the recent moves of the PS and PPD, the
icy
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reactionary forces were once again on the offensive. The
reactionary forces had learned lessons from their previous
attacks and had become more cautious and imaginative. T
had emerged from behind the facade of democratic parties
where they had been active since the revolution . 127
During the new anti-communist offensive, which began
in July and included violent attacks against party
headquarters and Communists in general, the PCP was less
cautious. It called for improvements in the workers'
standards of living, rather than seeking patience from the
workers; it increased its support of worker self-management
through seizures an
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had a very close relationship with Goncalves, but the
summer of 1975 was the high point of communist strength
partly as a result of its access to the Prime Minister.
Goncalves formed a Fifth Provisional Government which
was further to the left than any of the previous
governments because the PS refused to participate.
Although the PCP and MDP each held two ministries, the
government was primarily composed of military officers and
independent leftists. The PCP insisted that the new
unitary government reinstate the democratic order,
strengthen liberties, end the instability by centralizing
authority, begin additional purges within the state organs,
and implement measures to improve the economy. 12 9
As September approached the PCP saw Goncalves' power
wane, ant i -communist attacks throughout Portugal continue
(especially in the north) , and power within the MFA shift
to the moderates. Realizing it was losing control of the
revolutionary situation and that the nation was on the
brink of civil war, the PCP offered its militants a limited
self-criticism. It declared that it had committed errors
of sectarianism and over-confidence in the revolution. The
sectarian attitude of many of the members had to end. 1-30
Another phase in the revolution was ending. The
party' s declarations that the MFA had been weakened by
internal divisions, that the PS was allying with
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international forces against the revolution, that a
disinformation campaign had been launched abroad as well as
at home, and that the economic problems continued to mount,
were proof of this. Although several African nations were
given their independence (Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands,
Sao Tome and Principe Islands), decolonization was slowing
down in the case of Angola. 131
According to the PCP, the immediate threat to the
revolution was blamed on conservative members of the
military and on the PS which strengthened the reactionary
forces. Normally, the Fifth Provisional Government would
have been able to defuse the threat to the revolution; it
was unable to do so for lack of support and because the
divisions within the MFA proved too strong. It was not,
the PCP claimed, that some individuals within the MFA were
against the revolution but that they did not have the
political maturity necessary to analyze the situation
correctly . 132
The divisions within the MFA were allegedly caused by
the "Nine" who were officers supporting Major Melo Antunes.
He had written the MFA program as well as most of the MFA
documents, and favored moderate socialism. Earlier, during
1975, the MFA had split into various factions including the
Antunes faction, the faction surrounding General Vasco
Goncalves which was pro-PCP, and the faction surrounding
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General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, which was extreme-left.
As if prophesying the events of November 25, the PCP asked
the factions within the MFA not to use force to resolve
their rhetorical differences but to save their strength to
protect the revolution from the right. Merely ending the
political differences which emerged at the surface would
not solve the problems which were rooted much deeper. if
the reaction succeeded they would curtail the rights of all
Portuguese, not only those of the communists. Only unity
and the consolidation of the strength on the left would be
able to resolve the problems. 133
ORGANIZATION
.
During Phase Three, the PCP continued
to strengthen its organization. To help it in this task,
the party reintroduced 0 Militante in June, its
organizational and theoretical journal, in which the party
discussed various organizational problems.
The PCP criticized members who attended the meetings
and discussed the policies yet neglected the rest of their
duties. All members had to put party policy into effect.
Many militants had to be careful that their political
immaturity did not lead them to discuss events impulsively
and to distort the party's positions. Some cadres had
neglected the recruitment of new members, fearing that it
would increase the organizational problems even more. Many
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cells had been holding meetings of all of its members to
make decisions rather than electing members to the
executive organs which were to make the day-to-day
decisions. Without leadership, decisions could not be
implemented and meetings would not be orderly. These
temporary problems would be resolved as the party's
organization strengthened. They could be resolved by
placing cadres with the minimum training necessary in
positions of responsibility
.
13 4
The party stated that the initial task to strengthen
the organization was for present members to hold
enlightenment sessions which would attract prospective
members. Once a cell was organized, it had to hold regular
sessions to discuss the positions of the party. The PCP
emphasized the need to quickly act on applications for
membership. It set down standard operating procedures and
provided a general criteria which cadres could refer to
during the application process. Cadres were not to make
value judgments of new applicants. Only with time could
the applicants grow to be good members, so they should be
allowed into the party if all the criteria were met. 1 -^
The party's organization continued to develop. By May
15 the membership surpassed 100,000 (not including members
of UEC or UJC) . This was a tremendous organizational feat
compared to the membership figures the year before.
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Despite the increase the party claimed that class, age, and
sex make-up remained the same. it created District
Commissions in the four districts of the Adjacent Islands
which lacked them. The original goal, a commission in
every municipality, was almost realized. Most of the
commissions which remained to be organized were on the
Adjacent Islands and a few areas of the north where the
party had always lacked support. All other levels of
organization, including the "labor centers," continued to
grow. 136
The PCP remained concerned with internal sectarianism,
contending that communists had to end the sectarian views
which isolated them from the masses. Although socialism
could not be created without the communists, it also could
not be created without the masses. Because the technocrats
played an important role in the transition to socialism,
bias toward white collar workers and public functionaries
had to end. The politically immature small and medium
peasants of the north, the Beiras, and the islands, had to
be attracted to the party rather than alienated. Unless
the party could attract the small and medium peasants of
those areas, it would never increase its following there.
Because they were allies during the initial phase of the
revolution; the bias against intellectuals, technicians,
domestics, artisans, and small and medium merchants and
industrialists also had to end.!37
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CONCLUSIONS
.
During this Third Phase, the party
assessed that conditions were ripe to advance the
revolution. Although the party had moved cautiously ever
since April 25, it became less cautious after the MFA
nationalized the banks, the insurance companies, and later
the basic industries. The party pressed the workers to
increase productivity in the nationalized sector. The
increase would demonstrate to the MFA the success of
nationalizations and encourage it to nationalize additional
industries and proclaim a land reform. Strikes were out of
the question, especially in the nationalized sector. The
workers were to also play a larger role in the management
of the industries. The party continued to call for purges
at top levels of industries, state organs, local
government, the military and other important sectors. Its
hope was to infiltrate these various positions with
militants or sympathizers who would improve their operation
and demonstrate that the communists were honest and
effective administrators.
Although a broad land reform according to the PCP's
desires was not implemented, additional latifundios were
forcefully seized and became "de facto" nationalized. As
the revolution intensified, groups to the right of the PCP
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attempted to bring the revolution to a halt. Although it
would never admit it controlled either, the party's
infiltration of the press and of the unions gave it
tremendous power. Increasingly, even moderate leftists
were pushed to the right as they found the revolution
shifting in directions of which they disapproved.
As the nation drifted toward civil war,
counter-revolutionary attempts and anti-communist rhetoric
increased. The party found the nation dividing between the
conservative north and the more liberal Alentejo and Lisbon
regions of the South. As the revolution lost steam, the
party drew some initial conclusions. The agricultural and
industrial worker base was not enough to complete the
revolution, especially without the support of the MFA which
was torn by internal divisions. For the revolution to
succeed, the party had to make inroads in the northern
agricultural regions by altering decades of peasant anti-
communism .
Throughout Phase Three, therefore, The PCP focused on
intensifying its relationship with the MFA and minimizing
the influence of the elections and the bourgeois parties.
Its dominance in the unions, in the media, and within
certain sectors of the military moved the nation closer
toward the communist view of the ideal socialist society.
However, the strength of the PCP and the direction of the
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revolution divided not only the political forces in
Portugal, but also the MFA. The rifts within the military
affected the PCP's plans because it could no longer rely on
a cohesive MFA to continue its socialist prescriptions for
the nation. Instead of influencing a cohesive, strong,
military organization holding a monopoly of armed strength
it found itself influencing only one faction which could be
checked by other MFA factions. As a result of the
deteriorating revolutionary climate, during Phase Four the
PCP realized that the revolution had ended and began to
act accordingly.
PHASE IV - SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 25, 1975
The substitution of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo for
Goncalves' as Prime Minister, the shift of the Sixth
Provisional Government back toward the political center,
and the renewed influence of Antunes and the "nine" within
the MFA were among the factors which ushered in phase four
of the revolution, a three-month period during which the
revolution ended.
After losing control of the revolution during Phase
Three, the PCP became more cautious. The recurring themes
of Phase Four were similar to those of the previous phase.
These were the need to maintain unity between the people
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and the MFA, the warnings of counter-revolutionary activity
throughout the nation, the calls to increase productivity,
and the progress of agrarian reform in the Alentejo. The
party continued to emphasize the important roles of the
youth, intellectuals, women, small and medium farmers,
Catholics, and other popular forces in the revolution. The
parallels with Chile continued, as did the articles
glorifying life in the Eastern Bloc. Education, considered
an important sector, required reforms and purges. Given
the problems the PCP witnessed in the north, it devoted
increasing attention to that region by comparatively
analyzing its agrarian problems with that of the south.
The party also intensified efforts to unify the workers and
the peasants. It emphasized the power which unions and
popular organizations, such as neighborhood cells, could
wield. 138
By September, the revolutionary climate in Portugal
had cooled as chaos and division ruined the unity which the
PCP saw as essential to instal socialism. As the
revolutionary fervor lessened, the counter-attacks by the
reactionary forces also became less intense. Cunhal, who
had limited his public speeches and appearances during the
revolutionary phase, began making public appearances again.
His rhetoric was less revolutionary and more cautious.
Whereas previously the party discussed the socialist
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revolution offensively, as if it were imminent, the new
rhetoric had become more defensive. The PCP focused on
consolidating gains rather than extending the revolution.
It often supported strikes and work stoppages, an action
unheard of a few months earlier. it supported, for
example, a major strike in the building construction
industry even when the workers surrounded the constituent
assembly hall and forced the representatives to remain
there overnight . 139
The PCP even criticized (cautiously) the military
occupation of radio and television stations. The military
should defeat the reactionary forces not allow them access
to the media. The PCP claimed that in the north many
officers and soldiers had allowed and even helped the
reactionary forces attack party offices and labor centers.
The party evoked the lessons of Chile to emphasize its
point. 140
Because the ministerial posts were distributed
according to the results of the elections, which the PCP
had rejected, the new Sixth Provisional Government was
unfavorable to the PCP. It included five moderate military
officers, four seats for the PS, two for the PPD, and one
for the PCP. Once in power, the new government moved to
weaken the PCP by regaining control of the media and
restructuring the military.
The communist and ultra-left response was immediate as
they maneuvered to maintain their hold on power. Within
the military, discipline deteriorated as soldiers often
refused to accept and obey their new officers. The
situation in general deteriorated toward anarchy as grass-
roots organizations armed themselves, paramilitary
organizations were formed, and revolutionary cells emerged
within the military such as the pro-communist Soldiers
United Will Win (SUV)
.
Because the political atmosphere was delicate, and the
MFA remained a member of the new government, the PCP was
mildly supportive of the new government. The PCP claimed
that it was not participating in the government officially,
although it would support policies that it considered
favorable. This was a strange announcement because a
communist held the unimportant Minister of Public Works
post. Nevertheless, the PCP labeled this a compromise
rather than a coalition, and from the party press there is
no indication that a communist participated in the
government .141
The party also criticized the government, especially
the PPD's inclusion, its shift to the right, its austere
economic program, the attempts to cut support to newspapers
which did not share the government's right-wing perspective
(for example, Diario de Noticias and 0 Seculo both heavily
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subsidized by the government but controlled by communist
workers) ,142 the rumors that the economy was bankrupt when
Portugal had one of the largest gold reserves in the world,
and the abandonment of the previous government's policies.
It also criticized alterations of domestic policies to
please foreign nations and attract aid. When the aid
arrived it was always miniscule, conditional, and hardly
worth prostituting national independence. 143
The PCP claimed that the PS, the parties to its right,
and the pseudo-revolutionary parties had abandoned the
revolution and contributed decisively to the
"politico-military" crisis. The "military" crisis began as
ideological divisions within the MFA developed into purges
of several progressive and revolutionary officers (for
example, General Vasco Goncalves), and escalated to
imminent armed confrontation between the factions. The
solution to the increasing disciplinary problems within the
military was to purge the right-wing rather than the
left-wing elements. 144
The "politico" crisis was the reactionary forces'
attempts to block the revolutionary process and drag the
nation, via the government, to the right. They had not
succeeded for lack of strength, so they attempted to weaken
the revolution first. To counter the crisis, the party
increased its warnings of reactionary and
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pseudo-revolutionary activity and of attempts to instal
bourgeois democracy. It was time for the various factions
of the left to drop the polemics and rhetorical differences
and discuss how to save the revolution, for only through
unity could the reaction be stopped. 14 5
Despite its calls for unity, the party dismissed
alliances with the PPD; it was not a democratic party. The
PCP by-passed the PS leadership, which it claimed had been
working in alliance with the reactionary forces, and
appealed directly to the rank-and-file. The PCP also
discussed the formation of the Revolutionary United Front
(FUR), an alliance with extreme-left parties. 146 Although
the PCP argued that it never joined the FUR but only
participated in the advisory committee, most political
observers claimed it joined the FUR for three or four days.
The party's break with the alliance resulted from its
proposal that the PS be included in discussions to end the
crisis. Because the other members of the FUR considered
the PS a bourgeois party, they rejected the proposal.
The proposal indicated that the PCP had an ulterior
motive for participating in the front. Why would it have
proposed an alliance with the same PS it had been labeling
reactionary? By participating in discussions the PCP could
tell its militants that it had tried to reunify the left
but its calls for unity had been rejected. In this manner
the party could defuse internal pressures for an alliance
with the extreme-left without having to give up some of its
positions to create an alliance. in the aftermath, the
party increased popular rallies to show the strength of the
people when they acted in unison. 147
The PCP praised its own accurate analyses of the
political situation. It claimed the analyses had prepared
and mobilized the popular masses, in alliance with the MFA
and other democrats, for their defeat of the latest
counter-revolutionary offensives during the summer. The
grave economic problems, however, still needed resolution.
The government's shift to the right would not help the
economy. Discussions among the parties were imperative to
avoid civil war, improve the economy, and stop the right
ward shift caused by PPD and PS policies. The parties
should be consolidating the revolutionary conquests, not
trying to undo them. Because the parties to the right were
attempting to roll back the conquests of the revolution
through the new constitution, the PCP criticized them for
breaking their pact with the MFA. It also criticized the
PS's warnings that the extreme left was planning to seize
power. Through such warnings the PS was helping to
increase reactionary activity against the revolution. How
could the PS call for peace, the PCP asked, when the PS
repeatedly tried to instigate problems during the Fifth
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Government and continued to do so? 14 8
The retornados, Portuguese living in the African
colonies who were expelled (especially from Angola)
, became
a new issue in Portuguese politics. Because they were a
potential basis of support for the reactionary forces, the
PCP was very concerned. It warned that the number of
retornados would increase as the date for Angolan
independence (November 11) approached. The retornados had
to realize that the Portugal they were returning to was not
the country they remembered. It was a revolutionary
Portugal, and they had to work to fit in. If they so
desired, they could be absorbed into the revolution
.
14 9
As November 11 approached, the PCP increased its
warnings of new reactionary activity to try to stop
independence. The activity was especially centered around
a new coup attempt. 150 When the independence of Angola
became a reality, the PCP devoted considerable time and
effort toward glorifying the new nation and its struggle
for independence.
The final phase of the revolutionary period terminated
after the failure of the attempted left-wing military coup.
The coup attempt was led by extreme-left soldiers opposed
to Antunes and the moderates plans to consolidate military
power and weaken General Carvalho's (Otelo) power base.
Although the PCP claimed it was not involved, most
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observers believe it was at least marginally involved even
if it cut all ties with the coup when it realized it was
doomed to fail. The repercussions from the coup pushed the
nation's left-ward shift back toward the right and
moderation. For the PCP this development required new
analyses and tactics in the changed political atmosphere,
the topic of the next chapter.
Organization
. Organizationally, the party was faced
with some serious problems. After the severe attacks by
conservatives (mostly peasants) during the summer, the
party's growth stabilized. According to the party, its
membership neither increased nor decreased. The greatest
principles of a Leninist party were cohesion, structure,
and connection with the masses. As noted, the PCP argued
that sectarianism was holding back membership in the party.
The PCP emphasized the need to increase its influence among
groups most influenced by the right - the white collar
workers, technocrats, workers living in backward regions,
and especially small and medium peasants who were a highly
volatile group and could be attracted to the party. It was
also unhappy with the confusion and disorganization
demonstrated by many members during reactionary attacks.
It emphasized that the disorganization resulted from
insufficient meetings by the local cells or inadequate
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attendance by many members. The only solution was to
increase the meetings and attendance. 151
The party also emphasized the need to instill in new
members a sense of collectivism as opposed to
individualism. Individualism was ingrained in the people
by bourgeois societies. The workers, who made up eighty
percent of the party's militants, had the least amount of
individualism and the most collectivism. 152
During the Fourth and final Phase, the PCP realized
the revolution had been lost and it no longer had control
of the situation. It maintained its dual strategy of
participation within the government and activities outside
the government as it struggled to consolidate the gains of
the last nineteen months. A major pillar of its
revolutionary strategy had crumbled as the MFA split into
rival factions. The PCP was also struggling to harness the
extreme-left which was largely responsible for the chaos
and revolutionary activity at the grass-roots level and
divisions within the PCP. With the strength of the left
widely dispersed, the PCP did the best it could to keep
abreast of the political situation, which meant it also had
to disperse its resources, further weakening its control.
The coup of November 25 abruptly ended the revolution but
it also provided some advantages to the PCP which we will
discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
PICKING UP THE PIECES: THE PCP'S UNITED FRONT STRATEGY INPOST
-REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL
After the November 25, 1975 aborted, left-wing coup
and the resulting backlash, the PCP swiftly analyzed the
new political situation. During 1975, the party had taken
several "quick steps forward" but the political situation
shifted toward the center after the coup attempt. The PCP
realized that the revolution was "over" (temporarily) and
that its new goal should be to consolidate the gains of the
revolution: the nationalizations, the agrarian reform, the
new liberties, and worker-self management. Meanwhile, the
party could hope that the "step backward" was only
temporary and that the revolution would get underway again;
after all, the MFA would still be the watchdog of the
revolution for the next three to five years.
In this chapter we discuss the party's new strategy
after the drastic change in the political situation. The
party took advantage of the new political atmosphere to
strengthen its organization. Its tactics focused on
consolidating the revolutionary conquests and advancing in
any sector which allowed it the opportunity to do so.
Although at first the PCP was not openly anti-government or
anti-PS, over the years it became so. Having been offered
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a new opportunity to embrace Eurocommunism after the
November fiasco, the party decided to continue its
Stalinist structure and Marxist-Leninist strategy for
power. if the political situation shifted again in the
short or medium-term, the party would get a new opportunity
to compete for power. If, however, the political situation
did not change over the long-term, the PCP was doomed to
failure and a decline in electoral strength unless it
altered its tactics.
Since the party's strategy in the years following
November 1975 was basically the same, we analyze in detail
the PCP's tactics during 1976 and examine the party's
tactics since 1977 broadly.
The PCP in 1976: Electoral Politics
The PCP considered the political change which followed
the November attempted coup a major victory for the forces
of the right and a major defeat for the forces of the left.
It warned anew of the danger to democracy from the
reactionary forces. It boasted that it had foreseen the
dangers of the PS and the MFA moderates' overtures to the
right, as well as the ultra-lefts' adventurous and
divisionist tactics, long before November 25. The PCP
claimed that it had tried to reunify the forces of the left
and the MFA to prevent the crisis' escalation.!
The shift in the revolutionary situation toward the
center and the repercussions to the left occurred as a
result of the backlash which followed the aborted coup. To
portray the backlash as unjustified, the PCP claimed that
neither a coup nor even an insurrection occurred on
November 25. "It was a convergence of revolts over a wave
of purges to the left which surrounded a dispute over
leadership positions among various sectors of the MFA and
Armed Forces." Although its references were to revolts
rather than a coup, it is doubtful that the party believed
this statement.
2
Because the party implicated the pseudo-
revolutionaries as largely responsible for the coup
attempt, its attacks on the extreme-left increased after
the coup's failure. The PCP claimed that the extreme-
leftists had "closed organizations" and considered
themselves superior to the popular masses. The PCP argued
that although extreme-leftists considered themselves
vanguard groups, they had, in reality, betrayed the masses
they were supposedly leading. Once the extreme-leftists
placed themselves above the masses, they became sectarian.
The desire to destroy capitalism when confronted by
repression combined with the mispercept ion of masses'
strength led these pseudo-revolutionary groups to turn to
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violence. The violence exacerbated the sectarianism so
that members bureaucrat ically isolated themselves within
their own party and lost touch with the realities of the
day . 3
According to the PCP, a major lesson from the extreme-
left's mistakes was that a party could not move too far
ahead of the masses or it would lose their support, become
sectarian, and resort to violence. The strategy could not
be to only push ahead but to occasionally step back, assess
the situation, and then proceed. The left should not yell
attack even while it was retreating. 4
Clearly the party was not only criticizing the
extreme-left but also militants within the PCP that held
similar views. To reinforce its criticisms, the PCP took
advantage of an historic date in its past: the glass
workers' strike in Marinha Grande of January 18, 1934. To
commemorate the anniversary of the uprising, it published
excerpts from Jose Gregorio's old analysis "Sobre a
Associacao e o Movimento do Operario Vidreiro" (On the
Glass Workers' Association and Movement) in Avante
!
.
Gregorio concluded: that the uprising failed because
anarchists chose to resort to an armed struggle without
considering a mass struggle or strike, that the action by a
minority resulted in more severe repression than might
otherwise have occurred, that the conditions had not been
ripe for an uprising, and that the PCP had been penetrated
by anarchist and putschist views. 5
The implied parallels with the political situation
after November 25 are indisputable . 6 The party in 1976 was
repeating its calls of 1942 for unity of all workers and
anti-fascists. Because the PCP had many years of experience
as a vanguard party, the article implicitly reminded the
workers that the PCP was more qualified to lead them than
the recently formed extreme-left parties. Concrete
examples from the past were, like a picture, worth a
thousand words. The publication of the article also
emphasized the correctness of the party's rejection of
violence in the sixties and seventies.
A major goal during the consolidation of the
revolutionary conquests was to keep the post-revolutionary
purges of the extreme-left from weakening the party. The
PCP disassociated itself completely from the leftist groups
involved in the coup.^ With unexpected help from Major
Melo Antunes, a moderate within the MFA who played a key
role in curtailing the communists during 1975, the party
continued to function as a legal party. The PCP was even
allowed a minor post within the Sixth Provisional
Government
.
Major Antunes was concerned that elimination of the
PCP would allow post-revolutionary Portugal to shift
further to the right than he found acceptable. Although in
the summer of 1975 Antunes had found himself to the right
of the MFA political spectrum, after the military purges
which followed November 25 he found himself to the left of
the MFA mainstream. The dominant forces within the MFA
preferred to return to the barracks and leave politics to
the politicians .
8
In defense of its continued participation in the
government, the PCP reminded its militants that its role
was minimal and preferable to a government which was openly
rightist. Although the party did not support the wage
freezes imposed by the government, neither did it instigate
a crisis which might have ended the government. The PCP
argued that the government's fall could have led to a
rightward shift. 9 Having narrowly escaped the purges of
the extreme-left after November 25, the PCP was not willing
to ruin its public image any further by confronting the
government. By participating in the government, the party
tried to show the public that it did not have a dual
strategy for power, as many claimed, but was committed to
democracy rather than adventurous schemes. 10
Several themes dominated the party's rhetoric after
November 25. The party warned of terror from the
reactionary forces, especially in the north, and of its
economic and political consequences for the nation; the PCP
emphasized the importance of maintaining the
nationalizations and agrarian reform; it contended that if
the MFA reunified it would still be possible to stop the
shift to the right; it voiced its concern for the small and
medium farmer and the need for unity to safeguard
democracy; and it continued to advocate friendship and
cooperation with other nations including the ex-colonies. 11
In short, much of the rhetoric after November 25 mirrored
the rhetoric before it.
Because it would help consolidate the institutions and
the regime at a time when the right was increasing its
counterrevolutionary measures, Cunhal announced that the
PCP favored the elections for the Legislative Assembly
scheduled for April 25, 1976. However, the PCP was
concerned that elections would still not be free in the
north or the adjacent islands, where the PPD and CDS would
continue to dominate, and that the emigrants' votes would
be falsified. !2
Cunhal claimed that neither the PS, nor any other
party, would get the fifty percent required to govern
alone. The outcome, in his view, would depend on whether
the PS would ally with the left or the right. He urged the
PS to announce, prior to the elections, what its intentions
were so that the voters would know whether they were voting
for a leftist or rightist government. 13
As the electoral campaign got under way the rhetoric
intensified around the usual themes of unity, alliance with
the MFA, and vigilance of the reactionary forces. Cunhal
criticized the capitalist recuperation measures of the
PS/PPD Sixth Provisional Government, the PCP's limited
access to social communication, and the release of a
thousand PIDEs (ex-secret police)
. The continuation of the
MFA' s institutionalized role was praised as necessary to
protect the conquests of the revolution. Because those who
obeyed would further weaken the left, the PCP also
criticized the extreme-lefts' call for the casting of blank
ballots in favor of "popular power." 14 Cunhal warned of
the reactionary forces' conspiracy with foreign powers to
destroy the new regime as occurred in Allende's Chile. The
right - Social Democratic Center (CDS)
,
Popular Democratic
Party (PPD)
,
Popular Monarchist Party (PPM) , and Christian
Democratic Party - would not be content with an electoral
defeat but only with the reinstallation of fascism. He
claimed that the rights' pseudo-revolutionary allies were
helping them achieve this goal, especially the Association
of Workers and Peasants, the Portuguese Communist
Party /Marxist-Leninist (PCP-ml), and the Movement for the
Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat.
At its National Conference of March 14 organized
exclusively to formulate party policy toward the elections,
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the PCP announced its electoral program:
''de fended ^ ° f lib6rtY and democ^cy. It
freedom of the press and of assembly, freepolitical parties, freedom to organize, free
unions and the right to strike, a free
constitution, freedom of religion;
a democratic regime free of chaos and
terrorism;
the elimination of crime, corruption, drugs,
pornography, and prostitution;
respect for the democratic order;
and a continued military role in politics.
II. The PCP was the party of the workers. It
defended:
equal pay for equal work regardless of sex or
age, collective contracts and their
enforcement, dismissal only with just cause,
increased employment, price stability, decent
housing for all, worker commissions, and a
National Health Service.
III. The PCP was the party of Agrarian Reform and
small and medium agriculture.
IV. The PCP was the party for a new economy on the
path toward socialism.
V. The PCP was the party of a democratized education
and culture.
VI. The PCP was the Party of National Independence . 15
According to the PCP, for the elections to be
democratic four conditions were necessary:
1. liberty and individual rights throughout the
territory,
2. police measures against violence and terrorism,
3. the need to publicize the government's new measures
which were creating a new politico-military crisis,
4. and the severe punishment of campaigners who used
"mud-slinging" and lies. 16
Cunhal announced that the party's major goal was to defeat
the right and create a leftist democratic alliance in the
Assembly of the Republic (Parliament)
. He argued that the
people knew the PCP was committed to its leftist program,
and he encouraged them to vote for the PCP; a vote for
other parties would not insure that the First
Constitutional Government would be a leftist government.
Because votes would be scattered among many different
parties and not result in additional representatives, votes
for the extreme-left would be wasted. Because the PS might
align with the right, votes for it would be uncertain. 17
Since the parties of the left won a majority, the PCP
insisted that the PS, in order to abide by the electoral
results, form a United Front with the PCP and drop its
fantasies of creating a minority government. Cunhal warned
the PS not to expect the PCP to imitate the Swedish
Communist Party. Although party was not included in the
Swedish government, it did not vote against the Social
Democrats for fear that the government's fall might bring
the right to power. Conditions in Portugal were different
from those in Sweden, and the PCP would not play that role.
The only alternative to a United Front of the left was a
Holy Alliance of the right, which was unacceptable . 1
8
In the aftermath of the elections, the PCP proclaimed
that a majority of the left had won and that conditions
were ready for a government of the left. The right had
been defeated and the people had reaffirmed their
commitment to the spirit of April 25, 1974. The PCP
declared that the CDS increase to 16 percent from 7.6
percent the year before was at the expense of the PPD which
had polled 24.3 percent as compared to 26.4 percent in
1975. In turn, many individuals who had voted for the PS in
1975 (the PS received 37.9 percent in 1975 and 34.9 percent
in 1976) voted for the PPD in the latest elections. The
rationale for the shift, according to the PCP, was that
many voters in 1 975 had been conservatives but their
support for the revolution and the MFA led them to vote for
the PS. Since 1975, a clearer distinction between the PS
and the parties to the right emerged. The PPD had
exploited the bourgeois fears of conservative PS voters
through the media and drawn them further to the right. 1 9
The PCP congratulated itself for being the only major
party to have increased its vote. It received 14.4 percent
of the vote in 1976 and 12.5 percent in 1975. If we
consider that the MDP did not run in the 1976 elections and
that most of its votes went to the PCP, the communist vote
actually decreased from a combined 16.6 percent in 1975.
The PCP was also rejecting the CDS as a major party; after
all, its increase was even more spectacular than the PCP's.
Cunhal announced at a press conference that a political
center (bloco central) did not exist in Portugal and that
the electorate was either on the left or on the right with
a majority in the former. 20
In preparation for the Presidential elections
scheduled for June 27, which the party considered one more
step toward the institutionalization of democracy and the
preservation of the revolutionary conquests, the party
presented four goals:
1. work toward the consolidation, stability, and
continuation of the democratic process;
2. prevent the renewal of the "holy alliance"
against the communists and work toward the unity
of the working class and a rapprochement of the
socialists and communists;
3. continue the alliance between the people and
the MFA with the Spirit of April 25 in defense of
the constitution;
4. create the conditions which would allow a
leftist majority in the Assembly of the Republic
and the formation of a leftist government with
communist part icipation . 21
The PCP emphasized that the presidential campaign should
not become a struggle between the military and the
civilians. Because an officer would be best qualified for
the commander-in-chief role, the PCP supported a military
candidate for president. The candidate was not to be
partisan but to stand for the constitution, the
institutions, and the democratic order. He had to receive
the support of the popular movement, the PCP/PS majority of
the left, and be able to stabilize democracy. If the
candidate could not muster the backing of the Council of
the Revolution, of the PS and PCP, and of the popular
masses then the PCP reserved the right to present its own
civilian candidate, whether communist or not, who would
clearly define and present the PCP position. 22
The party set so many conditions for the acceptance of
a military candidate that it inevitably would have to
support a different candidate. Rather than the Council of
the Revolution supporting one candidate, several military
candidates entered the presidential race. Explaining that
it did not wish to divide the MFA by supporting or
criticizing any military candidate, the party eventually
nominated Octavo Pato, a Central Committee member since
1949 and leader of the party's parliamentary deputies
(representatives), to be its candidate for the elections. 2 ^
The party's campaign was an unusual one. From the
beginning the rhetoric was very cautious. Claiming that
his candidacy would weaken the left, the only candidate
whom the PCP criticized was Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho
(Otelo, as he is known to the Portuguese, had been demoted
from general after November 25), who had the support of the
extreme-left and was not considered a military candidate by
the PCP. The party emphasized that it entered the race to
delineate problems and propose solutions. Because none of
the candidates represented the left or the workers, it was
up to the party to voice their interests and the PCP
perspective. Its campaign was one of "enlightenment" not a
run for the presidency
.
24 Because it had achieved its
objective by making the representation of the left its
primary motive for entering the race, the electoral results
could be downplayed, especially since Pato was not expected
to do well. Winning electorally became a secondary
concern, at best. 25
The elections were a massive electoral defeat for the
PCP as even its own militants refused to vote for Pato.
Averting the need for a run-off election, General Ramalho
Eanes, who was supported by the three major non-communist
parties, won an overwhelming majority of 62 percent. Major
Otelo came in second with 16 percent, Admiral Azevedo won
14 percent, and Otavio Pato received only 8 percent.
The new President General Eanes was the slightly
left-of-center chief of staff who played an instrumental
role in ending the left-wing coup the year before.
Although his political views were similar to Major
Antunes', General Eanes favored decreasing the military's
role in politics. He played a key role in restructuring
the original MFA-Party Pact transforming the military role
to an advisory one and implementing other measures which
decreased the military's political role. 2 ^
The party tried to avoid criticism of its massive
defeat by emphasizing that its goal in the elections had
not been to win. It argued that despite the party's
inability to attract a large percentage of the vote, it had
played an important role by providing the workers and the
popular movement with an input which they would not have
had otherwise. The PCP also emphasized that the party
derived valuable lessons from the experience which would
help it continue the popular struggle. The party claimed
that its candidacy enlightened the public regarding the
political situation, the correlation of forces, the
consolidation of democracy, the need for a leftist
government, and the maintenance of cohesion and militancy
within the PCP. 27
As a result of its poor showing in the elections, the
party faced several internal criticisms: that the PCP
should have backed a non-communist candidate, that the
party waited too long to announce Pato as its candidate,
that the party should not have gone all the way in the
elections, that the party was excessively optimistic. The
Central Committee (CC) responded that it made the best
decision possible given the complexity of the situation, an
unsatisfactory answer to such profound questions. 28
As consolation, the CC told its militants not to take
the elections to be an indication of future results. In
the future, less military candidates would run and the
issues would not revolve around military concerns. The
Eanes victory, claimed the CC, strengthened democracy and
ended two years of provisional governments. The CC
downplayed the impact of its militants' lack of discipline
in the elections and analyzed Eanes' victory in partisan
terms. The CC declared that it was a defeat for the right,
and that the PCP was not the only party that lost votes to
Otelo. It specified in detail the amounts the other
parties lost to the left. The votes for Eanes, claimed the
CC, were less than the total which the three parties to its
right received in the legislative elections. 2 ^ The right's
support for Eanes, it claimed, was a ploy to defuse their
losses in the legislative elections. The right wanted to
capitalize on Eanes' victory, and create a coalition
government with the PS, and prevent a United Front of the
left
.
30
The party declared that the votes which Otelo received
were not votes for the ultra-left. The PCP insisted that
Otelo received votes for various reasons but they were not
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permanent votes because it would regain its previous
percentages in the next legislative elections. The lack of
militant support for the communist candidacy, claimed the
PCP, showed "a deficient evaluation of the masses'
feelings, and subjectivity in analyzing the situat ion . " 31
Because they were not partisan elections, the PCP argued
that the electoral results should not be portrayed in
partisan terms. This was a contradiction to the PCP's own
partisan analyses above. The PCP also emphasized that, in
the aftermath, the elections showed the potential for unity
of the left. 32
The party could have decided to run Pato in the
elections for several reasons. Because Eanes was known to
be a moderate and the PCP's three competitors on the right
were backing him, the PCP did not confront a right-wing
threat to the presidency. Because the PCP would have
mobilized to prevent a right-wing victory if the right had
presented its own candidate, the party would have had less
flexibility. But with Eanes' victory virtually assured and
his announcement that he would refuse PCP support if it was
offered, the party was free to back any candidate it
desired. Although it could have supported Eanes against
his will, not to do so would help defuse left-wing
criticism that the PCP had become a "bourgeois" party.
After months of participation in the provisional
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governments often holding back worker demands, the PCP
could prove its commitment to the workers by presenting its
own candidate to allegedly promote workers' interests.
The party could have supported an independent
candidate, such as former premier Admiral Jose Pinheiro de
Azevedo, but presenting its own candidate had advantages,
such as access to radio and television time for propaganda
purposes. The PCP also hoped that a communist candidate
would increase the party's leverage by forcing the election
into a second round.
Support for any candidate to its left was out of the
question. One of the advantages which the PCP reaped from
the November 25 coup was a considerably weakened threat
from the left. To support Otelo would have helped
strengthen enemies which it considered as bad as the
reactionary forces. Because the party's goal was to
destroy the pseudo-revolutionary threat, not to aid it by
making it the only opposition on the left, Otelo's
candidacy destroyed the party's option to withdraw Pato
prior to the first round.
The party took so long to decide which option to
pursue that many militants became restless. The party
wanted to see who the other candidates would be and to
carefully analyze every possible alternative. The decision
for Pato to run until the finale, rather than support
another candidate as the elections drew near, had definite
disadvantages, such as his receipt of only eight percent of
the vote. Politically it appeared that the party had lost
half of its support and that it suffered from internal
dissent; however, the PCP knew it had control of the party
apparatus and correctly concluded that the loss of votes
was only temporary. Not under any circumstances would it
support the ultra-left and there were not sufficient
reasons for it to support a candidate other than its own.
The election allowed the party to see which regions and
sectors of its militants were least "disciplined" so that
it could focus on bringing them into line and enforcing
"democratic centralism." This would explain the party's
renewed calls to strengthen the organization. It also
occurred at an opportune time since the Eighth PCP Congress
was to be held in mid-November and the organizational and
other lessons could be discussed as it approached.
Despite sharp criticism from the PCP, the PS formed a
minority government after the elections. PS memories of
its confrontation with the PCP during 1975, and the desire
to prevent pushing its more conservative members toward the
PPD, made a united front government with the PCP
unacceptable. Faced with a disastrous economic situation
after two years of economic and political instability, the
PS saw little alternative but to propose tough austerity
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measures to improve the economy. 33
The PCP was quick to label the government's program
and policies as rightist. Nevertheless, the PCP announced
that it would support any measures which corresponded to
the workers' interests, defended the liberties and
revolutionary conquests, preserved the institutions as put
forth by the constitution, struggled for a free and
independent democratic Portugal, and moved toward
socialism. 34
Local elections and the Eighth Party Congress were the
last major events on the party's agenda for 1976.
According to the party, the Sixth Congress of 1965 was
important because documents were approved tracing the fall
of fascism and pointing out the objectives for the working
class and for political development. Eleven years later
many of the party's goals for a "Democratic and National
Revolution" had been fulfilled. A democratic regime had
been installed, monopoly power had been destroyed, many
industries had been nationalized, an agricultural reform
had been initiated, the colon i al wars had ended,
independence had been given to the colonies, living
conditions had improved, and friendly relations with all
nations had been established. In the international arena,
conditions had also changed from the cold war to peaceful
co-existence. As a result of these developments a new
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congress was necessary to bring the party's program and
statutes into line with the changes. 35
The Seventh Congress (Extraordinary) of 1974 had not
been a normally scheduled one. Because there had not been
enough time to organize a full congress to deal with the
drastic changes that occurred immediately after April 25,
it had been necessary to hold an extraordinary congress to
address specific concerns. The Eighth Congress, held in
November, was to be the first ordinary congress since the
party went clandestine in 1926. The members formally
approved the party's analyses of the political changes
since the revolution and its policies for the future. The
only significant change at the Eighth Congress was the
increase in the size of the Central Committee from 36 to 90
full and alternate members, which was a quantitative change
rather than a qualitative or ideological one. 36
After the congress, the PCP became the first party in
the nation to form an electoral front when it created the
United People's Electoral Front (FEPU) to run in the
December 12 local elections. Officially the front was
created to allow MDP, Popular Socialist Front, and other
partisan or independent individuals to run on the same
ticket. 37 m reality, the front was primarily created to
increase PCP votes and influence in areas where it was
weak. FEPU also gave the party influence over many of its
non-communist partners. The elections were considered
important enough for the party to run the FEPU ticket
throughout the nation with the exception of two
municipalities and one parish where the local members
missed the deadline for the submission of candidates. 38
Now that the party had returned to a strategy of
attrition in post- revolutionary Portugal, expanding its
power base at the local level became very important. By
dealing with concrete problems at the local level and
producing tangible results over time, the party hoped to
gain the support and respect of local residents, especially
the peasants in northern and central Portugal.
According to the CC, the local elections were a great
victory for FEPU and a big defeat for the right. The vote
for FEPU, it claimed, reflected the people's unhappiness
with the PS minority government . 39 The PCP announced that,
in proportion to the legislative elections, the party
percentage of the vote in this election increased to 17.7
percent. In reality, because FEPU was an electoral front
and many votes went to the PCP's co-partners, the party did
not get that high a percentage of the vote but FEPU did win
more than 250 municipal assemblies
.
4 0
According to the PCP, as a result of the three
elections of 1976 and the implementation of the
constitution on April 25, the institutionalization of
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democracy had made considerable progress. The party's
goals continued unchanged: to end the threat to the
democratic regime from the reactionary and
pseudo-revolutionary forces and to solve the crisis which
confronted the nation. The solution could only come
through socialism, agricultural reform, and the
nationalized sector, not through bourgeois democracy. The
existence of bourgeois democracy controlled by monopoly
power was incompatible with free parties, unions, worker
assemblies, protests and strikes. Bourgeois democracy
would only result in repression and a new dictatorship. 4 !
The party added that it would work within democratic
means against any measures it considered contrary to
democracy or the workers' interests. A government of the
left should be composed of the PS, PCP, independents, and
the military. The party was especially critical of the
People's Democratic Unity (UDP) , which the PCP claimed was
trying to divide the people. 42 Because the UDP had been
the only Maoist group to get representation in the Assembly
and had been crucial in supporting Otelo's candidacy, it
was a real threat and was singled out by the PCP for
scathing attacks.
The PCP was also concerned with the "retornado"
(Portuguese-African refugees) issue and foreign pressures
to exclude communists from future governments. 43 The PCP
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argued against indemnification for landowners as a result
of the land reform because of the years of exploitation to
which the workers had been subjected. 44 Cunhal criticized
the national media as biased, declared that democracy had
not reached all regions, criticized balance of payment
deficits and austerity measures, opposed the law which set
the criteria for managerial purges, criticized economic
sabotage and capital flight, blasted the government's
foreign policy, supported the freedom to strike, and
criticized government alterations to the laws governing
strikes, collective contracts, and unions. 45
Post 1977: the Dual Strategy Continues
We analyzed in detail the PCP's tactics throughout
1976 as an example of the party's post-revolutionary
strategy. Although shifts and oscillations occurred from
1977 on, the party continued to pursue the same basic
strategy. A few individuals favored its transformation to
Eurocommunism but they were not in positions of power and
were easily dealt with.
The party analyzed the political situation in Portugal
after the 1976 parliamentary elections as entering a new
period in which the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy"
combined with the "antiworker and antipopular" stance of
the PS government. The PS faced a deteriorating economy as
a result of the improvement of workers' salaries after the
revolution, the accompanying increase in consumption, the
decrease in productivity, the decline in investment, the
downturn in tourism, the decrease in emigrant remittances,
the fall of agricultural production, and the absorption of
almost 500,000 refugees from Africa. The deterioration was
exacerbated by the increase in oil prices, and economic
stagnation throughout the world. Because the PS
implemented unpopular austerity measures in its efforts to
improve the faltering economy, it was accused of working
with the reaction. 46
As long as the PCP was not included in the government,
it would make it as difficult as possible for the PS to
deal with the crisis if the measures were contrary to the
workers' interests. Although it was committed to leave the
PS in power to prevent a further shift to the right, it
would only support those measures which favored the
workers. However, since measures which the PCP opposed
were usually supported by the PSD (PPD changed its name to
the Social Democrat Party at its October Congress in 1976)
and CDS, the PS minority government was able to continue in
power for 16 months. A majority was required to defeat the
government on a vote of no confidence which required both
the communists and the parties to the right of the PS to
vote together. Meanwhile, the PCP continued to criticize
the government's measures which often intensified the
divisions within the PS, a major rival that had potential
PCP supporters within its ranks.
The PCP continued its indirect support for the PS
government until August 1977. At that time the government,
passing a series of laws which the PCP labeled
counterrevolutionary, prepared to pass a law dealing with
agrarian reform that was unacceptable to the PCP. The
party's lukewarm support vanished, and it called for the
ouster of the government and new parliamentary elections. 47
Increasingly, the PCP insisted that the PS was allying with
the right against the workers. In October it continued its
calls for new elections and presented an alternative: a
government of "platform," to include the PCP, that would
move the nation back to democracy rather than the
capitalist recuperation policies which were unraveling the
conquests of the revolution . 48
After the First Constitutional Government's fall in
December of 1977, the PCP insisted that the PS form a
government of the left as it had been elected to do. The
PCP was willing to negotiate as long as the new government
created a platform which would respect the constitutional
institutions, maintain the balance between the public and
private sectors, and respect the workers' rights. 49 The
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PCP rejected the Second Constitutional Government, which
the PS did not call a coalition government, but instead,
one which included CDS "personalities," as incapable of
solving the nation's problems. The PCP was ready either to
participate in a PS government, an independent government,
or a government with PCP "personalities" to provide a
democratic solution. 50
After the collapse of the Second Constitutional
Government in October 1978, the party again called for new
elections or a new government of "platform" based on the
ten-point program which the PCP had presented in May. 51
Faced with the prospects of creating another unstable PS
government, President Ramalho Eanes, to the surprise of the
political parties, chose instead to create a government of
independents headed by Prime Minister Alfredo Nobre da
Costa. The PCP was cautiously critical of the Third
Provisional Government which it considered rightist.
Nevertheless, the party claimed that to prevent helping the
reactionary forces, it did not vote to defeat the
government
.
5 ^ The real reason was that the government had
been created by the president and the PCP wanted to keep in
good terms with him. 53 When the Third Constitutional
Government's program was not approved, the Nobre da Costa
government was dismissed. 5 ^
President Eanes attempted the same strategy when he
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appointed Carlos Alberto de Mota Pinto to head the Fourth
Provisional Government. Claiming that his program was
further to the right than the previous government, the PCP
rejected Mota Pinto from the start. It was more critical
of the Fourth Government than of any predecessor ones. It
also criticized the PS for accepting the program of a
rightist government. 55 It called for the government's
dismissal and insisted that the president schedule new
elections and appoint a caretaker government consisting of
the four major parties. 5 ^
After Mota Pinto's resignation in June 1979, the
president scheduled special elections for December 16. An
independent caretaker government under Prime Minister
Lourdes Pintasilgo was appointed to govern until the
elections. Although the PCP disliked her "rightist"
policies, it accepted her government to prevent a
government standing further to the right. 57
The PCP declared that the local elections of December
2 were a great victory for the new coalition ticket -
United People's Alliance (APU) , which was a reincarnation
of FEPU. 5 ^ The party claimed that its percentage of
electoral votes climbed to 20 percent. 59 Two weeks later,
in the special parliamentary election, the PCP was
surprised to see the rightist Democratic Alliance (AD),
consisting of the CDS, PSD, and the Popular Monarchist
Party (PPM)
,
gain a majority of seats in the Assembly. The
PCP declared that the AD was successful because it fooled
the people into voting for it and because the Union of the
Left for Social Democracy (UEDS) divided the votes on the
left. 60 It criticized the AD for intensifying the
capitalist recuperation measures and creating a new cold
war in its foreign policy toward the USSR. 61
By the summer of 1980, the PCP began preparations for
the regular parliamentary elections scheduled for October.
It continued to emphasize the need for unity of the left to
break the strength of the AD, and for not wasting votes to
the People's Democratic Unity (UDP) or other parties on the
left. 62 In September the party intensified its criticisms
of the AD government and called for its resignation. The
PCP was especially critical of the AD' s abuse of its
governmental powers to brainwash the voters. It was
sharply critical of the AD's control of the media and of
its increase in the minimum wage just prior to the
elections
.
6 ^
In the aftermath of the elections, faced with a new,
stronger victory for the AD, the CC made a general
assessment of the results. It concluded that the AD impeded
free elections by remaining in office during the campaign.
Rather than focusing on the AD victory, the CC emphasized
that the APU stopped the right from doing better in the
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elections. APU received 16.76 percent of the vote, a
decrease from 47 to 41 parliamentary seats. The AD's
majority increased from 128 to 134 seats, while the PS
maintained its 74 seats in the 250 member assembly. The CC
criticized its own mi spe rcept i on of the strength of AD
propaganda, and its declaration of the AD's inevitable
defeat prior to the elections. But it also announced that
the elections provided valuable lessons. The AD's policies
would justify the party's warnings of its capitalist
recuperation policies. As long as the left continued
divided the AD government would govern for four years. 64
After the legislative elections, the party's emphasis
shifted to the presidential elections scheduled for
December of that year. If the AD candidate Antonio Soares
Carneiro won the election, the victory on the right would
be complete. The PCP declared that an AD presidential
victory had to be prevented at all costs. 65 Although the
PCP insisted that Eanes was in the best position to defeat
Soares Carneiro, it presented the head of the PCP's
parliamentary group, Carlos Brito, as its own candidate of
"enlightenment." Because Eanes was not supported by all
democrats, and Otelo and Aires Rodrigues ran as candidates
to the left of the PCP, the party declared that it did not
have an alternative but to withdraw Brito' s candidacy just
prior to the first round. Instead it threw party support
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to Eanes to prevent a victory of the right. 66 Because
Eanes won with 57 percent of the vote in the first round,
the PCP declared that the presidential elections were a
victory for the left. The right's candidate received only
40 percent of the vote and Otelo only 1.5 percent. 67
With the elections over, the party intensified its
criticism of the government's counterrevolutionary
activities. The party especially blasted the AD's attempts
to revise the constitution. The AD wanted to decrease
presidential power, end the Council of the Revolution's
constitutional veto, place the military under civilian
control by shifting the appointment of military heads from
the president to the government, denationalize the
industries, and undo the agrarian reform. Because the
revisions could not be accomplished without PS support, the
PCP was especially critical of the PS. 68 To increase its
opposition to the right and preserve the conquests of the
revolution, the PCP supported a new wave of strikes. The
party insisted that the conditions for change were ripening
and that the government be dismissed and replaced with a
democratic one. 69
After Prime Minister Francisco Balsemao resigned in
August and President Eanes again selected him to form a new
government, the PCP became extremely critical that a great
opportunity to end the AD government had been lost.
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Because it had only been elected as a result of its power
abuse during the previous elections, because its
presidential candidate had lost, and because it was trying
to revise the constitution, the PCP questioned the AD's
legitimacy to continue its mandate. 70 It also criticized
the PS for allowing the AD to remain in power. The PCP
even chastised President Eanes and the Council of the
Revolution for misjudging the situation. Meanwhile, it
warned that the economy worsened and the strikes would
continue, and that the AD had relaunched its "subversive
coup" to end democracy. Because the changes which the AD
proposed and the PS supported were drastic and required
consultation with the people, the PCP insisted that new
elections be held. 71 On February 12 and May 11, 1982 the
party staged general strikes. 7 ^
In a brilliant tactical move, the PCP proposed to
Parliament a series of laws dealing with maternity,
including a law to permit abortion on demand. Because the
PCP had never shown great concern for any of these issues
beforehand, 7 ^ the proposals were obviously geared to create
divisions within the AD and destroy the alliance. Since
the PS was supporting the AD's attempts to revise the
constitution, the PCP also hoped that the proposals would
cause divisions within the PS. The laws might also
increase support for the party, especially from the
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young
.
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In June, the PS leader Mario Soares also called for
general elections after the constitutional revision and
announced that the PS would officially break relations with
the PCP as a result of the latter' s meddling in PS internal
affairs. 7 ^ The PCP denied the charge and criticized the PS
for waiting until after the constitutional revision to
bring down the government. The revisions passed in October
included government appointment of military heads and the
replacement of the Council of the Revolution with a
Constitutional Tribunal to judge the constitutionality of
legislation
.
7 f . ,
Increasingly, the PCP attacked the PS as a rightist
party, resulting in Soares' counterattack that the PCP
considered the PS to be its major enemy. 77 Although the
PCP denied the allegation, it was clear that the PCP was
trying to destroy the PS and attract as many socialists to
itself while encouraging the creation of a new, more
manipulatable party to replace the PS. This suggestion was
voiced after the December 1982 local elections and became
more commonplace throughout 1983.
The PCP analyzed the local elections as an important
victory for the left (the PCP received almost 20 percent) .
It announced that the PS electoral increase, from 26
percent to almost 30 percent, did not mean people supported
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the PS program but only that they were tired of the AD's
policies as also reflected in the large increase in
abstentions. The configuration of parties left a void
which could accommodate new parties to attract the support
of the abstainers. 78
When Balsemao offered his resignation to President
Eanes as a result of splits within the AD, the PCP
mobilized to prevent the creation of a new AD government.
It announced that the fall of the government was a result
of the workers' struggle. To appoint a new AD government
would be to ignore the results of the AD defeat in the
recent local elections. 79 As if to demonstrate that it was
a force to be reckoned with, the PCP continued its support
for strikes and demonstrations, while praising the
president's dismissal of the government and his call for
new elections in April 1983. 8 0
As election day approached, the PCP reminded the
people of its decisive moves which brought down the AD
government. Because the PS would ally with the right and
continue the policies of the AD government, it reminded
voters that a vote for the PS would not be a vote for the
left. 81 The party was extremely anti-PS throughout the
electoral campaign. 82 After the election the PCP again
declared a great victory for APU (it received 18 percent),
although the PS won a relative majority of the vote (36
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percent). After three years of rightist policies against
the workers, the AD had been defeated and the nation was at
the crossroads once again. The PS could choose to return
to democratic policies or continue the rightist policies of
the AD. 8 3
The PS rejected discussions with the PCP to form a
coalition government and instead formed one with the PSD.
The PCP criticized the PS and treated it as a member of the
right. To increase the difficulties between the coalition
partners, the PCP reintroduced its abortion proposal in
Parliament and supported strikes and demonstrations. 84 The
PCP maintained that unity must continue if the workers were
to prevent additional measures by the PS/PSD government
against their interests. The party continued to argue that
either the PS pursued democratic policies, which would only
be possible if Soares did not head the party, or new
parties would emerge to fill the void on the left. The
only solution to the economic problems would be to create a
government of "National Salvation" with the participation
of the PCP. 85
At its Tenth Congress in December 1983 the PCP divided
the reactionary forces' attempts to destroy democracy into
five phases:
1. attempts to profit from the November 25, 1975
"revolts" and install a new dictatorship were
unsuccessful because the constitution was
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successfully implemented.
2. the PS, PS/CDS, and Presidential governments
attempted the change through counterrevolutionary
legislation.
3. the AD attempted to implement a subversive
coup plan but failed after the defeat of itspresidential candidate.
4. the AD with PS support revised the
constitution but was then defeated by the
continued worker struggle.
5. the PS/PSD continued the AD policies. 86
The PCP also announced that Soares' candidacy for president
in 1985 was unacceptable and that he was a candidate of the
right. The party insisted that the PS/PSD government had
to be dismissed prior to the presidential elections. 87
Organization
.
The years which followed the November
coup attempt were very active years in its organizational
sphere. After months of expanding its membership during
the revolutionary period and allowing loosely disciplined
and ideologically diverse individuals into its ranks, the
PCP mobilized to strengthen the party's organization.
Strong organization was a major pillar of an effective
Marxist-Leninist party, it declared. After November 25,
the party had the time to insure that every cell and
commission was organized according to Lenin's principles.
With three major elections and a national congress to be
held in 1 976 and only seventy percent of PCP militants
participating actively within the organization, this goal
was considered especially important. 88
Throughout the year the attention which the party
placed on organization was obvious, especially in 0
Militante articles. According to the PCP, it had to end
the adventurous views which plagued many sectors of the
party. It had to erase ultra-leftist ideas and support
from the "cassette," the term often used by non-communists
to describe the pre-recorded minds of PCP members. The best
way to reach this goal was not to focus on ideology over
organization but to work on both simultaneously with
special attention to organization. Theory alone would not
help the organizational drive; concrete organizational
reality was more important. With a strong organization,
sectarianism would be eradicated
.
8 9
In order to achieve an organizational facelift the
party insisted that the members participate actively within
the party, attend meetings regularly, pay their dues,
recruit new members, and read the party press .
^
Organizational improvements required increased meetings at
every level of party organization, from the cell to the
Boards of Regional Organization (DORs) . The topics for
discussion were the party's program, statutes, and analyses
of the political situation in the long and short-term.
Organization meant the increased election of assemblies
secretariats to improve internal communication and
discipline. This would require the formation of new cadres
and qualitative improvement of existing cadres, especially
at the intermediate level. with an effective, strong
organization the principles of "democratic centralism"
could be assured; ideological purity would follow. 91
Throughout the period the party emphasized the need to
follow its members' progress so that they would develop
into good militants. The party was having a difficult time
holding on to new members, receiving dues from many, and
keeping track of them when they moved. 92 The party also
emphasized the need for the PCP to increase its revenue and
in 1977 launched a campaign to collect 50 million escudos,
in part to help the party build a new headquarters in
Lisbon. 93
Of high priority was the need to form new cadres and
follow their progress. Additional intermediate cadres,
which linked organizations at the bottom of the hierarchy
with those at the top, were especially lacking. By
intermediary, the party meant cadres who worked at the
municipal level. It considered the formation of
intermediate cadres essential to decentralize the party
structure and relieve the pressure on the District
Commissions which were not close enough to the people at
the local level to understand their particular problems. 94
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This would help explain the constant party attention
to developing Municipal Commissions. Since the party was
weak in most regions of the country outside the industrial
areas and the Alentejo, the Municipal Commission was its
link to the people and the small scattered cells. 95
Through the Municipal Commissions the party hoped to learn
more about the particular problems in a given municipality
so that it could elect individuals through APU to the local
government, improve the local conditions, and gain the
peoples' confidence. 96 Only by improving its image could
it hope to change the beliefs which decades of
anticommunism had instilled in local residents. 97
In addition to the focus on the Municipal Commission,
the party continued to emphasize the importance of the
factory cell - the most important organization of a
Leninist party. The PCP continued to espouse the
importance of participating within the cell and had several
campaigns to strengthen their organization
.
9 ^ Accompanying
the concern with the company cell, was an interest in
strengthening the links between the cell and the unions and
with the Worker's Commissions. The latter continued to be
valued highly because of their unitary character.
Another way to strengthen the party was to continue
its recruitment of new members. At the Eighth Congress in
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1976, the party declared that it had 115,000 members but
in terms of age, sex, or sectoral distribution, the party
basically remained the same. 99 After 1977 the party had
several membership drives which increased the party's
militant's to over 200,000 in 1983, excluding the 25,000
members of the Portuguese Communist Youths - JCP (the two
autonomous youth organizations, Union of Communist Students
and Union of Communist Youth, merged in 1979 to form the
JCP)
.
The drives always emphasized the need to attract
additional youths, women, and small and medium farmers
which portrays the party's weakness in those areas. 100 It
was clear that the PCP was especially concerned with its
inability to rejuvenate the party. 101 As early as 1978 the
two communist youth organizations claimed to have 27,000
members which shows the severe decline facing the PCP. 10 ^
A major issue discussed after 1975 in 0 Militante was
the importance of the "base" organizations: the grass-root
Popular Assemblies, Worker Commissions (distinct from the
party cells or party-dominated syndical committees in the
firms), Farmers' Leagues, and so forth. 103 Many of these
organizations emerged independently of the PCP during 1974
and 1975, usually with extreme-left support and
organizational help. Because they had much more internal
democracy than the PCP organizations, the party resented
the competition from the popular organizations; since
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populist views were often contagious, the grass-root
organizations made it more difficult for the PCP to
discipline its own members. 104
After the November 1975 setback to the extreme left,
the party saw its chance to infiltrate and control the base
organizations, which explains the party's increased
emphasis on them after 1976. With the December 1976 local
elections approaching, if handled correctly, the base
organizations could prove a valuable asset to attract local
votes. The official reason for infiltrating these
organizations (the party does not use the word infiltrate)
was that these non-partisan organizations provided an
atmosphere in which its participants learned the strength
and importance of unity. The organizations were an
important safeguard to insure that democracy continued in
Portugal
.
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The party continued to devote considerable attention
to the agricultural sector both in the north and in the
south. It called for an increase in the recruitment of
peasants to the party. Because peasants in the north had a
long tradition of individualism, self-sufficiency,
ant icommunism, and suspicion of organization, the PCP
emphasized the importance of forming Farmer Leagues. Small
and medium farmers would be more apt to join them than they
would communist organizations. The leagues were to give
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special attention to concrete problems and their solutions.
They were to improve marketing procedures, attain
fertilizer at favorable prices, and so forth. 106
In addition, the party organizations were to become
more flexible in their approach to the peasants. Realizing
that quasi-workers dominated in the north, returning to
work in the fields after a day at the local factory, the
party restructured its local organizations accordingly,
holding meetings at more convenient times, providing
transportation for those who lived far away, and so forth.
Because anticommunism was especially strong in the north,
the party organizations would have to adapt to the local
conditions, in extreme circumstances becoming
quasi -clandestine .107
In the south, the PCP focused on the problems
surrounding agrarian reform and on strengthening its
organization within the collect ives . 1 0 8 The party's
communique that every party organization, from the district
commissions to the parish commissions, had to devote one
of their best cadres exclusively to agricultural issues
shows the party's concern with this sector. 109
The party's Ninth Congress in late 1979 did not reveal
any major change in party policy except for an increase of
the CC permanent and alternate members to 133. 110 The
Tenth Congress of December 1983 also increased the size of
the CC to 165 with many young members to rejuvenate the
party. More significant was the creation of a 5 member
Permanent Political Secretariat which was headed by Cunhal.
It was rumored that the new secretariat had been created to
smooth the leadership transition whenever Cunhal decided to
step down, possibly resulting in a collective leadership.
The PCP also altered other leadership organizations:
increasing sizes, adding women to the Secretariat and
Political Commission (Politburo), and purging some
suspected "Eurocommunist s .
"
1 1
1
Many of the party's usual concerns continued
throughout this period. It called for an end to
sectarianism within the party, for the maintenance of
unity, for the avoidance of bureaucracy, 112 and for the
increased recruitment of Catholics. 113
Conclusions
.
The post-revolutionary PCP had
similarities and differences with the revolutionary PCP.
The party did not alter its long-term strategy for power
when given the opportunity to do so. Instead, it continued
to reject the Eurocommunist path in favor of the Stalinist
approach (see chapter eight for elaboration) . The tactics
and short-term strategies were adapted to the new political
situation, but the basic analyses upon which the orthodox
leaders based the nation's transition to socialism remained
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the same. Why the party did not change its strategy
revolves around the leadership's' backgrounds and their
social, economic, and political analyses of Portuguese
society which we will discuss in chapter eight.
Clearly the PCP recognized that the revolutionary
period was over. It found itself on the defensive in
almost every area of activity. Its influence within the
MFA, the news media, and government bureaucracy had been
sharply reduced after the November 25 purges. The MFA,
which was a last hope to rekindle the revolution, became
moderate and progressively relinquished its involvement in
politics. Nevertheless, the PCP continued its dual
strategy for power as a parliamentary and revolutionary
party
.
Within Parliament the party continued to criticize the
parties to its right and left, the governments' capitalist
recuperation policies, and their measures against the
working class, while simultaneously calling for a united
front government of the left with the PS. The PS, however,
looked to the right instead of the left for its alliances.
Nevertheless, initially the PCP did not antagonize the PS
minority government in hopes that it might one day convince
it to form an alliance. Not until August of 1977 did the
party stop supporting the PS and call for its resignation
from power. From that point on the PCP realized that an
alliance with the PS was not likely and focused its
attentions elsewhere. it also called for the maintenance
of a strong MFA role in politics. Like a democratic party,
it participated and tried to reap maximum advantage from
the elections.
Outside of parliament, the PCP was a conservative
revolutionary party on the defensive; it waited for
conditions to ripen so it could launch its offensive anew.
While it waited, it strengthened its power base through
various tactics. The PCP moved to consolidate the
conquests of the revolution. In the agrarian reform and
nationalized industrial sector the party braced itself for
the offensive from its right. It tried to expand into the
regions and sectors where it was weakest, especially the
north and Auronomous Islands populated by small and medium
farmers. Although its competitors on the right and left
launched an offensive against PCP-dominat ed unions, the
party counter-attacked and actually expanded its union
base. It used its influence to remind the government that
it could create an unfavorable labor atmosphere if it so
desired. Meanwhile, expecting that the PS austerity
measures would drive additional workers into the
Intersindical camp, the PCP minimized union offensives in
the late seventies. The PCP also improved its organization
quantitatively and qualitatively, continued to battle its
opponents on the left, and infiltrated all sectors of
society as it waited for a change in the political
atmosphere
.
Throughout this period the party continued to simplify
complex problems into black or white solutions. The PS was
either with the PCP and the people for democracy, or it was
with the PSD and CDS for dictatorship. Most problems were
analyzed in the "you are with us or against us" format.
The party's analyses consistently offered a one-sided
perspective. The elections were always analyzed from the
standpoint of the party, the left, democracy, or the
people. Favorable results were blown out of proportion
while unfavorable results were minimized, or ignored
altogether. The party read partisan conclusions into
elections which were non-partisan, such as the presidential
election of 1976.
But most of all, the party came to conclusions for
which it had little, if any, supporting evidence. The PCP
stated that the 1 976 legislative elections were a big
victory for the left and that the people voted for a PS/PCP
government; but one could just as easily have concluded, by
combining the electoral results of the PPD and PS, that the
elections showed a victory for the political center. How
could the party prove its conclusion that the electoral
shifts to the right in the legislative elections were as a
result of rightist propaganda and fraud? These tactics
portray how the party distorts its analyses to present the
results it would have preferred, rather than the results it
actually found. Of, course, this is politics, and parties
to the PCP's left and right carried out similar practices.
Increasingly, the PCP exploited its opposition status
to its maximum potential. The party's stance in
relationship to the parties to its right, including the PS,
became hostile. It was evident from the party's rhetoric
during the constitutional revision that it was not
interested in forming an alliance with the PS. By 1983 the
party was treating the PS as its primary enemy. Having
succeeded after the revolution in eliminating its
competition to the left, it was logical that its next focus
would be its other major competitor, the PS, on its right.
The goal was to weaken the enemy by portraying the PS
as an ally of the right. In this way the PCP hoped the
socialists would eliminate Mario Soares as their party
leader. The PCP also hoped to attract PS members to the
MDP or PCP, or to instigate splits within the PS. When
these strategies did not have positive results, the next
tactic was to encourage the creation of a new party or
parties which might offer a more acceptable alternative for
PS members than the APU parties offered. The emergence of
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the "Greens" and the Democratic Renovator Party (PRO) were
hoped to succeed in this role.
After every possible governing coalition was
attempted, the only untried alternative was a coalition
with the PCP. The PCP, however, does not really care for
parliamentary politics. It exploits its parliamentary role
as much as possible, but given Cunhal's disdain for
"bourgeois democracy" the party's ultimate strategy for
power is not parliamentarian. As stated before, the PCP is
a Stalinist party. Rather than play the Eurocommunist game
to slowly increase its percentage of the electoral vote, it
prefers to wait for the continued economic deterioration
and for conditions to ripen allowing a few more steps
toward socialism. Because in the past the PCP has always
profited most from backlashes to right-wing coup attempts,
the party hopes that deteriorating conditions will result
in a right-wing coup allowing it to renew its offensive. 114
Given that Portugal does not have a large middle-class to
support bourgeois democracy this would appear to be a
reasonable strategy. However, if the party maintains its
orthodoxy and conditions do not ripen in the short or
medium-term, the party's tactics will lead to disaster.
Already the party is failing to attract the young who see
the PCP as a conservative party unwilling to change with
the times. Increasingly, the PCP is concerned with the
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rising average age of its militants, which explains why the
party added many young militants to the CC and other
leadership organs in the Tenth Congress. The party is also
failing to attract women, as well as small and medium
peasants to the party, which together make up a majority of
the population. More intellectuals are leaving the party
than are joining it. In short, unless the party drastically
alters its strategy, in the long-term it is doomed to
become less significant.
For the present, the party continues to make good
showings in the elections and its influence in the unions
is crucial. The party's strength is based on the triad of
maintaining the nationalized sector, the agrarian reform,
and some worker control of the industries. If in the
long-term the party does lose influence, that would not
appear to effect the current leadership which preserves a
centralized Stalinist organization and Leninist view of
revolution. The role of the party is to patiently wait
until the conditions for revolution return.
Meanwhile the party continues to strengthen its
organization at every level and to infiltrate society. It
strengthens its hold on the unions through Intersindical
and fights attempts to create parallel organizations among
the workers. It continues to attack the country's
integration into the European Economic Community as well as
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the European Parliament. The party also criticizes every
government's economic program, as well as every agreement
with the International Monetary Fund. 115 The PCP continues
to hold large demonstrations and support strikes
(especially in the eighties) to make any government's task
that much more difficult.
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CHAPTER 7
THE PCP'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Although organizational strength alone does not insure
that any party will be successful in a society, it is one
of the most important factors in distinguishing a communist
party from non-communist parties in a nation's party
system. The strength of a communist party as compared to
other parties is largely a result of the organization and
internal cohesion which bind it together based on Lenin's
principles and often reinforced by a Stalinist view of
"democratic centralism." Therefore, in this chapter we
discuss the PCP's organizational structure from its
directive organs to the cells. We also discuss its major
leaders and important concepts such as "democratic
centralism.
"
The Organizational Structure
At the PCP's Tenth Congress held in December of 1983,
the party declared that it had a membership of 200,753
excluding the 25,000 members of the Portuguese Communist
Youth (JCP) . This was a significant increase when compared
with the estimated maximum of 3, 000 at the time of the
April 25, 1974 coup. The party's social composition
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consisted of 45.7 percent industrial workers, 19.8 percent
white-collar employees, 11.7 percent agricultural workers,
15.6 percent "miscellaneous" (domestics, artisans,
scattered professions, small and medium industrialists and
merchants, fishermen, and so forth),! 5.3 percent
intellectuals and technicians, and 1.9 percent farmers.
Age distribution within the party ranged from 1.8 percent
under the age of twenty, 23.7 percent between twenty and
thirty years old, 47.7 percent between the ages of thirty
and fifty, and 26.8 percent above the age of fifty. Of the
total membership 20 percent were women.
2
The membership figures publicized at the Tenth
Congress can only be accepted as a general measure of party
strength. Given the party's concern with members who were
not paying their dues (50 percent at the Tenth Congress)
,
for its inability to locate militants that had moved, for
the enrollment of individuals without their knowledge by
commissions wishing to fill their membership campaign
quotas, for problems delivering membership cards to its
militants, and for only three out of four of its members
actively participating in party organizations, the number
of militants which the party claims are probably
exaggerated.
3
The social composition statistics are equally
unreliable because of the categorization of its members'
professions. It is clear that many individuals classified
as workers ceased to be workers decades ago. Individuals
such as Dias Lourenco, Francisco Miguel, and Georgette
Ferreira have been party functionaries for decades and
should not, except in a very special sense, be considered
workers. Some individuals who are categorized as workers
might be better described as intellectuals. 4 Because the
party places so much emphasis and pride in being a
proletarian party, it is understandable that the PCP
portrays a majority of its members as workers. The party,
for example, considers white-collar employees to be very
close to agricultural and industrial workers, making the
party's worker majority 77.2 percent of its members. 5
The statistics also demonstrate the PCP's continued
problems in attracting women, the young, and farmers to the
party. Although women increased from 20.5 percent in 1979
to 21.6 percent in 1983, their membership still needed to
be increased to match their share of the population which
exceeded fifty percent . 6 The party had difficulty shedding
K
its conservative image which was not attracting the young.
It again increased the size of the CC, putting primarily
young members on it to eradicate the image that the
leadership organs were run by old militants from the
clandestine period. The party also continued attempts to
expand into regions where it was especially weak, such as
those dominated by small and medium farmers. Although the
party was successful to a limited degree, it was evident
that it still had much work to do to destroy the
anticommunist barriers which the years of dictatorship
built in those areas. 7
Organization
. Countering criticisms that the PCP is a
Stalinist party lacking internal democracy, especially
given its disdain for Eurocommunism, the PCP insists that
it is the most democratic party in Portugal. As proof of
this, it emphasizes its statutes, program, and internal
organization. The internal democracy, it claims, is at its
peak in the months preceeding the party congresses. The
party' s positions are discussed in advance at the lowest
levels of party organization by the militants who propose
changes and elect representatives to the congress. 8 in
addition, because the party claims that its directive
organs are elected from the bottom up, the members have
strong control over policies.
This is how the party claims its internal organization
functions, but it is just a facade for the top leadership
which bureaucrat ically controls the members from the top
down. Rather than the militants electing representatives
to the party congress (who elect the Central Committee,
which in turn elects the Political Commission, the
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Secretariat, the Permanent Political Secretariat, the
Secretary-General, and other directive organs - see figure
3), the top leaders have always directly and indirectly
controlled the selection of the directive organs, including
the Central Committee. Ever since its emergence from the
clandestine period, the orthodox leaders have controlled
the organization. Although new members who joined the PCP
after April 25, 1974 have been added to the expanded
directive organs, the ex-clandestine leaders have always
controlled the names of the individuals nominated for
leadership positions and continue a hierarchical selection
of reliable, orthodox leaders. A Eurocommunist tendency
exists within the PCP, but it is not allowed positions of
power as was demonstrated by the recent withdrawal of
Osvaldo de Castro from the Central Committee. 9
In keeping with the actual structure of the party, we
will discuss its organization not according to the official
bottom-up flow of directives, but will reverse the order
begining with the units at the top and working our way down
(see figure 4 ) . 10
The position of Secretary-General, which Alvaro Cunhal
has held since 1961, is the most powerful position within
the PCP. Although he claims to hold the position only as
long as he has the confidence of the members, it is clear
that his control of the party is firm. As in the past, his
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rule will remain unchallenged. The Secretary-General plays
a key role in formulating official PCP policies on the
evolution (or non-evolution) of party ideology and in the
selection of members of the other directive organizations.
The Secretary-General is the primary spokesperson for the
party and as such plays a major role by articulating its
policies at press conferences, through speeches, and often
as the official representative of the PCP to communist
parties in other nations. 11
The next most powerful position in the party is the
Permanent Political Secretariat. The creation of this new
organ was unexpected and did not receive much direct
mention within the party press. 12 The five member organ is
composed of Alvaro Cunhal, Carlos Costa (often considered
the second most powerful and one of the most orthodox men
in the party) , Carlos Brito (the third most powerful
communist and the leader of the parliamentary group),
Domingos Abrantes (in charge of the syndical sector), and
Octavio Pato (in charge of the party's functionaries). Its
major purpose may be to smooth the leadership transition
with emphasis on collective leadership when Cunhal decides
to step down. Given the expanding membership of the CC,
Secretariat, and Political Commission, the Political
Secretariat can also play an important role in centralizing
major decisions among a tight, reliable, orthodox group
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while allowing a facade that the leadership organs are
changing with the times.
The next organization in the hierarchy is the
Secretariat, composed of eight full and two alternate
members. It is responsible for the Commission for
Budgetary Control (Budget Commission), the International
Affairs Section, and the Information and Propaganda
Section. It directs the rest of the organization below.
The Political Commission (Politburo) is composed of
18 full members and seven alternate members. It is charged
with analyzing the political situation between meetings of
the Central Committee. It is also responsible for several
subordinate organizations, such as the Parliamentary Group
(composed of the communist deputies) , the Economic Affairs
Commission, Agrarian Reform Commission, Cadre Commission,
the Central Commission for Organization (with a subordinate
organization similar to the Regional Commission but
responsible for emigrants' concerns), the Ideological
Commission, the Syndical Commission, the Local Government
Commission, the Small and Medium Farmers Commission, and
the Information Commission.
Although the party congress is considered the supreme
organ of the PCP, it is not as all-powerful as claimed. It
is a ceremonial event which approves decisions made
beforehand by the top organs. Theoretically, the Central
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Committee governs the party between congresses but by the
time it analyzes the nation's political situation, these
organs have already made important conclusions. Although
it is the CC which elects those organs, including the
Secretary-General, the selection of its members is top-down
and has also been discussed beforehand.
According to the party statutes, the CC is the second
most important organ. It determines when party congresses
are to be held, including extraordinary congresses if it
feels that they are necessary. It is responsible for the
political, ideological, and organizational work of the
party. It oversees the selection and distribution of the
cadres, the implementation of policies, the administration
of the budget, the creation of the organs necessary to
effectively implement its organization, and the maintenance
of solidarity with other communist parties throughout the
world. However, in reality the CC is not as powerful as
the party statutes would have us believe, because the
decisions have often been passed down from the other top
organs . 13
The next level below the CC consists of 13 Regional
Organizations whose role is to direct organizational
activities for their region. Each of these organizations
is responsible for the hierarchical breakdown within its
own region. The number of these organizations has expanded
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to accompany the increases in party strength. Each
Regional Organization is directed by a Board known as the
DORs. The thirteen Boards of Regional Organization are:
Lisbon (DORL), Setubal (DORS), Porto (DORP), Leiria
(DORLEI), Santarem (DORSA)
, Minho (DORM), Tras-os-Montes
(DORT)
,
Beira Litoral (DORBL)
, Beira Interior (DORBI),
Alentejo (DORA), Algarve (DORAL)
, Azores (DORAA)
, and
Madeira (D0RAM).14 Each organizational Board is elected
by its Assembly (which is in turn elected by
representatives from other organizations below the Regional
Organization). 15 Some Regional Organizations also oversee
Coordinating Organizations and Special Organizations formed
to meet special needs. 16
Below the Regional Organizations are the District
Commissions which correspond to the political
administrative division within the country. In many cases
a Regional Organization also acts as the District
Commission (for example, Lisbon, Setubal, Porto, Leiria,
Santarem) if it encompasses only one district. In the
Autonomous Islands the District Commissions are called
Island Commissions. It is up to the District Commissions
to coordinate and oversee the activities of the Municipal
Commissions and other subordinate organizations within
their district. 17
Beneath the District Commissions are the Municipal
Commissions. As of the Tenth Congress only 53
municipalities lacked such a commission (although many of
the commissions which did exist were not functioning to
their full potential)
.
According to the PCP, the Municipal
Commission is of special importance to relieve overburdened
District Commissions of their responsibilities, and tighten
the party's links with the masses. Because party
organizations are few and weak in areas where the PCP has
the least support, the Municipal Commission plays an ideal
role in expanding party influence and coordinating activity
in those areas. There special attention is devoted to
creating cells in the important industries. 18
Beneath the Municipal Commission is the Parish
Commission. Many are still lacking in the weaker organized
areas of the nation. The Parish Commission is considered
especially important in organizing unitary Commissions of
Residents to deal with rental problems and other issues
facing residents. It is expected to play a key role in
expandng the party's influence in local areas by resolving
local problems. The support of recreational activity and
culture is seen as an additional way in which the Parish
Comission can expand the influence of the party. The Local
Commission and Zone Commission become important subordinate
organizations to the Parish Commissions where there are
large populations or large areas. In addition, the party
also has Professional Organizations (for doctors, lawyers,
and so forth), and Sector Organizations
.
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According to the party, the most important
organization within the PCP is the cell. All militants are
to participate primarily through the cell in their place of
employment. Any place of employment that is important or
has 100 or more workers should have a cell. 20 Cells exist
within the factories, offices, mines, ships, schools,
ports, warehouses, garages, cities, villages, ranches
(latifundios)
,
and so forth. Participation in neighborhood
cells is acceptable as long as they are not the militant's
primary cell of activity. When the cell reaches a size too
large to efficiently accommodate all of its militants
(usually 100 or more members) during its regular meetings,
the cell is divided further into nuclei. The nuclei are
usually based on the different departments or sections
within the firm. The various nuclei as a whole make up the
cell, and the "assembly" is the cells' superior
organization. Given the large size of the cell, the
assembly elects a secretariat to govern the cell and
maintain close relations with each of the nuclei. The cell
is to meet regularly to discuss the party's policies, and
to insure that its members understand and implement them. 21
By studying the problems which face the masses around it
and reporting these to its superior organs, the cell acts
as the ears and eyes of the party. It distributes Avante!
and other party publications, collects dues, and recruits
new members. 22
In addition to the party organizations discussed
above, we should also discuss party Work Centers which are
the social meeting places for all PCP members,
sympathizers, and
-friends." The Work Centers are
considered a very important aspect of the party's
organization for several reasons. They offer a substitute
for the cafe where workers can meet free of alien
influences. If militants socialize at the Work Center they
are more aware of important activities occuring within the
party as well as of the party's latest policies. The
Center also symbolizes the party by showing non-militants
the organization and strength of the PCP. The centers are
open to all who are friendly to the party, and act as
problem resolution centers as well as centers for the
recruitment of new members. 23
In addition to the party' s formal organization, as a
Leninist party the PCP attempts to control groups beyond
its reach by creating popular unitary organizations
(ancillary organizations) around specific issues. In many
cases these organizations are mere extensions of the
party's policies. In other cases, they are autonomous but
highly influenced by PCP members or sympathizers. The
Portuguese General Confederation of Workers (CGTP) -
Intersindical is a good example of such an organization . 24
It is the largest union confederation in the nation and is
clearly controlled by the PCP
. Additional examples are:
Portuguese Communist Youth (JCP),25 Democratic Movement
(MDM)
,
The Greens (Ecological Movement), Portuguese
Democratic Movement (MDP - its partner in the APU electoral
alliance), League of Small and Medium Farmers, 26
Portugal-USSR Association, Popular Collectives of Sports,
Culture, and Recreation, 27 and so forth. The PCP attempts
to influence through infiltration those organizations which
it does not create, and if unsuccessful, eventually creates
parallel organizations. After 1975 the PCP especially
focused on infiltrating grassroots organizations such as
Worker's Commissions, Resident Commissions, and Popular
Assemblies to reach individuals who did not normally have
contact with the PCP. 28
After 1975 the PCP, similar to other communist
parties, became increasingly bureaucratic as it expanded
its organizational hierarchy. Increasingly the party
became laden down with bureaucratic procedures; criticisms
were heard concerning cadres becoming sectarian. The
bureaucracy constantly screened its members for
information, not only to keep in touch with the views of
the masses, but also to keep track of what individual
members thought. An example of this is the informational
questionnaire which the party distributed to all of its
members
.
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Because the revolution was essentially over after
November 1975, the party focused on strengthening its
organization. It began by simultaneously improving the
organization from below as well as from above. At first it
focused on the cells at the bottom and on the Regional
Organizations and District Commissions at the top.
Although the cells were to be of concern every year with
various campaigns for their expansion and improvement, 30
within a few years the top organizations were succesfullly
organized and the party focused on the intermediate
organizations, such as the Municipal Commission . 31 During
the party's organizational drives after 1975, it stressed
the importance of not only creating the intermediate
organizations and cadres which were especially lacking in
the party's organizational structure, but also on the
importance of all organizations holding regular meetings,
assemblies, and strenghtening the cellular structure with
nuclei and secretariats if necessary.
Democratic Centralism . The PCP considers democratic
centralism to be one of its most important guiding
principles. It is discussed in detail in the party
statutes and is considered one of the PCP's pillars of
strength. According to the PCP, what makes it
organization more successful and stronger than other
parties' is its militants' adherence to democrat!
centralism. The PCP expects all of its members t
participate in analyses and hold extensive discussion and
criticism of the party's positions. It is upon these open
discussions that it bases its declarations - that the PCP
is the most democratic party in the nation. Full debate is
allowed while a decision is being made on policy but once
the directive organs have made a decision, the debate is
cut-off and all militants, whether they agree or disagree,
are expected not only to accept the decision but to defend
it in public with vigor. This is what the party considers
the submission of the minority to the majority. Internal
cohesion is an iron rule and intraparty divisions are not
tolerated . 32
Democratic centralism also includes election of all
directive organs beginning at the base and rising through
the entire hierarchy. The leadership organs must then
report their activity to the militants and listen closely
to the comments and criticisms of its policies. The
"centralism" is a result of the strong hierarchical
organization, the submission of the majority to the
minority, and the discipline and coherence which keeps the
party strong. The "democracy" is that all of the
directive organizations are theoretically elected from the
bottom up. m theory discussion is untethered within the
party, and the militants have total control of the
direction of the PCP.33
Theoretically, a major problem with democratic
centralism is that dissent is not allowed after a decision
has been made. It is difficult for a committed "bourgeois-
democrat to accept an organization which gives the
leadership such total control, even if theoretically the
militants ultimately hold the reigns of power in their
hands. Throughout time, leadership organizations (whether
public or private) have made incorrect decisions. During
the time many incorrect decisions were in effect, only a
minority's consistent struggle changed the policies in the
long term. Although communist organizations like to
portray themselves as infallible, they also make mistakes.
Because democratic centralism makes it much more difficult
for dissenters within the party to uncover and eventually
change the incorrect decisions, party mistakes are often
more disasterous. It is true that this type of structure
leads to the creation of an organizationally strong party
able to compete more effectively than other political
organizations. Whether democracy can survive such an
organization, even a Eurocommunist one, is the question.
To the PCP, the benefits of democratic centralism and
collectivism will always outweigh the loss of individual
freedom and "bourgeois" democracy. A "true" democrat is
less doctrinaire and more pragmatic. Somewhere a balance
exists and that should be the ultimate goal.
Although theoretically the party organs are elected
from the base up, in reality power is distributed
differently. Because the orthodox members have maintained
firm control of the party ever since they emerged from
clandestinity, because they create and present the list of
Central Committee and other organizational candidates to
the congresses and assemblies, in effect the leadership
knows the character of the organization even prior to the
elections. Debate is allowed within the party but the
topics to be debated are passed down the hierarchy and
placed on the agenda by the hand-selected leaders of each
assembly. While it is true that party policy is discussed,
especially before each congress, and that the militants can
be critical, they must first be recognized to speak; they
must deal with the pressure from fellow militants, from the
leaders of the assembly, and from the representative of the
superior organization who is present to keep discussion in
line with party policy and who pays close attention to
dissent and dissenters. After a few attempts within the
same or at different meetings to voice an opinion counter
to that accepted by the party, the average militant soon
learns that it is best to remain silent. Dissent is
recorded and one wants to avoid reprimands. The average
militant rarely questions the leadership's decisions
anyway. while theoretically debate is welcomed, it is as
much to see how the positions of the party may relate to
the concrete problems which the masses face and how to best
implement the decisions, as it is to keep track of
potential dissent and internal divisions. Votes via secret
ballot would decrease leadership control of its militants,
so elections are open to maximize peer pressure and keep
individuals in line.
Leadership
.
At the age of 73, after a long history of
participation within the PCP, Alvaro Cunhal continues to
hold tight control of his organization. In 1931, at the
age of 18 he joined the PCP while a law student in
Lisbon. 34 In 1942, he became a member of the Secretariat,
and in 1961 was elected Secretary-General of the party.
Cunhal played a leading role in the reorganization of
1940-41 which formed the basis of the PCP's present
character. As he labeled himself in his 1950 trial which
sentenced him to 11 years in prison for communist activity,
he was "the adopted son of the proletariat." Because his
father was a lawyer-painter-writer and Cunhal received a
Master's degree in law, his origins were neither peasant
nor worker but petit-bourgeois. He spent 13 years in
prison during eight of which he was in solitary
confinement
.
Although he is the most orthodox of the leaders of the
major Western European communist parties, he is not a
puppet of the Soviet Union as many claim. Cunhal strongly
believes in his orthodoxy. It is the similarity of his
views with the Soviets' which leads him to support the
Soviet Union, but not necessarily Soviet dominance over
him. He is not only a major leader at home, but also in
the international communist movement. His orthodoxy has
been especially useful to the Soviets in their struggle to
maintain cohesion in a movement threatened by division from
the Eurocommunists
.
To conclude that Cunhal is a Soviet
puppet is to ignore his independent decisions during the
Portuguese revolution and especially in 1975 when the
Soviets reportedly tried to slow Cunhal' s revolutionary
strategy because it ran counter to detente and other Soviet
strategies
.
In many ways Cunhal' s ideology is still locked in the
past. His perception and analyses of modern Portuguese
revolutionary conditions have not altered radically from
his experiences and analyses of revolutionary conditions in
the forties. To Cunhal, although some conditions have
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changed which require tactical shifts, the major conflict
is the same conflict which led to the creation of the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. The
world is still divided into two camps: American Imperialism
on one side, with its arms race, and the Soviet Union and
Socialism in the other, with its goal to achieve the
fullest of democracies. In those days Cunhal strongly
criticized Titoism as well as the experiments in
social-democracy being practiced by the Spanish and Italian
Communist Parties. To Cunhal there is no middle ground,
which helps explain why political analyses in Portugal are
in black and white that always reject a middle-ground . 35
Although Cunhal holds the reins of power very tightly,
he cannot lead the party alone. The orthodox colleagues
which he has carefully selected to help him control and
lead the party, come from a generation which was profoundly
affected by decades of difficult clandestine existence and
by long prison terms. In the last congress, Cunhal and
the most trusted of his comrades formed a new Permanent
Political Secretariat to help in the leadership transition
which will follow Cunhal' s eventual resignation. Carlos
Costa, the second of the five members in the Political
Secretariat, is considered by many to be the second most
powerful leader in the party and a possible successor to
Cunhal if the attempt to collectivize the leadership fails.
Costa is 57 years old and escaped with Cunhal in 1960 from
Peniche prison. He spent 15 years in prison and is
presently in charge of the local government sector. Carlos
Brito, the leader of the parliamentary group, is considered
a close rival of Costa and for that reason, although still
orthodox, he is considered to be somewhat less
conservative. He is 53 years of age and spent eight years
in prison. Domingos Abrantes, 51 years old, spent 11 years
in prison and presently is in charge of the syndical
sector. Octavio Pato is the fifth member and is in charge
of the functionaries of the PCP. He is sixty years old and
spent nine years in prison. Other leaders are also
considered important power brokers such as Sergio
Vilarigues, Blanqui Teixeira (in charge of 0 Militante ) ,
and Jorge Araujo, but the five mentioned above appear to be
in the best position to lead the party. 36
The PCP also has its share of political celebrities
who are very popular within and outside of the PCP.
However, popularity is not comensurate with power; many of
these personalities have either been dropped from
leadership organizations or never been allowed into them
for their suspected beliefs in Eurocommunism. Osvaldo de
Castro, for example, was a member of the CC but was dropped
from that organization for his liberal views. Apparently
he had been gaining too much individual support from
militants who belonged to the organizations headed by the
Leiria Board of Regional Organization. After being
nominated as a candidate from Leiria during the
Parliamentary elections on two separate occasions, and
being replaced by the hierarchy with a more orthodox
communist on both occasions, leaders higher up moved him to
a different region and dropped him from the CC . Other
members of the Eurocommunist "tendency" are Vital Moreira,
currently a member of the Constitutional Tribunal, and
Jorge Leite, a member of parliament. Although these
individuals are very popular, because their views are not
trusted by the orthodox leaders, they do not hold positions
of power within the organization.
Conclusions
The organizational structure of the party, the leaders
which control it, and democratic centralism are all crucial
elements in explaining the strength of a communist party as
well as its ideological line. The way in which it is
structured, compounded by democratic centralism, allows the
leaders almost total control of the entire organization.
This is the key to understanding why the PCP is not a
Eurocommunist party. What makes it different from the
Italian Communist Party, for example, is the leadership
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which brings to the PCP an ideological orthodoxy which the
Italian communists rejected several decades ago. The roots
of the PCP's orthodoxy and its comparison to Eurocommunism
will be the subject of the next chapter.
The organizational strength of the PCP gave it a
leading edge in the party system which developed after
April 25, 191 A. Although the revolution in Portugal is
over, the PCP is stronger organizationally today than it
has ever been in the past. Problems exist in the quality
of many of its militants, but overall the PCP remains the
strongest Portuguese party in organizational terms. Yet
organization alone and control of most syndicates in
Portugal does not make the PCP the party gaining the most
electoral votes. As long as democracy continues, the
electorate still determines a party's ultimate strength.
However, because the PCP has never expected to come to
power democratically, it is organizational strength, not
electoral strength, which it deems of value. This is
another reason for its divergence with Eurocommunists
.
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CHAPTER 8
IDEOLOGY: THE PCP, ORTHODOXY, AND EUROCOMMUNISM
In this chapter we discuss the PCP's ideology, and its
commitment to a Stalinist form of organization and Marxist-
Leninist path to socialism rather than the path which the
Eurocommunist parties have pursued. Because the PCP never
chose this path, the focus here is not on an extensive
discussion of Eurocommunism but on the PCP's rejection of
that position. A full discussion of Eurocommunism would
have to examine not only the roots of this variant of
communism but also the crisis which Eurocommunism faces
today: the French Communist Party (PCF) has moved away from
Eurocommunism, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has split
into three political groups, and the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) has lost electoral support despite its
Eurocommunist strategy. Although we discuss many of the
issues related to Eurocommunism below, a full analysis of
the variant would have to be more detailed and is not
necessary for our purposes in this chapter.
For almost two decades, scholars interested in
communism in general and Western European communism in
particular have discussed the impact of Eurocommunism on
western democracies and on the struggle to achieve
socialism in Western Europe. Although many scholars have
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criticized the inaccuracy of the term "Eurocommunism, - 1 in
Western Europe, the French Communist Party (PCF)
, the
Italian Communist Party (PCI), and the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE) are recognized as being or having been
Eurocommunist parties. Labeling a party Eurocommunist
generally means that the party has chosen a path to
socialism which differs from the path which orthodox,
pro-Soviet communist parties continue to pursue. Briefly,
the Eurocommunist party differs from the Marxist-Leninist
party in that it is often critical of Soviet policy as well
as the Soviet road to socialism. The Eurocommunist party
generally rejects long accepted classic analyses concerning
the path to socialism, including the "dictatorship of the
proletariat." It de-emphasizes the revolutionary conquest
of power in favor of the electoral and democratic
transition to socialism. It also de - empha s i z e s the
devotion to working-class interests, and instead broadens
the party's attraction to the expanding middle classes
whose votes are necessary for a successful electoral
struggle for power. Eurocommunism may also include a
liberalization of ' "democratic cent ralism . "2
The PCP's perception of Eurocommunism does not differ
from the above analysis. According to Cunhal, among the
major pillars supporting Eurocommunism are the "historic
compromise" and a policy of "national independence,"
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especially in relation to the Soviet Union. To defend the
PCP's independence, Cunhal argues that the party also
follows similar policies. The similarity of the PCP's
interests with Soviet interests are merely coincidental .
3
The PCP: A Marxist-Leninist /Stalinist Organization
Despite its disdain during the Seventies for
Eurocommunism when it was espoused as a democratic
alternative to Soviet-style socialism, the PCP rarely
openly criticized the Eurocommunist parties. Although the
PCP found itself on the defensive and was often forced to
justify its orthodox strategy, it preferred to avoid
discussions of Eurocommunism. When confronted, it argued
that Marxist-Leninist parties did not follow dogmatic
theory but adapted it to the conditions they faced within
their own nations on the basis of "scientific socialism."
It hinted that its fraternal partieswere still committed to
Marxism-Leninism but had chosen the Eurocommunist path as a
mere tactical shift to face the evolving conditions within
their societies.
^
The PCP used the same argument to deny that it was
copying Eastern European-style socialism. It emphasized
that Portugal had its own particular circumstances which
required its own unique approach to socialism: the approach
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which the party was implementing. Differences existed, but
because political democracy could not be separated from
economic, social, and cultural democracy, there would also
be many similarities in its transition to socialism. The
principal means of production would become the property of
all the people. Everyone would have a right to employment,
to an education, to health care, to living quarters, and to
rest. The exploitation of man by man would vanish. 5
Because ideologically the PCP has not changed
significantly since the Sixties, a discussion of party
ideology since that time will help us distinguish the
differences and similarities between the PCP and the
Eurocommunist parties. While tactics did change after
April 25, 1974, the party rejected a general ideological
shift toward Eurocommunism in favor of maintaining its
Stalinist organization and Marxist-Leninist analyses of
political developments.
According to Cunhal, the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship
would not be defeated as a result of its own internal
contradictions or international pressures but only as a
result of the people's struggle of which the PCP was the
vanguard. Because monopoly capital was more concerned with
exploiting national resources than modernizing the nation,
he concluded that Portugal would continue to be the least
developed of the Western European nations. The country was
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polarized, with monopoly capital and latifundistas on one
side, and the proletariat (industrial workers and rural
salaried workers), peasants (small and medium agriculture),
urban petit-bourgeoisie, some sectors of the medium
bourgeoisie, and intellectuals on the opposite side. The
unity of the latter democratic groups would lead to a
"Democratic and National Revolution" that would bring down
the dictatorship and destroy monopoly capitalism. 6
Cunhal emphasizes that the PCP is totally committed to
Marxism-Leninism, which provides the means to convert all
nations to socialism and resolve their gravest problems.
The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is a dynamic, flexible,
non-dogmatic ideology which embraces different socialist
tactics as the world continues to evolve. The reason for
Marxist-Leninist flexibility and applicability to nations
with varying conditions is that "scientific socialism"
teaches its disciples how to analyze domestic situations in
terms of an eventual evolution to socialism.
^
According to Cunhal, because monopoly capital still
dominates the economies and polities of Italy, Spain, and
France, the E u r o c o m m u n i s t parties adapted to
parliamentarian (bourgeois) democracy. In contrast,
monopoly capital and the latifundios were greatly weakened
in Portugal after April 25, 1974; so the PCP was not bound
by the constraints which led the Eurocommunist parties to
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choose the slow, evolutionary "bourgeois democratic" path
to socialism. The PCP's Marxist-Leninist path had resulted
in a radical transformation that not only altered the
political structures but also affected the socio-economic
structures. Because the level of economic, social, and
political development among the European nations differed,
the paths toward socialism also had to differ. 8
Since Portugal did not have a large middle class, a
Eu r o c ommuni st strategy which de - emph a s i z e d the
working-class influence in favor of middle class votes was
inappropriate. Because the largely agrarian society was
still moving toward development and industrialization, the
blue-collar worker was still a major force within the PCP
.
If the nation moved toward post-industrialization, the
party might have to consider broadening its electoral
appeal to the middle classes as traditional industries fell
into crisis, but that was not the case.
To Cunhal, underdevelopment meant that future
industrialization increases would expand the working
classes even more and polarize some of the political groups
which were allied with the workers during the first phase
of the revolution. 9 Nevertheless, the PCP continued to
espouse a wide basis of support trying to appeal to as
broad a mass of Portuguese classes as possible. Rather
than criticize the petit-bourgeoisie as a class and risk
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losing the bourgeois support it had, the party attacked
specific groups which were aiding monopoly capital and
latifundistas to recoup the losses of the revolution . 10
Underdevelopment, a high illiteracy rate, and lack of
democratic tradition were among the factors which convinced
Cunhal that western-style liberal democracy would not work
in Portugal. He insisted that to be similar to the other
Western European nations Portugal would have to reinstate
monopoly power, capitalist recuperation, and monopoly state
capitalism, which would run counter to PCP theory. Because
monopoly capital still dominated in the nations where
Eurocommunism had taken root, he implied that Portugal had
moved closer to socialism than had those nations. 1 !
The party's devotion to Marxism-Leninism portrays the
orthodoxy which Cunhal and his comrades at the head of the
party have. Unlike the party's early defensive arguments
concerning its rejection of Eurocommunism (because each
nation had to choose its own path to socialism according to
its domestic conditions)
,
by the eighties, when faced with
the limited successes of Eurocommunist strategies, the PCP
became offensively critical of Eurocommunism. Cunhal drew
lessons from the crises which struck the Eurocommunist
parties, and especially from the divisions which weakened
the PCE, to prove that the PCP was pursuing the correct
strategy toward socialism. He declared that once a
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communist party dropped its Leninist character to become
only Marxist, it was no longer a communist party but a
social-democratic party. Although Cunhal refused to label
the PCI, for example, a social-democratic party, he did
consider it heavily influenced by s o c i a 1
- demo c r a t i
c
positions. 12 Octavio Pato, one of the top PCP leaders,
criticized Eurocommunism as another bourgeois attempt to
divide the international communist movement. The
compromises which the Eurocommunist parties made in nations
still dominated by monopoly capitalism could affect their
ultimate socialist goal: to end the exploitation of man by
man . 13
At the PCP's Tenth Congress in 1983, the PCI
representative was the only one to be greeted with total
silence rather than a standing ovation, a sign of PCP
offensive criticism. With Eurocommunism in crisis, Cunhal
boasts that the PCP's own strategy has been correct all
along. Of what use had been the years of snubbing
proletarian internationalism, criticizing the Soviet Union
and other socialist bloc nations, decreasing the role of
the working class, and weakening democratic centralism?
After all of those years of reforming the parties' Leninist
character, the result had been a decline in their electoral
strength because of the prostitution of the party by
bourgeois politics.
^
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Cunhal insisted that the Eurocommunist parties should
not separate Marxism from Leninism. 15 Socialism could only
be reached through revolution and the vanguard of the
working class, which the Eurocommunist parties rejected.
They replaced the working class vanguard role with the
vanguard role of the intellectuals and urban bourgeoisie.
They rejected the worker-peasant alliance and replaced it
with an alliance of heterogeneous classes. Rather than
criticize parliamentarianism as the Leninists did, they
embraced "bourgeois democracy" and rejected the
revolutionary path to power led by the working class. In
many ways the Eurocommunist parties became similar to
social democratic parties. !6
Once a communist party diminished the role of the
working class, emphasized Cunhal, it began to revise
essential objectives, systematically criticize historical
experiences in the construction of socialism, and lose its
Mar xi st -Len in i s t character. To preserve the party's
working-class nature; its Marxist-Leninist ideology,
objectives, social composition, and structural organization
had to be preserved. The shift from the factory cell to
the neighborhood cell weakened the party's working-class
character. Because workers were less often affected by
adverse bourgeois influences than were intellectuals, a
communist party had to maintain a majority of workers in
441
its directive organs. Non-workers could develop a
working-class consciousness, but not as naturally as
workers . i^
Cunhal insisted that a communist party which was
influenced politically and ideologically by the bourgeoisie
lost its working-class character which was essential for
class independence. The adoption of reformist views, and
the break with the international working class and other
communist parties destroyed the independence of the
party. 18 He emphasized that like the Eurocommuni st
parties, the PCP also faced tremendous pressures from the
bourgeoisie to undermine its class independence. The
bourgeoisie wanted to destroy the PCP' s Marxist-Leninist
foundation by forcing it to abandon the six major
principles which the Eurocommuni st s abandoned. The PCP
refused to abandon its Marxist-Leninist character, its
friendly relations with the Soviet Communist Party,
proletarian internationalism, the preference for socialist
solutions to the nation's problems, democratic centralism,
or its praise for the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries
.
1 9
In his recent book, 0 Partido Com Paredes De Vidro
(The Party With Walls Of Glass), Cunhal discusses
Eurocommunism, Marxism-Leninism, and the comportment of the
ideal communist and communist party. He claims that what
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makes the communist militant and the communist party
different from other individuals and parties is their
"moral superiority, "20 their complete devotion to their
goal of socialism and the end to the exploitation of man by
man. This commitment, and the devotion to the collective
rather than the individual comes from deep within the
communist . 21
The party continued to draw from its past, and
glorified its role and experience during the clandestine
period as giving it the exclusive right to determine the
needs of the working class. It emphasized that a
Marxist-Leninist party needed to be quick and flexible when
it analyzed changes and implemented solutions, as was the
case on April 25, 1 974 and November 25, 1975. This was
part of the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist party.
Although the past was important, it was not more important
than the present. New problems often required new
solutions . 22
Eurocommunism In Crisis
One of the major criticisms which the Eurocommuni s t
s
face from orthodox communists as well as social-democrats,
and which they have not adequately resolved, is that their
rejection of Leninism, abandonment of the "dictatorship of
the proletariat," criticism of the Soviet Bloc, acceptance
of democratic habits, and so forth makes them almost
indistinguishable from social-democratic parties. 23
As discussed above, the crises which shook the
Eurocommunist parties in the eighties allowed the PCP to
become offensively critical of Eurocommunism. Despite
their compromises toward M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m , the
Eurocommunist parties seem as distant from power as does
the PCP. Of the three Eurocommunist parties, the PCF is
the least committed to Eurocommunism. It embraced
Eurocommunism from 1975-1978, abandoned it from 1979-1980,
and embraced it again from 1981 to 1984, only to reject it
anew. The PCF' s Secretary-General George Marchais'
approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a clear
break with Eurocommunism. In April 1981 the PCF vote
decreased by more than 25 percent of its usual showing in
the first round of the presidential elections to 15.3
percent of the votes and did only slightly better in the
parliamentary elections in June of that year with 16.2
percent. In the 1984 European Parliament elections, the
PCF vote decreased to just over 11 percent, and in the 1986
parliamentary elections, it polled only 9.79 percent. 24
In Italy, from 1977 to 1979 Eurocommunism's appeal
began to wane as the PCI saw its electoral percentages
decrease from 34 percent in 1976 to 30.4 percent in 1979.
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In the 1985 municipal and regional elections, the party
decreased from its 1980 showing and lost some of the major
cities, such as Turin, Naples, and Rome, which it had
conquered in the Seventies. Now lacking a charismatic
Secretary-General equal to Enrico Berlinguer who died in
1984, the rank and file is unsure of the PCI's direction. 25
As to Spain, the PCP has especially drawn lessons from
the internal divisions which the PCE faced in the eighties,
a culmination of internal divisions which had surfaced
years before. 26 Although Secretary-General Santiago
Carillo and his followers inched toward Eurocommunism over
the -last two decades, they maintained a Stalinist model of
organization and Leninist conception of "democratic
centralism." Their views were often not liberal enough for
the party's liberal Eurocommunist wing, the "renovators,"
who argued that the move toward Eurocommunism was only a
public relations gimmick. Because organizationally the
party was still dominated by Carillo' s autocratic rule, the
renovators insisted that the PCE had to overhaul the
party's organization, eliminate "Stalinism," and create a
new type of "democratic centralism."
Carillo' s transformation of the PCE to a Eurocommunist
party also annoyed the "traditionalists." Because of their
belief in democratic centralism and party unity, the
orthodox wing of the party reluctantly accepted Carillo'
s
embrace of Eurocommunism. However, they preferred a
Marxist-Leninist/Stalinist party with a decreased emphasis
on the parliamentary path to power and a return to the
party's original working-class ideological foundations. (In
other words, they preferred a party similar to the PCP)
.
In the long-term, the conflicts among these three
groups tore the PCE into three distinct political
organizations. The internal divisions destroyed the
party's unity from the leadership to the rank and file. A
party which had won 10.8 percent of the vote in 1979
decreased to only 3.8 percent in October of 1982. Although
its membership had risen from 15, 000 in 1975 to a high of
201,757 in 1977, it suffered successive decreases to 80,000
in February of 1985. It is estimated to have lost an
additional 10,000 to 12,000 members since then, as
individuals joined the political organizations set up by
the "renovators" and "traditionalists . "27
To prevent the "renovators" from contesting his
leadership at the PCE' s Eleventh Congress in 1985, and
substituting his pro-reformist archrival Vice-Secretary
General Nicolas Sartorious in his place, Carillo took the
initiative and resigned. In this way he hoped to choose
his own successor, Gerardo Iglesias, who has a strong
working-class background and was a Carillo loyalist.
Because Carillo and his followers would still be in the
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Executive Commission and Central Committee, he expected
that Iglesias would defer to him in major policy decisions.
However, Iglesias had his own solutions to the problems
which faced the PCE. He soon rejected Carillo's
paternalism and moved closer to the renovators'
positions . 28
The PCP's position vis-a-vis Eurocommunism was
strengthened when it reminded its members of the damages
that can occur to a communist party that ignores democratic
centralism by allowing internal unity to break down,
factions to emerge, and the bourgeoisie to influence its
policies. Because the factions within the PCE were not
dealt with immediately, in time they infiltrated leadership
positions and the executive organs of the party. Without
the strong unity and collective decision making which a
strong communist party needs, divisions emerge within the
executive organs. Once unity breaks down among the
leadership, the rank-and-file members reflect the divisions
and endanger the party's cohesiveness . 29 The PCE'
s
experiences must have influenced the PCP's decision to
demote followers of its Eurocommunist tendency at its Tenth
Congress in 1983. Even though the party knew the action
would lead to external criticism and rumors, occasional
speculation over a few individuals is better than allowing
them to become entrenched within leadership positions and
gain individual strength and support which would cause much
graver consequences in the long term.
The PCP is trying to prevent similar occurances within
its own organization. The autocratic leadership which
Carillo imposed within the PCE resulted in the
dissatisfaction of the "renovators." Because Cunhal is an
autocratic ruler himself, by turning to collective
leadership he is hoping not to personalize his rule so that
widespread dissatisfaction, if it emerges, will not be
focused on only one individual, It will be much more
difficult to replace an entire Permanent Political
Secretariat than one Secretary-General.
Collectivity and Collective Leadership
Since its Tenth Congress, the PCP has moved to
strengthen its organization by placing special emphasis on
collectivity. This move is supported by the party's
attacks against Eurocommunism which, in relaxing democratic
centralism and moving toward bourgeois politics, also
deemphasized collectivity at the expense of individuality.
Through its emphasis on collective leadership and
collectivity, the leadership hopes to eliminate any views
that the party or Cunhal is autocratic and Stalinist.
The PCP's conception of democracy is different from
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the western democratic tradition of individual rights.
Instead, the PCP focuses on collective above individual
rights which justifies its adherence to democratic
centralism and the new focus on collective responsibility
and leadership. At all levels of organization a new
emphasis on collective leadership, including discussions of
it prior to 1961 when the party did not have a
Secretary-General, appears to be setting the stage for such
leadership to replace Cunhal when he steps down. 30
However, even when Cunhal no longer is Secretary-General,
he will continue to monitor his succession through his firm
hold on the party as a member of the Permanent Political
Secretariat. It will be much more difficult for a
collective leadership to radically alter his legacy than if
one individual took the reins and, like Iglesias, turned
out different than expected.
Cunhal' s recent book appears to be preparing the
members for the future, as it smooths the transition to
avoid political infighting and sudden shifts within the
party, makes constant references to the collectivity as
opposed to individuality, refers to the Permanent Political
Secretariat as a collective leadership body, and moves to
create ideological purity within the party. Individual
experiences are important but it is their role as a part of
the party's collective experiences which count. 31 In
keeping with the emphasis on collectivism throughout the
party organization, Cunhal chastises the belief that
individualism is a sign of freedom. Because individualism
makes the individual a "slave to himself" and a "prisoner
of his own limitations," collectivity is true freedom. 32
Not only the PCP's collective experiences are important,
but also the experiences of the communist parties
throughout the world, which is another reason why a
communist party has to maintain links with its
"brothers .
"
33
The PCP has always maintained tight control of its
history and traced its policies to the past. The emphasis
on collectivity and collective leadership is not any
different. Cunhal insists that even while he has been
S e c r e t a r y - Gene r a 1 , the leadership has really been
collective. Because of the party's difficult clandestine
existence and the numerous arrests of its leaders, it
maintained a collective leadership after the 1941
reorganization. A collective leadership is strong because
it can maintain stability despite major changes within the
organization . 34
Cunhal emphasizes that a collective leadership helps
the party to continue its gradual change. In order to be
successful in controlling the change, such leadership has
to be flexible and adapt to varying conditions. This
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requires the connection of the entire leadership to the
rest of the party. It also requires the renovation of the
leadership with new blood. If change to the leadership
organs is not gradual, when the change comes it will be too
abrupt and all-encompassing. Older leaders have to make
way for younger leaders prior to their incapacitation by
old age or death. "The human being ages as a result of
natural law. The party must not age." 35
It is clear, therefore, that the PCP has no intentions
of abandoning its Ma r x i s t - Le n i n i s t ideology or its
Stalinist views. The Ma r x i s t - Len i n i s t party brings
together three distinct entities: the vanguard party, the
working classes, and the popular masses, and combines them
to prepare for the revolution. The reason why a
distinction between these three groups is often difficult
to uncover is that the masses, the working class, and party
militants are often indistinguishable, with a militant also
belonging to the working class, and an intellectual or
member of the middle class having a "working class
consciousness ."36
Conclusions
Even though the PCP is clearly a Marxist-Leninist
party, it confronts many problems also faced by the
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Eurocommunists and often applies similar solutions.
Despite its disdain for Eurocommunism, in many instances
political observers in Portugal have concluded that the
similar tactics are an indication that the party will
evolve toward Eurocommunism . 37 They po int/ for example, to
the party's strategy at the local level, which is designed
to attract new voters to the PCP by showing communist
"moral superiority" - their devotion to their jobs, their
honesty, uncorruptability
, and efficiency in meeting local
concerns
.
Given our discussions concerning the party's devotion
to Marxism-Leninism and its Stalinist organization, it is
clear that only in the very long run can we expect any far-
reaching change. The mere fact that a party resorts to
similar strategies or tactics in certain circumstances does
not mean the party is necessarily headed toward
Eurocommunism. The PCP has always emphasized its adherence
to international communism and the lessons which the
communist parties of the world have to offer each other.
It is no mystery that despite ideological differences and
varying conditions from nation to nation, many similarities
also exist.
Sydney Tarrow, for example, describes the problems
which the PCI encountered when its policies, which were
designed for the industrial north, clashed with the needs
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of the agricultural south. 38 The PCp ran infe0 similar
problems when it attempted to develop policies which would
harmonize with the industrial zones, the latifundio
dominated agricultural south (with land-holding patterns
similar to Italy's south), and the rest of the nation which
was comprised of minifundio landholding patterns by highly
individualistic, small and medium peasants. The party's
strategies were basically designed for the industrial
enclaves of the nation, especially around Lisbon and Porto,
and were then adapted to embrace a largely spontaneous
movement of farm occupations in what is considered the
agrarian "red belt" in the Alentejo. Although the party
did attempt to integrate the conservative northern peasants
into its socialist strategy, the policies were clearly
contradictory to the views of the conservative peasants in
the long term. The contradiction of imposing a "war of
movement" in the Alentejo and industrialized zones, and a
"war of position" in the north soon surfaced. 39 The
reaction by the northern conservative peasants was a major
factor in ending the revolution . 4
0
On face value, the PCP's courtship of the small and
medium farmer, of the small and medium industrialist and
merchant, of the intellectual, and of other groups which
belong to the middle-classes might confuse the observer
into asking how this is different from Eur ocommuni st
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tactics. The difference is that the PCP claims a majority
of its members belong to the working class from the rank-
and-file all the way up to the leadership organs. As a
Marxist-Leninist party the PCP insists that its work is
geared to helping the working class, which requires a
majority of its members to belong to the working class.
Once the party allows a majority of intellectual and
middle-class individuals to rule the party, it claims it
will be headed toward bourgeois democracy and
Eurocommunism
.
There are several reasons why the PCP does not have a
strong Eurocommunist tendency. The students of the sixties
who might otherwise have been attracted to Eurocommunism
were drawn either to orthodox communism or to ultra-leftist
ideologies. Because of the intense competition between
these two groups, there was little ideological space to
support a Eurocommunist view. Because the dictatorship
prevented knowledge of major ideological debates such as
Trotskyism, Titoism, and the Twentieth CPSU repurcussions
from entering the nation, the same debates which shook
other communist parties to their roots did not affect the
PCP. The party is so firmly dominated by old time
Stalinists that any E u r o c o mmu n i s t s or suspected
Eurocommunists are not allowed into positions of power. 41
The major reason why the PCP is the most orthodox of
the Western European communist parties can be traced to its
leadership. In chapter three we noted that, except for the
brief "rightward shift" from 1957 to 1961, the current
orthodox leaders have had firm control of the party since
the 1940-41 reorganization. The difficult life which they
experienced during the clandestine years, and their
confinement to long prison terms, reinforced their
unwavering commitment to proletarian internationalism and
Marxism-Leninism.
Because Spain is not radically different from its
Iberian neighbor, a strategy similar to Spanish
Eurocommunism could be applied in Portugal. However,
Cunhal and the top leadership have always insisted on the
PCP's orthodoxy as the only possible strategy given the
domestic political and economic climate. To support his
claim that Portugal is different from Spain, Cunhal
emphasizes that Spain initiated a political democratization
and liberalization but the change has not reached the
social and economic sectors as they have in Portugal. 4 ^
During Carillo's leadership from 1960 to 1983, the PCE was
as organizationally Stalinist as the PCP. Carillo,
however, used his firm control of the party to lead it
toward Eurocommunism, while Cunhal kept the PCP firmly
rooted in Marxism-Leninism. The splits which recently
weakened the PCE strengthened the PCP's orthodoxy, making a
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timely shift to Eurocommunism out of the question.
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CONCLUSION
Although studies of the Eurocommuni st parties (PCI,
PCE, and PCF) abound, systematic research on the PCP has
been largely ignored. A few journal-length articles focus
on the PCP's role during the Portuguese "revolution" of
April 25, 1974 to November 25, 1975; but analyses since
then have been short, sporadic, and confined to the
Portuguese newspapers. The fact that the party has
rejected the Eurocommunist path to power cannot justify the
paucity of research devoted to the PCP. Our goal has been
to fill this void.
As the various chapters demonstrate, this analysis has
been broad-based to contribute not only to a wider
understanding of the PCP's strategy for power but also to
the general field of comparative politics. This study
includes several levels of analysis beginning with the
comparative theory of political parties and the analysis of
the Portuguese political system before focusing on the
PCP's history, tactics, and organization. In the end we
return to the broader field of comparative politics by
discussing Eurocommunism.
The PCP continues as a force to be reckoned with
inside and outside of parliament. Outside it controls
several of the ancillary organizations as well as most of
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the unions, which gives it the strength to mobilize mass
demonstrations on short notice. Inside it has continued to
receive between 15 and 20 percent of the vote at a time
when the Eurocommunist parties have seen their electoral
percentages decline. For this reason alone an analysis of
the PCP's electoral success despite its Stalinist character
warrants closer examination. The PCP argues that its
success results from its rejection of the bourgeois
Eurocommunist path to power. Therefore, in the context of
Eurocommunism this analysis provides a different
perspective on the strategy which a communist party should
pursue in a liberal democratic regime.
Because the PCP has consistently played an important
role in Portuguese politics, this analysis also contributes
to our understanding of the political system in general .
We saw that the PCP's concept of power must be
distinguished from the concept which the liberal democratic
parties embrace. Throughout its long history the party's
tactics have accompanied the transformations within the
political system, but in the long run its ultimate goal
remains to seize control of the state and create an Eastern
European-style government. Its tactics during the 1974-
1975 revolutionary period failed; but the party, led by
orthodox, Stalinist warriors from the clandestine period,
has continued to follow the Leninist approach rather than
l 6 l
the Eurocommunist approach.
If the Eurocommunist parties were not currently faced
with their own crises, the internal and external pressures
for tactical changes by the PCP might be greater. But the
Eurocommunist tendency within the party has always been
weak and has grown weaker as a result of Eurocommunism's
recent defeats in other Western European nations. The
pressures for change have been diffused by the orthodox
leaders as they prepare for the gradual transition of power
from the "old" Stalinists to their hand-picked "new"
Stalinist comrades.
In the long term, the lack of change within the party
may lead its power base to gradually weaken as liberal
democracy becomes a tradition and the Portuguese abandon
the "static" party for parties which have adapted to
democracy, but we should not ignore the PCP's ability to
change tactics on a moments notice. It has done so in the
past and can continue to do so in the future.
The party is gambling that the political and economic
crisis in Portugal will not be resolved by the "system"
parties thereby strengthening the "anti-system" party's
appeal to the masses. As long as the PCP remains in the
opposition it can avert responsibility for the crisis. If
the problems eventually lead to a non-democratic solution,
the PCP is prepared to either play an influential role (if
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the solution is left-wing) or slip into clandestinity (if
the solution is a right-wing backlash by the reactionary
forces)
.
No matter what the future may hold the PCP will
continue its struggle for power regardless of the stakes
involved or the size of its power base. One of the party's
strengths has been its consistent resilience.
During the height of Eurocommunism (mid-seventies)
there was much discussion in scholarly circles concerning
the evolution of the Eu r o c ommun i s t parties. Some
questioned not in which direction they could change, but
how they could change. Can a party which considers itself
Marxist-Leninst abandon the characteristics which make it a
revolutionary party? If not, how can a party which
professes to be Marxist-Leninist simultaneously claim to be
a democratic party? Although the PCP asserts its
commitment to Marxism-Leninism, it denies this is
incompatible with liberal democracy. However, when
compared to its other tactics, its competition in electoral
politics and other democratic institutions is of low
priority. Power to the PCP is meaningless according to the
liberal-democratic notions of the word. By power, the
party envisions total control of Portuguese society. The
democracy it envisions is not liberal democracy, but
communist "democracy" which values collective rights over
individual rights.
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After April 25, 1 974 , the PCP's acceptance of
Eurocommunism was virtually impossible. As the strongest,
most organized party to emerge from the dictatorship, the
party had a clear advantage in the nation's politics.
Given the firm control which the orthodox leaders held on
the party, the PCP's strength vis-a-vis other political
parties, its respect among the people for its long years of
struggle during clandest inity , and the close relationship
which it formed with the MFA, it is inconceivable that the
orthodox leaders would have chosen any path which diverged
from Marxism-Leninism. Although the conservative north and
the Autonomous Islands would not have accepted communist
domination without a struggle, the conditions did exist for
the party to seize power by force. From a Marxist-Leninist
perspective, given the political situation (especially
after the left-wing backlash which followed the aborted
right-wing coup of March 11, 1975), the party did not
necessarily make a bad strategic choice. Although it
misjudged the opposition and strength of the conservative
north and the moderates, how could the orthodox leaders
have chosen any other path when power seemed so close at
hand?
While proponents of Eurocommunism existed within the
party during this period, they were few and were not in
positions of power. They could not have argued their case
when faced with a potential revolutionary situation. The
PCP's political competitors were the moderating forces to
its right, especially the socialists who preferred a social
democratic path to power, and the radicals to its left,
especially ext reme- le f t i st s who preferred increased
revolutionary activity. Because as Marxist-Leninists the
PCP leaders claimed to be revolutionaries, the major threat
was from the left. Increasingly, the PCP was confronted
with radicalism in its own ranks spawned by the activities
of the ultra-left. Indeed, if pressure was mounting for
tactical change, it was for increased radicalism to prove
to its members that it was as committed to revolution as
was the ultra-left. With orthodox leaders at the head of
the party and the threat from the ultra-left, moderation of
its policies to the right (Eurocommunism) was out of the
question. Although the PCP preferred moderated, controlled
revolution, not the anarchic type which the ultra-left was
bound to create, the clear choice was "revolutionary."
Because from the point of view of the PCP there were
so many advantages to support its tactical decision, it is
difficult to consider its rejection of Eurocommunism and
adherence to Marxism-Leninism as a mistaken move. If a
crucial decision had to be made, it was after the November
25, 1975 left-wing coup attempt abruptly halted the
"revolution" and not before. However, the party remained
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firmly in the hands of its orthodox leaders. They
continued as Marxist-Leninists in the hope that a society
which lacked a strong democratic tradition would return to
a potentially revolutionary situation. It was at that
point that the party gambled. The decision was to bluff
acceptance of the new democratic experiment while it
strengthened its organization and infiltrated society in
preparation for the next revolutionary situation.
Given that the PCP has not changed its orthodoxy, the
question then becomes: can it be expected to change? If we
contemplate how the PCP might change, in the short term
only the cosmetic type changes which it is currently
implementing can be expected. Because the current
Permanent Political Secretariat will continue to control
the party's direction for at least the next generation, and
the PCP's Eurocommunist "tendency" is not a threat, even in
the medium term little change can be expected within the
PCP. To change radically, the PCP would have to
qualitatively change its leaders, which can only be
expected in the long term.
We have concluded that as long as conditions remain
the same, the PCP cannot change. As long as the nation
continues its progress toward industrialization, broad
support for the PCP from blue-collar workers as well as
white-collar workers in the service sector (such as bank
tellers) will continue. The party is also entrenched in
the "red belt," among the agrarian workers of the Alentejo.
When combined with its domination of various ancillary
organizations, especially of the unions, the party is much
stronger than the 15-20 percent of the vote it receives in
elections. We cannot measure the strength of a communist
party that does not expect to come to power electorally by
electoral percentages alone.
Unless circumstances change radically and become
revolutionary, the PCP faces a long, gradual "war of
position" if it is to reach power democratically. Although
it has a stable basis of support among the groups mentioned
above, it will have to attract additional members and
sympathizers if it intends to reach power via parliament.
But the PCP is not dedicated to achieving power
democratically. It has never had a "democratic" tradition
and will not develop one in the short term.
As the past has shown, although the PCP likes to
portray itself as infallible, it does make mistakes as
proven by its tactics during the summer of 1975 and during
the presidential elections of 1976. It should not be
assumed that the strong control which the orthodox leaders
have on the party, the PCP's strong organization, the
control of a majority of the labor unions, and its dominant
position in many ancillary organizations makes the party
all powerful. As Annie Kriegel, an expert on the PCF,
points out, a party's strength is not measured by the
massiveness of its membership size but instead by the
homogeneity of its ideology, cadres, and organization.!
Because the PCP has a large membership which it has
succeeded in making more homogeneous over the last few
years, it is quite strong. However, the party has made
mistakes in the past and history often repeats itself.
Time is the party's enemy. The longer democracy
continues, the longer people will have to establish a
democratic tradition. With time, new generations will
become accustomed to liberal democracy and
parliamentarianism, which will force the orthodox PCP to
the political sidelines or to evolve toward Eurocommunism
(and face contradictions similar to those which the current
Eurocommunist parties face) . Every year democracy sets in
further. Although entry into the EEC and the European
Parliament may not benefit the nation economically, it will
help it politically by strengthening democracy.
However, because democracy is only twelve years old
and does not yet have a strong tradition, all hope is not
lost for radical change. 2 As long as the economic problems
and political instability continue, the PCP can still reap
benefits. If conditions get bad enough, the PCP hopes to
profit whether the reaction is from the left or the right.
After all, the party's major advances have been as a result
of aborted right-wing coup attempts.
Because time is running out for radical change, and
democracy is slowly becoming entrenched, the party must
make contingency plans in case conditions for revolution do
not return. The Tenth Congress of 1983 and Cunhal's recent
book 3 are laying the ground work for those plans. While
the party is not altering its orthodoxy but strengthening
it, the PCP is also aware that it must expand its influence
if it is to survive. Its members are becoming older, and
attrition will weaken the party unless it can revitalize it
with new blood. The party's focus on collectivity and
collective leadership and on gradually easing younger
"orthodox" members into leadership positions is surely
designed to deal with this crisis. The de-emphasis on
individual leadership is to protect the party from the
individual who appears to be orthodox but is masquerading
or has a change of heart once he or she reaches the most
powerful positions. The lessons of the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE) have not been forgotten. Collectivity gives
the party time to promote young "orthodox" leaders while
surrounding them with enough "old line" orthodox leaders to
prevent radical change should the former's theoretical
beliefs turn out differently in practice.
It is clear that these changes are only cosmetic. The
power is still held by the orthodox members as is evident
by their creation of the Permanent Political Secretariat as
the ultimate watchdog of the new "collective leadership"
experiment. This new organ will collectivize the
leadership, prevent radical change within the party, and
maintain firm control in the hands of the orthodox leaders.
It is no accident that all of its members are hardline
orthodox leaders who have played crucial roles in the
party's direction since the clandestine years which
followed the reorganization of 1940-1941.
The PCP is changing, but the change is organizational,
not ideological. It is strengthening its orthodoxy and
preventing a shift to Eurocommunism. In its favor it can
point to the current crisis of Eurocommunism and especially
the problems which the PCE has faced. Unless the PCP
radically alters its tactics in the long term, however, it
will not be able to attract new members and sympathizers in
the numbers needed to keep the party at its current level.
The party has already exhausted its easy supply of
recruits. Its increase from less than 3000 members in
April 1974 to 200,000 in 1983 was done in waves. In the
first wave were the sympathizers who remained on the
sidelines during the clandestine years. The second wave
was created by the revolutionary process which followed the
aborted right-wing coup attempt of March 11, 1975. The new
members joined because they believed the PCP was uniquely
qualified to bring socialism to the nation or because they
were opportunists who wanted to reap the benefits of a
party that was very powerful at the time and had many jobs
and services to distribute to its supporters. The third
wave joined the party after the November 25, 1975 jolt
ended the revolution and moderated the nation's politics.
Most of the new members had always been committed to the
nation's transformation to socialism, but had belonged to
extreme-leftist groups which disbanded in the aftermath of
the revolution. They found the PCP to be the next best
alternative for achieving socialism once hope of victory
via their parties was dashed. 4 The members from the last
two waves would be likely to support change within the PCP;
but as long as the orthodox leaders continue their firm
control of the party, change is impossible.
Already the PCP is failing to attract the youth to the
party. As long as it continues to attract a consistent 15
to 20 percent of the vote, internal repercussions will be
minimal. However, in the long term, if the party continues
to face problems attracting the youth and new members, and
if its electoral percentage falters, internal unrest may
begin. Its uncontested strength in the unions is already
beginning to waver. The PCP had always been very
successful in mobilizing members of the CGTP-Intersindical
for political strikes and as a show of strength. Until
about 1982, workers went on strike, slowdown, and so forth
without fear of reprisals. Since then, workers are more
cautious to follow Intersindical
' s "suggestions" for fear
that their jobs will be at risk. The party is still very
powerful in the unions but more cautious in mobilizing
workers for political protests through Intersindical. 5
Because the party refuses to change its
Marxist-Leninist approach to socialism, its conquest of
power in Portugal cannot be via parliamentary politics. It
will continue to participate in domestic politics, as any
other Marxist-Leninist party would, but that will not be
its tactical focus. For this reason, the size of its
electoral support or party membership will be of less
importance than the party's qualitative support. The
orthodox leaders would rather have a smaller party made up
of indoctrinated members committed to the party's
Marxist-Leninist tactics and "democratic centralism" than
to sacrifice the purity of the party for more members and a
larger share of the vote.
The PCP will continue to be a Marxist-Leninist party.
Comparable to Annie Kriegel's conclusions concerning the
PCF , 6 the PCP is and will continue to be a
"counter-society," a miniature Eastern European society
existing within a liberal democracy. Like the PCF, it
often sheds its skin by demoting, punishing, or purging
members who do not adhere to democratic centralism or do
not commit themselves to the collective rather than the
individual. This has especially been true since the
divisions which emerged in its neighbor the PCE.
Also comparable to the PCF, the PCP has an "inner
circle" and an "outer circle." The members of the
ancillary organizations, sympathizers, and other
individuals on the fringes of the party (including inactive
and less doctrinaire PCP members) form the outer circle;
and the active militants, cadres, and leaders of the party
form the inner circle. Because the members of the outer
circle are less dedicated than the members of the inner
circle, the party will dispense with the former if it finds
it necessary to strengthen its homogeneity and tighten the
circles . ^
As a Marxist-Leninist party, the PCP will continue to
pursue a "dualist" strategy for power, working within the
democratic political arena and outside of it
simultaneously. The party will be active in the "hard" or
radical opposition as illustrated by the "revolutionary
vanguard" role and Kriegel's "counter society." 8 It will
also be active in the "soft" or moderate strategic pole, as
illustrated by George Lavau's "popular tribune" function
(acting as the representative of the victims of capitalist
society) and as a participant in democratic politics. 9
These dual strategies often lead to contradictions in the
party's policies. The PCP, in fulfilling Lavau's "tribune
function," tries to represent the grievences of other
social groups as part of its tactical maneuvers to broaden
its support while playing the vanguard role of the working
class
.
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Figure 5. Hard/Soft Poles
Source: Adapted from Ronald Tiersky,
French Communism, 1920-1972
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), P. 368.
One of the major differences between the PCP and other
Western European communist parties is that the
contradiction between the parties' dualist nature in the
more advanced nations focuses on the party as a
revolutionary vanguard (because a revolutionary situation
is virtually nonexistent, especially as these societes
enter the post- indust r i a 1 phases). For the PCP the
contradiction focuses more on democratic politics because
it not only considers itself revolutionary, but still hopes
that revolutionary conditions will develop. Because the
PCP's rhetoric continues to be more revolutionary than its
activity, and because it attempts to prevent assimilation
into a liberal democratic system (soft pole) at the same
time that it participates within it, the PCP will find that
in the long term its dualist strategy will clash with its
revolutionary vanguard role (hard pole) if Portugal
continues democractic.
It will be interesting to follow the PCP's progress to
see if any shifts emerge in the very long term, as a result
of social pressure, or whether the current leaders can
preserve the party's orthodoxy. For the time being the PCP
is firmly attached to "democratic centralism" and is doomed
to future decay as it continues its "ordinary Stalinism. 1,10
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